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NTSB investigation record

ATL07FA102

Completed

Piper Pa-32-260· N5595J

NTSB Report
Date
July 9, 2007
Location
Tyringham, MA
Conditions
IMC
Record
Published September 2, 2021

Primary finding

Probable cause

The pilot's inadvertent encounter with thunderstorms during cruise flight. Contributing to the accident was the failure of air traffic control to appropriately issue weather information and initiate an in-flight deviation around known and clearly observed weather.

Investigator assessment

Analysis narrative

During a personal instrument flight, the pilot encountered thunderstorms and the airplane separated in-flight over Tyringham, Massachusetts. The pilot obtained a preflight weather briefing and was also advised of a significant meteorological information (SIGMET) during the flight. Control continuity could not be established due to the fragmentation of the wreckage. However, the separation signatures were found to be consistent with the control surfaces being installed and operational at the time of the break-up. Examination of the airframe, flight controls, and engine did not reveal any mechanical anomalies. Review of air traffic control (ATC) data revealed that a relief controller had been briefed to turn the accident airplane due to weather; however, the relief controller failed to issue weather information or initiate a flight deviation around known and clearly observed weather, despite very little traffic and a light workload at the time.

Source record

Factual narrative

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On July 09, 2007, at 0808 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-32-260, N5595J, lost control and broke up in-flight over Tyringham, Massachusetts. The airplane was substantially damaged, and the certificated private pilot and pilot-rated passenger were fatally injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the personal flight from Wiscasset Airport, Wiscasset, Maine to Columbia County Airport (1B1), Hudson, New York. The airplane was registered to and operated by Hartley Marine Services Incorporated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. Personnel at the Bridgeport federal contract facility (FCF) automated flight service station (AFSS) reported that on the afternoon prior to his departure, the pilot contacted them to request predicted flight weather conditions for a 0600 departure from Wiscasset, Maine, to Columbia, New York, and a 1800 return flight. Bridgeport AFSS reported that the pilot was advised of potential marginal weather along portions of his flight route, and suggested that an IFR flight plan would be appropriate. According to personnel at the Bradley consolidated terminal radar approach control (TRACON), the pilot contacted a Bradley approach controller at 0748 to report that he was operating at 6,000 feet. At 0756, the controller asked the pilot "how's your ride at six?" The pilot responded, " the ride has been good, mostly light chop. We've had some light precipitation, but nothing at the moment. We may be getting back into here it's getting a little darker." The controller advised the pilot "extreme precipitations were off to the right side, about seven miles heading your way at thirty knots." At 0800, the controller then advised all aircraft that "hazardous weather information convective significant meteorological information (SIGMET) two nine eastern for Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York is available on hazardous in-flight weather advisory service (HIWAS), flight watch, and flight service frequencies." At 0807, the pilot advised the controller that he was "getting into it pretty good over here," and asked to "divert to the south." The controller approved the diversion, and advised the pilot to contact him when he was back on course. At 0808, the controller asked the pilot to report his flight conditions, and the pilot advised "severe." The controller then asked the pilot if he was able to maintain altitude because his radar showed that he was descending. Shortly thereafter, radar contact and communications were lost. A witness in the area at the time of the accident stated that he was outside in his yard when he heard an airplane engine "screaming." He recalled that it sounded like the airplane was coming straight down and ended with a "thud." He also said that at the time of the accident he heard very loud "thunder claps." He called 911, and first responders located the airplane across from the witness's home. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot, age 54, held a private pilot certificate with ratings for instrument airplane and airplane single engine land. His pilot certificate was updated on April 28, 2003. He held a third-class medical certificate issued on September 20, 2006 with limitations for corrective lenses. Federal Aviation Administration medical records revealed that the pilot reported a total flight time of 3,350 hours on the application for his most recent medical certificate. The pilot's logbooks were not recovered for review. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The six-seat, low-wing, fixed gear airplane, serial number 32-1062, was manufactured in 1968. It was powered by a Lycoming O-540-E4B5, 260-horsepower engine and equipped with a two bladed McCauley propeller model HCC2YR1BF. Review of the aircraft maintenance logbook records showed that an annual inspection was completed on June 15, 2006, at a tachometer reading of 3,495.13 hours, and an airframe total time of 7,110.68 hours. The airplane was not equipped with weather radar. A review of logbook records revealed that the last altimeter and airplane static system test, required by Title 14 CFR Part 91.411 for IFR flight, was performed on September 11, 2000. The regulation requires that the test be conducted every 24 calendar months in order for the airplane to be certified to operate in IFR conditions. Further review of the logbook records revealed that the last transponder system test, required by Title 14 CFR Part 91.413 for IFR flight, was performed on September 14, 2000. The regulation requires the test be conducted every 24 calendar months in order for the airplane to be certified to operate in IFR conditions. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION The nearest weather reporting facility, Barnes Municipal Airport, in Westfield, Massachusetts, reported that on the day of the accident at 0853, winds were variable at 3 knots, 1 1/2 miles visibility in heavy rain and mist, few clouds at 700 feet, broken ceiling at 1,800 feet, overcast ceiling at 3,000 feet, altimeter setting 29.95 inches of mercury. Remarks peak wind 020 degrees at 27 knots. Thunderstorms began at 0837 and ended at 0848, and rain showers began 0838. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The accident site was located off a private road in a wooded area, 20 nautical miles west of Springfield, Massachusetts. The debris field was approximately 3/4 mile in length, and 1,000 feet wide along a measured magnetic heading of 025 degrees. All flight control surfaces and airframe components were accounted for within the accident site area. The instrument panel and cockpit were destroyed and fragmented. The right wing was separated from the fuselage center section and the wing spar fracture surfaces exhibited signatures consistent with overload separation. The left wing was separated from the fuselage, and was located approximately 600 feet from the right wing. The wing spar fracture surfaces exhibited signatures consistent with an overload separation. The wing center section was located at the main crash site. Approximately 6 feet of the left and right wing upper and lower spar caps remained attached to the center section. The fracture surfaces on the spar caps exhibited signatures consistent with overload separations, with "S" bending. Both wing tips were separated from their respective outboard wing assembly. Ten feet of the outboard left wing, with the left aileron attached, was located near the main crash site. The left flap was separated and located in several pieces. Four feet of the right wing was recovered in the debris path, and the right aileron was recovered separately. The entire right flap was separated and recovered as a unit. The vertical stabilizer was detached from the fuselage and located in the debris path in two portions. The top portion of the vertical stabilizer had approximately one-fourth of the rudder still attached. The left and right stabilator tips had separated from the inboard portions of the stabilator. The left inboard stabilator half was separated as a unit with the anti-servo tab attached. The right inboard stabilator half was recovered in several pieces and the right anti-servo tab was also separated and recovered. At the main crash site, the rudder horn and stabilator balance bar were in place at the aft fuselage. Rudder and stabilator cables were traced forward from the rudder horn and balance bar to the forward fuselage. One stabilator cable was detached from the balance bar at the welded tab. The aileron cables were attached to the aileron bell cranks, which were pulled from the wings when the outboard panels separated. Control continuity could not be established due to the fragmentation of the wreckage. The engine was fragmented at the main accident site. All of the cylinders were separated from the case halves of the engine. The crankshaft was exposed and no signs of overheating or oil distress were noted on the be

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