CEN09FA086

The pilot’s failure to maintain clearance from the water. Contributing to the accident was the inadvertent encounter with instrument meteorological conditions.

The air taxi flight was en route to an offshore drilling platform to drop off passengers. When the helicopter became overdue for its routine position report, the company attempted unsuccessfully to contact the pilot through several means, including radio and telephone. The company conducted an aerial search along the route of flight; however, the helicopter was not located. The company then notified the Coast Guard of the missing helicopter approximately an hour and forty minutes after it became overdue. The wreckage was located 2 miles offshore in 13 to 15 feet of water, along the helicopter's route of flight. An examination of the helicopter airframe, engine, and related systems revealed no anomalies. Damage was consistent with controlled flight into the water. A cold front had just passed through the area several hours prior to the accident. Visible satellite imagery around the time of the accident depicted mid- to high-level cloud layers in the vicinity of the accident location. Breaks in the upper cloud layers depicted low stratus-type clouds within 15 nautical miles of the accident location. AIRMETS for instrument meteorological conditions, turbulence, and icing were valid for the accident area and route of flight. Cloud bases were most likely below 1,000 feet above ground level and visibility was restricted due to mist and possible light snow. The air temperature was recorded at 34 degrees Fahrenheit and the water temperature was recorded at 64 degrees Fahrenheit. There was no record to indicate that the pilot had obtained a formal weather briefing from a recorded source. The pilot held a commercial certificate and an instrument rating; however, he was not approved for instrument flight under Part 135 and was not current. At the time of the accident the company did not have a formal risk assessment program and a formal evaluation of the flight risks was not performed for the accident flight. The pilot normally flew a helicopter in which the flight tracking system engaged when the master switch was turned on; however, the accident helicopter required the system to be activated by a separate switch in the cockpit. This variation was not in the checklist. According to company records, the pilot had been flying the accident helicopter for two or three days prior to the accident. During this time there was no track record for the helicopter, which is consistent with the pilot not activating the helicopter's flight tracking system. The pilot, whose personal flotation device was inflated and secured, suffered severe chest injuries complicated by asphyxia due to drowning. Two passengers were secured within their flotation devices; however, neither flotation device had been inflated. Two passengers were not wearing flotation devices when they were located; however, two personal flotation devices from the accident flight were recovered and showed signatures consistent with use. One had been partially inflated, and the second had been entirely inflated. The 4 passengers suffered asphyxia due to drowning with probable complication of cold water shock and hypothermia. The investigation was unable determine if the company's delay in notifying the Coast Guard contributed to the severity of injuries in the accident.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On December 11, 2008, approximately 0730 central standard time, a Bell Helicopter 206L-4, N180AL, owned and operated by Rotorcraft Leasing Company L.L.C., was destroyed when it impacted water, six miles south of Sabine Pass, Texas, in the Gulf of Mexico. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The non-scheduled domestic passenger flight was being conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135, and was operating on a company flight plan. The commercial pilot and four passengers were fatally injured. The cross-country flight departed Sabine Pass at 0722 and was en route to, West Cameron 157, an offshore drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico. According to officials with Rotorcraft Leasing Company L.L.C. (RLC) the pilot met his passengers, all employees of Island Operating Company, Inc., in Sabine Pass on the morning of the accident. Witnesses observed the pilot preflight and prepare the helicopter for the flight. At 0725, the pilot contacted RLC Communications Center and filed a flight plan from Sabine Pass to West Cameron 157. The pilot reported that he had four passengers and two hours of fuel on board, and expected to arrive at the destination at 0742. RLC’s Communications Center provided flight following services for the accident flight. Company policy required that a 15-minute position report be made for every flight. When the 15 minutes had elapsed (from the time the pilot filed his flight plan until his anticipated position report was due) the dispatcher immediately began to look for the helicopter. She attempted to contact the pilot at the destination platform, and the departure location with no success. The dispatch supervisor was notified of the missing helicopter within eight to 13 minutes of the missed report. Company helicopters in the area were launched in search of the missing helicopter with negative results. According to RLC records, the Coast Guard was notified of the missing helicopter between 0912 and 0913. According to the Coast Guard they were notified of the missing helicopter at 0917. Recovery vehicles were dispatched, and the helicopter wreckage was located approximately 1100 and recovered to Broussard, Louisiana, for further examination. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot, age 43, held a commercial pilot certificate with helicopter and instrument ratings last issued on May 7, 2007. He was issued a second class airman medical certificate on May 20, 2008. The certificate contained the limitation “must wear corrective lenses while flying.” The pilot’s personal flight logbook was not located. According to the pilot’s resume he submitted to RLC in October of 2008, he had logged no less than 3,450 hours total time; 3,390 hours of which were logged in single engine helicopters, and 73 hours in simulated and actual instrument meteorological conditions. RLC flight records reflected the pilot had 220 hours of “offshore” flight experience. RLC hired the pilot on October 10, 2008. According to the company records, he received his initial training in October of 2008. Between the dates of October 13, 2008, and October 22, 2008, he had completed a total of 15.8 hours of flight training in the Bell 206 B and L3 models. The pilot’s airman competency and proficiency checks for CFR 135.293 (Initial and recurrent pilot testing), and 135.299 (Pilot in command: Line checks: Routes and Airports) were completed with a satisfactory rating in all tested areas on October 22, 2008. In addition to his flight training, the pilot successfully completed “Water Survival/Helicopter Underwater Egress Training” on October 20, 2008, at Acadiana Safety Association. According to the “RLC Pilot’s Monthly Summary” flight sheets, the pilot had flown 15.8 hours in October, 42.2 hours in November, and 19.1 hours in December. The pilot had logged no less than 77.1 hours in the Bell 206 while employed at RLC. During interviews with the director of operations, chief pilot, and safety officer, the pilot’s training, experience, and flight ability were discussed. It was elaborated that the pilot had good flight skills and demonstrated good situational control during flight. The pilot had not been involved in any previous events or activities that would have raised question as to his judgment or ability. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The accident helicopter, a Bell 206-L4 (serial number 52104), was manufactured in 1994. It was registered with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on a standard airworthiness certificate for normal operations. An Allison 250-C30P turbine engine rated at 650 shaft-horsepower powered the helicopter. The helicopter was registered to and operated by Rotorcraft Leasing Company, LLC., and was maintained under an approved inspection program. A review of the maintenance records indicated that the last inspection had been completed on November 30, 2008, at an airframe total time of 6,331.3 hours. The helicopter had flown 28.7 hours between the last inspection and the accident and had a total airframe time of 6,360 hours. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION The closest official weather observation station was Southeast Texas Regional Airport (KBPT), Beaumont/Port Arthur, Texas, located 21 nautical miles (nm) north of the accident site. The elevation of the weather observation station was 15 feet mean sea level (msl). The routine aviation weather report (METAR) for KBPT, issued at 0653, reported, winds, 300 degrees at 9 knots; visibility, 10 miles; sky condition, overcast 4,400; temperature 1 degrees Celsius (C); dew point, minus 1 degrees C; altimeter, and 30.01 inches of mercury (Hg). A special report was issued at the approximate time of the accident at 0736, which indicated winds at 300 degrees at 12 knots; visibility, 10 miles; ceiling broken at 1,200 feet, broken at 4,600 feet, and overcast at 12,000 feet; temperature, 1 degree C; dew point minus 1 degree C; and altimeter 30.03 inches of Hg. A review of the observations indicated that a strong cold front moved through during the previous evening producing instrument meteorological conditions with visibility restricted in light rain, mixed freezing precipitation that turned to light to moderate snow, which ended at 0612 with a dusting of snow reported. At the time of the accident, the low pressure system was located to the east in central Alabama with a cold front extending south-southwestward into the Gulf of Mexico, with northwest winds of 30 knots behind the front. The Aviation Weather Center in Kansas City, Missouri, issued the offshore area forecast at 0500 the day of the accident. The forecast for coastal waters, including the accident helicopter’s route of flight, predicted scattered to broken clouds at 1,000 feet, broken clouds at 2,500 feet, with clouds tops at 5,000 feet. The surface winds were forecast to be out of the northwest at 20 to 25 knots. Occasional broken clouds at 700 feet with visibility three to five miles in rain and mist were forecast. The National Weather Service also had a full series of Airman's Meteorological Information (AIRMET) current for the area. AIRMET Zulu for moderate icing conditions from the freezing level to 20,000 feet, AIRMET Tango for potential moderate turbulence below 12,000 feet, and AIRMET Sierra for instrument flight rules conditions with ceilings below 1,000 feet and/or visibility below three statute miles in precipitation and mist. Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) images taken at 0732 and 0745 depicted mid- to high-level clouds in the area of the accident. Breaks in the upper level clouds depicted low-level stratus-type clouds over the Gulf of Mexico in the vicinity of the accident location. A small band of stratocumulus was identified in the immediate vicinity of the accident site, consistent with that associated with more vertical development of clouds capabl