Primary finding
Probable cause
The pilot's failure to maintain altitude/distance from obstacles during an IFR circling approach, and his failure to follow the instrument approach procedure. Contributing to the accident was clouds.
Investigator assessment
Analysis narrative
The private, instrument-rated pilot, was on an IFR cross-country flight, and had been cleared for a GPS approach. He reported that he was 5 minutes from landing, and said he was circling to the left, to land the opposite direction from the published approach. The traffic pattern for the approach runway was right traffic. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and the weather conditions included a visibility of 3 statute miles in light rain and mist; few clouds at 400 feet, 1,000 feet overcast; temperature, 55 degrees F; dew point, 55 degrees F. The minimum descent altitude, either for a lateral navigation approach, or a circling approach, was 580 feet, and required a visibility of 1 mile. The missed approach procedure was a right climbing turn. A circling approach north of the runway was not approved. Witnesses reported that the weather included low clouds and reduced visibility due to fog and drizzle. The airplane was heard, but not seen, circling several times over the city, which was north of the runway. Witnesses saw the airplane descending in a wings level, 30-45 degree nose down attitude from the base of clouds, pitch up slightly, and then collide with several trees and an unoccupied house. A postcrash fire consumed the residence, and destroyed the airplane. A review of FAA radar data indicated that as the accident airplane flew toward the airport, its altitude slowly decreased and its flight track appeared to remain to the left side (north) of the runway. The airplane's lowest altitude was 800 feet as it neared the runway, and then climbed to 1,700 feet, where radar contact was lost, north of the runway. During the postaccident examination of the airplane, no mechanical malfunction was found. Given the lack of any mechanical deficiencies with the airplane, it is likely the pilot was either confused about the proper approach procedures, or elected to disregard them, and abandoned the instrument approach prematurely in his attempt to find the runway. It is unknown why he decided to do a circle to land approach, when the tailwind component was slight, and the shorter, simpler, straight in approach was a viable option. Likewise, it is unknown why he flew towards rising terrain on the north side of the runway, contrary to the published procedures. From the witness statements, it appears the pilot was "hunting" for the airport, and intentionally dove the airplane towards what he perceived was an area close to it. In the process, he probably saw trees and terrain, attempted to climb, but was too low to avoid the trees.
Source record
Factual narrative
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On August 6, 2007, about 1255 Alaska daylight time, a Piper PA-46 airplane, N35CX, was destroyed by impact and postimpact fire when it collided with trees and a residence during an instrument landing approach to the Sitka Rocky Gutierrez Airport, Sitka, Alaska. The airplane was operated by the pilot as an instrument flight rules (IFR) cross-country personal flight under Title 14, CFR Part 91, when the accident occurred. The private certificated, instrument-rated pilot, and the three passengers, received fatal injuries. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed in the area at the time of the accident. The flight originated at the Victoria International Airport, Victoria, Canada, about 1100, and an IFR flight plan was filed. According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) personnel, the pilot requested the RNAV GPS 11 approach to Sitka about 1209 from controllers at the Anchorage Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC). About 1221, the pilot requested ceiling information from a departing airplane at Sitka, and was told that it was 1,700 feet msl. About 1229, the pilot was instructed to maintain at or above 6,000 feet until established on a published portion of the approach, and was cleared for the GPS 11 approach to Sitka. At 1236, ARTCC controllers provided the pilot with a special weather observation from Sitka at 1227, which included; wind 260 degrees (true) at 11 knots, visibility 5 miles in mist, and few clouds at 800 feet. The ceiling was broken at 1,400 feet, overcast at 2,300 feet, with a temperature of 57 degrees F, dew point temperature of 55 degrees F, and the altimeter was 29.87 inHg. About 1247, the pilot was instructed to contact the Sitka Flight Service Station (FSS). At 1247, the pilot contacted Sitka FSS personnel and reported that he was "inbound, GPS 11, circle to land, left hand pattern." The Sitka FSS specialist inquired if the pilot had heard the most recent automated terminal information system (ATIS), which was Hotel, and requested an estimated time of arrival. The pilot indicated he had the ATIS information, gave his ETA as 5 minutes, and said, "landing on 29." A Learjet medevac airplane was holding on the ramp at Sitka to depart on an IFR flight. The crew of the Learjet inquired several times from Sitka FSS personnel about the status of the accident airplane as it proceeded inbound on the instrument approach, as they could not depart until the accident airplane arrived. About 1257, Sitka FSS personnel contacted Anchorage ARTCC, and inquired if they were in contact with the accident airplane, and they said that they were not. Sitka FSS personnel began trying to locate the airplane, and received notification about 1303 that it had crashed in the city. Witnesses on the ground in Sitka, both near the harbor and in the city, reported that the weather included low clouds and reduced visibility due to rain. The airplane was heard, but not seen, circling several times over the city, which is north of the runway. One witness saw the airplane descending in a nose down attitude from the base of clouds that he estimated as 500 feet above the ground. Other witnesses saw the airplane descending at an estimated 30 to 45 degree nose low attitude, pitch up, and collide with several trees, separating the outboard portion of the left wing. The inboard section of the left wing separated from the fuselage just prior to the airplane's collision with a house. The first person to arrive at the crash site reported that the airplane crashed through the front door area of the home. The tail of the airplane was lying in the street, and the fuselage had penetrated the floor. A fire began near the left front portion of the residence, and electrical wires were alive and sparking. About 2 minutes after the crash, the fire spread throughout the house. An extensive postcrash fire destroyed the airplane. OTHER DAMAGE The residence was destroyed by impact and postimpact fire. No one was in the residence at the time of the collision. PERSONNEL INFORMATION Pilot Information The pilot held a private pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane ratings. His recent third-class medical certificate was issued on October 7, 2005, and contained no limitations. FAA records on file in the Airman and Medical Records Center in Oklahoma City, revealed that on the pilot's application for medical certificate, dated October 7, 2005, he indicated that his total aeronautical experience was about 1,200 hours, of which 150 were in the previous 6 months. The pilot's logbook was found in the wreckage, but it sustained extensive fire damage. The logbook had a page entry of about 1,800 hours of total experience, with about 1,672 hours as pilot-in-command. The pilot completed a flight review and an instrument proficiency check on April 16, 2007. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The six-seat, pressurized airplane had been modified under a supplemental type certificate (STC) for installation of a turboprop engine by JetProp LLC, Spokane, Washington. The engine was installed under STC ST 00541SE, on February 28, 2003. At the most recent annual inspection, the engine had 1,198.8 hours. Examination of the maintenance records revealed that the most recent annual inspection was on June 1, 2007. At that time, the airplane had 1,987.9 hours. In addition, a 100 hour inspection was completed on July 27, 2007, 10 days before the accident, at a total time of 2,042.3 hours. The most recent inspection of the pitot/static system, to include the altimeters and transponder, was on April 7, 2006. The airplane's instrument panel included, among other equipment, a Garmin GNS 480 communication and navigation unit, a GNS 530 communications and navigation unit, a Garmin MX-20 multifunction display with Garmin Chart View, which had electronic instrument approach charts and airport diagrams, a Garmin GDL-69 satellite weather receiver, a Honeywell KAS-297 altitude/vertical speed selector, an autopilot, HSI, and flight director with a GDC-31 roll/steering adapter that allowed heading selection from either the flight director or a GPS unit. In addition, the airplane was equipped with weather radar. Once programmed, the navigation and communications equipment was capable of flying the approach and missed approach profiles. For the missed approach, the pilot would have to select a vertical speed and altitude. Among other features, terrain depiction information, weather information, approach charts, and the airplane's flight track, were available for display on either of the communication and navigation units, and/or the multifunction display. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION At 1253, an aviation routine weather report (METAR) at Sitka, Alaska, was reporting, in part: Wind, 290 degrees (true) at 5 knots; visibility, 3 statute miles in light rain and mist; clouds and sky condition, few at 400 feet, 1,000 feet overcast; temperature, 55 degrees F; dew point, 55 degrees F; altimeter, 29.88 inHg; remarks, rain began at 1228. Several witnesses reported that the weather conditions included overcast skies, with fog and drizzle, and the visibility as low as 500 yards over the city. COMMUNICATIONS A transcript of the air to ground communications between the airplane, and the Anchorage ARTCC facility is included in the public docket of this accident. RADAR DATA In a review of continuous data recording (CDR) radar data, maintained by the Anchorage ARTCC facility, and recorded from the Biorka Island radar site, the accident airplane appeared to cross the Biorka Island VORTAC, and proceed to the HESOK FIX at 5,000 feet, which is the initial approach fix. The airplane made a left teardrop turn and flew inbound from HESOK toward the airport. Its altitude slowly decreased, and the flight track appeared to remain to the left side (north) of the runway. The airplane's lowest altitude was 800