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NTSB investigation record

ANC16LA054

Completed

De havilland Beaver dhc-2· N95RC

Date
August 9, 2016
Location
Iliamna, AK
Conditions
VMC
Record
Published September 25, 2020

Primary finding

Probable cause

The pilot's decision to perform the takeoff despite calculations showing that the distance available was inadequate, which resulted in impact with terrain.

Investigator assessment

Analysis narrative

The airline transport pilot of the float-equipped airplane was attempting a takeoff with the load of passengers that he had flown to the lake earlier in the day. The pilot's calculated takeoff distances for the water run and over a 50-ft obstacle were 1,050 ft and 2,210 ft, respectively. The pilot did not add a safety margin to his takeoff distance calculations. The approximate shore-to-shore distance of the takeoff path was 1,800 ft. During taxi, the pilot retracted the wing flaps, where they remained for the takeoff. GPS data showed that the airplane attained a speed of about 49 knots before impacting terrain just beyond the shoreline. The airplane's stall speed with flaps retracted was about 52 knots. Postaccident examination revealed that the left wing flap was in the fully retracted position; the right wing flap assembly was damaged. The airplane flight manual takeoff checklist stated that flaps were to be selected to the "TAKE-OFF" position before takeoff. Additionally, the takeoff performance data contained in the flight manual was dependent upon the use of "TAKE-OFF" flaps and did not account for no-flaps takeoffs. Even if the pilot had used the correct flap setting for takeoff, the calculated takeoff distances were near the available takeoff distance, and it is likely that the airplane would still not have been able to avoid a collision with terrain. The pilot stated that there was no mechanical malfunction/failure with the airplane, and he should have "done the right thing," which was to conduct two flights, each with a half load of passengers.

Source record

Factual narrative

GPS Download of Recorded Data A Garmin Aera 500, which was a portable GPS unit, was removed from the airplane by the operator and later sent, upon request, to the NTSB IIC. The GPS unit was then sent to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Division for the download of recorder data. The GPS unit can store a detailed tracklog including latitude, longitude, date, time, GPS altitude, and groundspeed information – within the unit whenever the receiver has a lock on the GPS navigation signal. All recorded data was stored in non-volatile memory. The first track point was recorded at 16:29:57 as the aircraft was shown in the water on the east side of the lake. By 16:40:44, the aircraft had turned toward a southwest track and began a takeoff run over the water. By 16:41:09, the aircraft had reached the midpoint of the lake and the groundspeed was 40 knots. By 16:41:18, the aircraft had crossed the lake's western shore and was near terrain at a recorded of 49 knots. At 16:41:51, the groundspeed was 0 knots. At 16:48:11, the last track point was recorded associated with the event flight. Figure 2: The figure is a Google Earth overlay of GPS data points showing a path toward the southwest. Presented data points located about in the middle of the path and lake show a speed of 40 knots and a data point over terrain near the southwest lakeshore of 49 knots. Effect of Flaps on Maximum Lift Coefficient Aerodynamics for Naval Aviators (January 1965) states: "In many aircraft the effect of intermediate flap deflection is of primary importance in certain critical operating conditions. Small initial deflections of the flap cause noticeable changes in [maximum lift coefficient] CLmax, without large changes in drag coefficient. This feature is especially true of the airplane equipped with slotted or Fowler flaps (refer to fig. 1.17). Large flap deflections past 30 to 35 degrees do not create the same rate of change of CLmax but do cause greater changes in [drag coefficient] CD. A fact true of most airplanes is that the first 50 percent of flap deflection causes more than half of the total change in CLmax and the last 50 percent of flap deflection causes more than half of the total change in CD. The pilot began employment as a pilot for Rapids Camp Lodge Inc in 2015. The pilot's resume showed two periods in which he was pilot flying DHC-2 float equipped airplanes in Alaska. The most recent was his employment as a Part 135 pilot from June to September 2014 flying DHC-2 and Cessna 185 float equipped airplanes, and wheel-equipped Cessna 206 airplanes. From June to September 2012 he was employed as a pilot for Part 135 pilot operator flying DHC-2 float equipped airplanes. The operator had no training records that were available and/or provided to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Investigator-In-Charge (IIC). The operator did not hold a Part 135 certificate and its operations conducted under Part 91 did not require an FAA approved training program and records of that training. The airplane was manufactured in 1956 and according to the airplane type certificate data information it was certified under civil air regulations (CAR) 3 and CAR 10. The airplane registration certificate was issued to the operator on June 22, 2000. The airplane had a supplemental type certificate (STC) installation for Aerocet 5850 floats (SA 01722SE), which was dated September 9, 2011, and a STC installation for a Kenmore Air Harbor gross weight increase (SA 4025NM), which was dated June 28, 2000. The Aerocet float STC had a flight manual supplement correction factor for takeoff distances. The Kenmore Air Harbor gross weight increase STC had no flight manual supplement correction factor for takeoff distances. The airplane was not required nor was it equipped with shoulder harnesses under CAR 3 and 10 certification standards. FAA airworthiness records, dated May 9, 2001, show that shoulder harnesses were installed for the airplane pilot and copilot seats. There were no shoulder harnesses installed for the passenger seats. Airplane Flight Manual and Takeoff Performance Charts The DHC-2 Beaver Flight Manual states that the cockpit wing flaps indicator is situated on the instrument panel and is marked: FULL FLAP, LANDING, TAKE-OFF, CLIMB, and CRUISE. Section 2.8 (f) of the flight manual, Takeoff Check, states in part: "Flaps – TAKE-OFF position." Section 2.9 (f), Takeoff, states in part: "Allow aircraft to fly itself off at 55 to 65 mph in a tail down attitude and climb at 65 mph. Flight Manual Takeoff Distance Chart The Operating Data Charts section of the flight manual provides takeoff distance charts for land and seaplane configurations. All the takeoff distance charts are based upon a wing flap configuration that is in the takeoff configuration. There are no distance charts within the manual that provide takeoff distances with retracted wing flaps. STC Flight Manual Supplements for Takeoff Performance The STC flight manual supplement for Aerocet floats states the correction factors to be applied to the seaplane takeoff and landing performance. At a gross weight of 5,090 lbs or less: water run – none, takeoff to 50 feet – add 50 percent. At a gross weight between 5,090 lbs and 5,370 lbs: water run – 15 percent, takeoff to 50 feet – add 70 percent. Approximate Flight Manual/STC Takeoff Distances The pilot reported that the airplane maximum gross weight was 5,370 lbs, and the airplane weight at the time of the accident as 5,150 lbs. The pilot reported that the winds were 240 degrees at 13 knots, gusts were 8 knots, and the outside air temperature was 15 degrees Celsius. Recorded GPS data shows that the altitude of the airplane at takeoff was about 950 feet. According to Aerocet, the approximate water run was 914 feet. The approximate total distance to clear a 50-foot obstacle was 1,989 feet. Airplane Stall Speeds Section 4.6.1, Load Factors, of the flight manual, states that the Section 4.10.1, General, of the flight manual states that the stalling speed with flaps up is 60 mph indicated airspeed (IAS) and with flaps "Landing" is 45 mph IAS. A stall speed of 60 mph is equivalent to about 52 knots. On-scene examination of the accident site by an FAA Aviation Safety Inspector revealed that the southwest side of the lake, at the shoreline, had an indentation from the impact of the floats. Approximately 100 yards to the southwest from the lakeshore was a small hill, just south of a small pond. The wreckage of the airplane was on the hill, angled down towards the pond, with the right wing of the airplane partially in the water. A trail of small pieces of fiberglass from the floats was in a direct line from the initial lakeshore impact area to the scene of the crash. An impact area on the edge of the hill showed where one float and then the engine had impacted, with the airplane coming to rest about 30 feet further, facing to the southwest. No fuel was present on the ground, nor was any fuel line broken open/separated. The fuselage was fully intact, and the wings were intact. The left wing appeared to be largely undamaged, except for the left float, which had broken in half and the rear half was bent up and had cut several inches into the trailing edge of the flap, about 12 inches outboard from the fuselage. The left-wing flap was in the fully retracted position. The right-wing flap was extended and was undamaged. The right-wing flap extension/retraction mechanism was broken off from the flap. The propeller exhibited damage consistent with engine power. On August 8, 2016, about 1651 Alaska Daylight Time, a float-equipped DeHavilland DHC-2 (Beaver) airplane, N95RC, sustained substantial damage during takeoff when the floats collided with the banks of Crosswind Lake, about 30 miles south of Iliamna, Alaska. The commercial pilot and three passengers sustained serious injuries, and three passengers sustained minor in

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