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NTSB investigation record

CEN10FA027

Completed

Commander Aircraft Company 114-b· N6025U

Date
October 23, 2009
Location
Adrian, MI
Conditions
IMC
Record
Published September 25, 2020

Primary finding

Probable cause

The pilot did not maintain control of the airplane due to spatial disorientation while on an instrument approach in instrument meteorological conditions.

Investigator assessment

Analysis narrative

The air traffic controller cleared the flight for a non-precision instrument approach and provided vectors to an intermediate fix located on the inbound course for the airport, which was reporting a ceiling of 700 feet above ground level. Radar track data revealed that, as the airplane proceeded on the inbound approach segment from the intermediate fix toward the final approach fix, there were significant heading changes and large altitude fluctuations, including rapid ascents and descents. As the airplane neared the final approach fix, instead of proceeding straight on the inbound course as called for by the approach procedure, it entered a left descending turn during which the rate of descent increased to 3,600 feet per minute. A witness reported hearing an airplane circle above his residence at a low altitude, but was unable to see the airplane due to a low cloud ceiling and limited ground visibility. He subsequently saw the airplane in a descent, about 200 to 300 feet above the ground, when the left wing separated from the fuselage. Another witness reported seeing the airplane rolling clockwise in a 45-degree nose-low descent before the left wing separated from the airplane. Neither witness reported seeing any smoke or fire until after the airplane collided with terrain. The postaccident examination did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Additionally, the left wing main spar exhibited upward deformation consistent with an overload separation during flight. Pilots are vulnerable to spatial disorientation if they do not properly rely on cockpit instrumentation to maintain basic orientation while operating in instrument meteorological conditions. Because the airplane was in an overcast cloud layer throughout the instrument approach, the pilot lacked a discernible horizon; therefore, he would likely have been susceptible to spatial disorientation. The radar flight path and witness observations were consistent with the pilot becoming spatially disorientated and losing control of the airplane.

Source record

Factual narrative

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On October 23, 2009, at 1631 eastern daylight time, a Commander Aircraft Company model 114-B airplane, N6025U, was substantially damaged when it collided with terrain following a loss of control near Adrian, Michigan. A postimpact fire ensued that consumed a majority of the fuselage. The private pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by DEM Enterprises, LLC, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Day instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight that was operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The personal flight departed Wilkes-Barre/Scranton International Airport (KAVP), Scranton, Pennsylvania, at 1329 and was on an instrument approach to Lenawee County Airport (KADG), Adrian, Michigan, when the accident occurred. At 1246, the pilot filed an IFR flight plan through a direct user access terminal service (DUATS) provider. The filed flight plan was from KAVP to Ann Arbor Municipal Airport (KARB), Ann Arbor, Michigan, with an estimated time en route of 2 hours 40 minutes. There was no record of any weather products being requested or provided by DUATS within 24 hours of the departure time. Additionally, there was no record that the pilot had contacted an automated flight service station for a weather briefing or to file a flight plan during the same time period. At 1329, the pilot was cleared for takeoff on runway 29 at KAVP. After departure, the flight was handled by multiple Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control facilities as it proceeded westbound toward Michigan. At 1456, the pilot reported to the air traffic controller that the airplane was in smooth air at 6,000 feet mean sea level (msl) above a broken ceiling at 5,500 feet msl. At 1526, as the airplane approached Michigan, the air traffic controller told the pilot to fly direct to LLEEO intersection for the LLEEO-Two terminal arrival procedure. At 1600, the air traffic controller told the pilot to descend to maintain 4,000 feet msl. At 1609, after receiving the current weather conditions at KARB, the pilot requested to divert to KADG because of the low ceiling at KARB. The weather at KARB included an overcast ceiling at 300 feet above ground level (agl) and a ground visibility of 1-1/2 miles with light rain and mist. At 1614:47, the air traffic controller told the pilot to fly direct to EZHAF intersection, an intermediate fix for the global positioning system (GPS) runway 23 instrument approach procedure into KADG. At 1618:36, the air traffic controller told the pilot to descend to 3,000 feet msl and to fly a 270 degree heading toward EZHAF intersection. At 1624:15, the air traffic controller cleared the pilot for the GPS runway 23 approach and to maintain 3,000 feet msl until established on the inbound course. At 1628:08, the air traffic controller told the pilot to change to the KADG advisory frequency and to cancel his flight plan via phone upon landing. Additionally, he was told to fly the published missed approach if required. At 1628:33, the pilot acknowledged the frequency change and that he would have to cancel his flight plan via phone upon landing. No additional voice transmissions were received from the pilot. According to FAA radar track data, the airplane crossed over EZHAF intersection at 3,000 feet msl before turning southwest toward KADG. As the airplane approached the final approach fix, KUJZO, the airplane entered a series of turns north of the desired inbound course. The airplane initially turned to a westerly course before turning back toward the final approach path. The airplane descended from 2,900 feet msl to 2,200 feet msl during these turns. The minimum descent altitude for that approach segment was 2,400 feet msl. At 1629:13, the airplane briefly turned onto a southwest course before entering a left 200 degree turn north of KUJZO. During the first half of the turn, the airplane climbed from 1,800 feet msl to 2,400 feet msl over a 23 second period. The average rate of climb was 1,600 feet per minute during the first half of the turn. During the second half of the turn, the airplane descended from 2,400 feet msl to 1,900 feet msl over a 14 second period. The average rate of descent was 2,150 feet per minute during the second half of the turn. The airplane descended from 2,200 feet msl to 1,900 feet msl during the final 5 seconds of recorded data, equating to an average descent rate of 3,600 feet per minute. At 1630:04, the last radar return was recorded 1/2 mile north of KUJZO intersection at 1,900 feet msl, with the airplane in a descending left turn. A witness reported hearing an airplane overfly his residence at a low altitude, but he was unable to see the airplane due to heavy fog in the area. He noted that the airplane had come from the north and was traveling to the southeast. He then heard the same airplane turn northbound for a short time before seeing it pass over his residence about 200-300 feet above the ground traveling southeast. The witness noted that the left wing had separated from the fuselage. He stated that the airplane then impacted behind a tree line in a field south of his residence. The witness did not report seeing any smoke or fire until after the airplane collided with terrain. Another witness reported seeing the airplane rolling clockwise in a 45 degree nose-low descent before one of the wings separated from the fuselage 200 to 300 feet above the ground. The witness stated that he heard the airplane's engine operating until it descended behind a tree line and collided with terrain. The witness did not report seeing any smoke or fire until after the airplane collided with terrain. PERSONNEL INFORMATION According to FAA records, the pilot, age 51, held a private pilot certificate, issued on January 30, 2009, with airplane single engine land and instrument airplane ratings. His last aviation medical examination was completed on July 30, 2008, when he was issued a first-class medical certificate with the limitation that he use corrective lenses for near vision. A search of FAA records showed no accident, incident, enforcement, or disciplinary actions. The pilot's flight logbook was consumed during the postimpact fire. The most recent pilot data was obtained from the pilot's FAA application for his instrument rating, dated January 30, 2009. On that application, the pilot indicated having accumulated 287.6 hours total flight time, of which 236.4 hours were as pilot-in-command. He had accumulated 193.8 hours in the accident airplane make and model, 31.3 hours at night, and 47.8 hours in instrument conditions. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The accident airplane was a 1994 Commander Aircraft model 114-B, serial number (s/n) 14611. The airplane was a low wing, all-metal, single-engine, four-place monoplane. The airplane had a maximum takeoff weight of 3,250 pounds. The airplane was equipped for operation under instrument flight rules. A Lycoming model IO-540-T4B5 reciprocating engine, s/n L-25185-48A, powered the airplane. The 260-horsepower engine provided thrust through a McCauley model B3D32C419-C, s/n 930993, constant-speed, three-blade, metal propeller. The accident airplane was issued a standard airworthiness certificate on January 28, 1994. The pilot purchased the airplane on March 15, 2007. The recording hour meter was destroyed during the postimpact ground fire, which prevented the determination of the total service time at the time of the accident. The airframe, engine, and propeller had a total service time of 842 hours at the last annual inspection, which was completed on April 15, 2009. The biennial testing of the static system, altimeter system, automatic pressure altitude reporting system, and transponder were completed during the last annual inspection. The last recorded maintenance was performed on October 16, 2009, at a total service time of 885 hours. A postaccide

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