CEN09FA146

The pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane while flying at night in instrument meteorological conditions.

The private pilot, who had received his instrument rating about one month prior to the accident, departed at night on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. During the weather briefing, the pilot was advised that conditions would be conducive for icing with increasing cloud cover. The pilot departed and climbed to 6,000 feet mean sea level (msl), but about one hour after departure he requested 7,000 feet to get above the cloud tops. On arrival, the pilot was cleared to descend to 4,000 feet msl and to fly direct to the initial approach fix for the destination airport. During the descent, the airplane encountered instrument meteorological conditions. The cloud bases were at 1,100 feet above ground level (agl) near the accident site. Air traffic control (ATC) asked if the airplane was picking up ice, and the pilot reported that it was not. Radar track data indicated that the airplane started a right turn, and about one minute later the airplane was lost from radar contact. The airplane was destroyed by impact with terrain. Witnesses nearby reported hearing the engine running at a high power setting. The inspection of the airplane and engine did not reveal any pre-impact anomalies. The airplane was not certified for flight into known icing conditions. The airplane’s parachute system was not deployed, and the parachutes' safety pin with the red colored "Remove Before Flight" tag was found in the activation handle, still in the handle holder. The preflight checklist calls for the safety pin to be removed prior to flight.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On January 30, 2009, at 2144 central standard time (all times cst), a Cirrus SR20, N495LV, was destroyed during impact with terrain about 5 miles north of Menomonie, Wisconsin. The private pilot, two passengers, and a dog received fatal injuries. The 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight departed Sheboygan County Memorial Airport (SBM), Sheboygan, Wisconsin, about 2005 and was en route to New Richmond Regional Airport (RNH), New Richmond, Wisconsin. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The airplane was on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The pilot received a preflight weather briefing from the Lansing Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) between 1641 and 1655 on January 30, 2009, which was approximately 5 hours prior to the accident. After the briefing, the pilot filed an IFR flight plan from RNH to SBM, and he filed for a return flight to depart at 2000. The weather briefer indicated that “your return trip might be more conducive for icing…” as the cloud cover was expected to lower with the evening. The pilot acknowledged the briefer and advised he would check the weather before the return flight. The pilot departed RNH about 1745 and arrived at SBM around 1930. Fuel receipts indicated that the airplane was refueled with 18.7 gallons of fuel at SBM. The airplane departed SBM about 2005 and was cleared to 6,000 feet mean sea level (msl). At 2109, the pilot requested and was cleared to climb to 7,000 feet msl to get above the clouds. At 2134, the pilot requested and was cleared to fly direct to TADPE, the initial approach fix for the RNAV (GPS) RWY 32 instrument approach at RNH. At 2137, the airplane was cleared to descend to 4,000 feet msl at the pilot’s discretion. At 2138, air traffic control (ATC) advised the pilot that they were not receiving the airplane’s transponder code and requested the pilot recycle the transponder. At 2141, ATC advised the pilot that they were in radar contact about 3 miles northeast of Menomonie Airport, but it was not receiving the airplane’s Mode C altitude reply. The pilot reported that they were descending through 4,500 feet msl. At 2142, ATC asked the pilot if he was encountering any icing. The pilot replied, “Five lima victor is not picking up any ice at this point.” ATC advised the pilot that about 30 – 40 miles north of Minneapolis there were reports of moderate icing between 3,000 – 4,000 feet msl. At 2143, the pilot stated, “Okay, we’ll keep our eyes open. Thanks." There were no further radio transmissions from N495LV. Radar track data indicated that at 2143 the airplane was flying in a north, northwest direction and crossed the Red Cedar River about a half mile south of the accident site. The track data indicated that the airplane entered a right turn. The last radar return at 2144 was approximately one half mile to the northwest of the accident site. There were no altitude indications since the radar was not receiving the transponder’s Mode C reply. The airplane impacted a field and traveled about 100 feet prior to entering a tree filled ravine. A witness reported seeing aircraft beacon lights traveling at what he described as “impossibly fast.” He stated that he “heard what sounded like a smoothly running piston engine at high RPM’s.” He observed a fireball after the airplane lights disappeared below the white pines on the opposite shore. Another witness reported that he heard the sound of a "high pitched engine running at high speed" just prior to seeing a flash of light outside his house, followed by a loud "thump" which shook his house. He stated that the engine sounded like it was at “full power.” A third witness reported seeing an airplane's red and green navigation lights that were parallel to the horizon for about 2 seconds before it disappeared behind a tree line. About 2 seconds later, he saw the flash of a fireball that lit up the horizon for about a second. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The 51-year-old private pilot held single-engine land and sea ratings, and an airplane instrument rating. He held a third class medical certificate, which was issued on January 30, 2009, with the limitation, "Holder shall possess glasses that correct for near vision." The pilot's logbook indicated that he had a total of 440 flight hours. He began his flight training in February 2005. He received his private pilot's certificate on June 5, 2006, and his single-engine airplane sea rating on October 6, 2008. The pilot received his airplane instrument rating on December 20, 2008. The pilot received 13.2 hours of flight training in a Cirrus SR22 from October 10 - 12, 2008. The flight training was conducted at the UND Aerospace Factory Training Center in Duluth, Minnesota, when he participated in the “Cirrus Factory Transition Training – VFR” course. The pilot flew an additional 45.6 hours in a SR22 from October 12 - December 31, 2008. He flew 22 hours in the accident airplane, all of which was logged since January 1, 2009. The pilot logged about 19 hours of actual instrument flight and 16 hours of night flight since November 25, 2008. The pilot’s logbook indicated that the pilot had made the round trip from RNH to SBM two times in January prior to the accident flight. Both return flights to RNH were at night. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The airplane was a single-engine Cirrus SR20, serial number 1223, with a Continental 210-horsepower IO-360-ES engine. The airplane was manufactured in June 2002 with an original registration number of N856CD. It was exported to Canada on February 23, 2007, with a total airframe time of 236.7 hours. It was reintroduced back into the United States in the fall of 2008 with a total time of 576.2 hours. The pilot purchased the accident airplane on November 3, 2008, and had the registration "N" number on the airplane changed to N495LV. The engine was overhauled on December 3, 2008, and was reinstalled on the airplane. The last annual maintenance inspection was conducted on December 18, 2008, with a total of 576.2 hours. The total time on the airplane at the time of the accident was about 611 hours. The airplane was equipped with traditional analog flight instruments such as an altimeter, airspeed indicator, vertical speed indicator, attitude gyro, and magnetic compass. It had an Avidyne FlightMax Multi-Function Display (MFD) and a Sandel Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI). The avionics package included a Garmin GNS 430 and a Garmin GNC 420 global positioning system (GPS) communication and navigational radios. It also had a Stec System 30 autopilot/turn coordinator, altitude transducer, and pitch computer. The airplane was equipped with a Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS), which is a whole airplane emergency parachute system. The limitations section of the Pilot Operating Handbook stated that “Flight into known icing is prohibited.” The airplane was equipped with a single Garmin GTX-327 ATC Mode C (identification and altitude) transponder with squawk capability. The transponder had four modes: OFF, STBY, ON, and ALT. With the transponder in the ON mode, the transponder replies to interrogations, but it does not include altitude information (Mode A). In ALT mode, the transponder replies to identification and altitude interrogations. Replies to altitude interrogations include the standard pressure altitude received from an external altitude source, which is not adjusted for barometric pressure (Mode A and Mode C). Any time the function ON or ALT is selected the transponder becomes an active part of the Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS). METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION The National Weather Service (NWS) Weather Depiction Chart for 2200 indicated that the accident site bordered an area of instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions, and was within the area depicted by MVFR conditions. Th