CEN12FA058

The loss of power to the rear engine due to fuel starvation during takeoff, which resulted from the fuel selector valve being inadvertently moved to the “off” position, and resulted in the airplane’s inability to climb.

One witness reported that the pilot started both engines before takeoff and that both the front and rear engines were running for about 5 minutes before he started to taxi the airplane. Another witness reported seeing the airplane flying just after takeoff at a low altitude and then hearing the engine shut off before the airplane went out of sight behind a stand of trees. Another witness reported seeing the airplane flying at a low altitude when it suddenly lost altitude and nose dived toward the ground. The twin-engine airplane's fuselage had two engines in tandem, one engine in front of the cabin and one engine behind the cabin. The airplane had retractable landing gear and a belly-attached cargo pod. Examinations of the rear engine's propeller blade assembly showed evidence that it was not producing power at impact. The front engine's propeller blade assembly showed evidence that it was producing power at impact. Examinations of the fuel distribution system revealed that the front engine fuel selector handle was set to the left tank. The front engine fuel selector valve was found between the "left tank" and "off" positions. The rear engine fuel selector handle and valve were found in the "off" position; therefore, the rear engine was most likely starved of available fuel, which is consistent with the physical and witness evidence of a loss of power to the rear engine. Further, given the witness statement that both engines were running before departure, it is likely that the fuel selector was inadvertently moved to the "off" position during, or shortly after, takeoff. Detailed examinations of the airframe components and teardowns of both engines did not reveal any preexisting mechanical anomalies that would have contributed to the accident. The Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH) noted that the airplane's single-engine climb rate is reduced 15 feet per minute (fpm) with the belly cargo pod attached and 240 fpm when the gear is in transit. The actual weight of the airplane at the time of the accident could not be determined due to a lack of fuel and airplane empty weight information. A weight of 4,000 pounds, the lightest weight shown in the POH, was used for airplane performance calculations, which showed that, at the time of the accident, the airplane's single-engine climb rate with the belly cargo pod attached was about 99 fpm. Given that the main landing gear were likely in transit, the climb rate could have been reduced by as much as 240 fpm. In this condition, the airplane would not have been able to climb and the pilot would not have been able to maintain level flight.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On November 11, 2011, at 1615 mountain standard time a Cessna 337G, N337LC, registered to LAMP Ministry LLC, of New Haven, Michigan, was destroyed when it impacted the ground shortly after takeoff from runway 20 at the San Luis Valley Regional Airport/Bergman Field (ALS), Alamosa, Colorado. The airplane was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The pilot, who was the sole occupant, sustained fatal injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The flight's intended destination was Harriet Alexander Field (ANK), Salida, Colorado. A witness located at the airport observed the pilot start the airplane (both engines). She did not see the airplane taxi or takeoff. Another witness, who was located south of the accident site, saw the airplane traveling east at a low altitude. Then he thought he heard the engine shut off and airplane went out of sight behind a stand of trees. The witness then heard a "pop", then, another "pop." Another witness, driving in a car nearby the accident site saw the airplane flying to the east when it suddenly lost altitude and nose dived toward the ground. This witness lost sight of the airplane behind trees and did not see the airplane impact the ground. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The accident pilot, who had over 3,650 total hours of flight time in single and multi-engine airplanes, 565 hours of which were time in the Cessna 337. He had been flown to Alamosa by another ministry pilot on the morning of the accident. The reason for the trip was to pick up the airplane after it's annual inspection was completed in Alamosa. The ministry pilot stated that the accident pilot was in good spirits and did not express any concerns. Both the accident pilot and ministry pilot discussed what work was done to the airplane during the annual inspection. The ministry pilot also stated that the pilot displayed very good aeronautical knowledge and flying skills and that his last bi-annual flight review was conducted in the Cessna 337 sometime during June of 2010. According to tachometer times entered in the aircraft journey log, between October 29, 2010 and November 1, 2011, the accident pilot flew the accident aircraft 124.1 hours. He held Commercial Pilot certificates for single and multiengine airplanes and held an instrument rating in airplanes. The pilot's most recent FAA medical certificate (Second Class) was dated June 6, 2011. The medical certificate noted that the pilot "must wear corrective lenses and possess glasses for near and intermediate vision". AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The airplane was a 1976 Cessna Skymaster 337G, S/N: 33701672. The twin engine airplane's fuselage had two engines in tandem, one in front of the cabin and one engine behind the cabin. The airplane was equipped with retractable landing gear and a belly-attached cargo pod. The airplane had been in Alamosa since October 15, 2011, undergoing an annual inspection, which was completed on November 1, 2011. The flight was the first flight after the annual inspection. According to airport personnel, 35.1 gallons of fuel (topped off) was added to the right wing tank prior to takeoff. Log Book Review Fire damaged aircraft journey logs with a start date of 1999 were recovered from the aircraft. The journey log recorded detailed flight times for individual flights and maintenance entries for the aircraft. Based on annotations in the journal, the aircraft was regularly flown in Canada from 1999 until December 2005. An entry dated December 12, 2005 was followed by an entry dated October 29, 2010. Starting with the October 29th entry, the accident pilot was the only listed pilot for the aircraft in the journal. The aircraft's last annual inspection was completed on November 1, 2011. According to the journey log and an interview with the repair station manager, the aircraft was flown to Alamosa on October 15, 2011*, with a tachometer total time of 4385.5 (hour meter 2113.6) to undergo an annual inspection that began on October 17, 2011. Based on last annual inspection entry in the journey log (November 1, 2011), the front engine Total Time (TT) was 1769.2 hours and Total Time Since Overhaul (TTSO) was 114.5 hours. The rear engine TT was 1420.9 hours and TTSO was 114.6 hours. Front and rear propeller TTs were 605.2 hours respectively. Each propeller had a TTSO of 114.6 hours. Also recovered from the wreckage were fire damaged individual logbooks for the front and rear engines and propellers. Front Engine The front engine was factory rebuilt in April of 1995 by TCM. In April of 2001, at 1001.9 hours, the engine was removed for repair and a new crankshaft was installed. The engine was reinstalled on the aircraft. In March of 2002, at 1164 hours, the engine was removed for propeller strike and reinstalled. An entry dated December 12, 2005 was followed by an entry dated May 5, 2009. The May 5th entry showed that the engine was removed for overhaul at 1654.6 hours Since Major Overhaul (SMOH). The engine was reinstalled on October 25, 2010. The last entry was dated November 1, 2011 (annual inspection). The front propeller was removed and overhauled at 490.6 hours TT on October 25, 2010. The propeller was then reinstalled on October 28, 2010. Rear Engine The rear engine was factory rebuilt in February 1998 by TCM. In March 2002 at 815.7 hours SMOH, the engine was removed, repaired and reinstalled due to propeller strike. An entry dated January 2, 2005, 1160 hours SMOH, was followed by an entry dated October 28, 2010, 1306.3 hours TT and 0.0 hours SMOH. The last entry dated November 1, 2011 was an annual inspection. The rear propeller was overhauled on March 3, 2010. The propeller was reinstalled had an annual inspection on October 28, 2010 at 490.6 hours TT. An entry dated November 1, 2011 showed a total time of 345 hours TT. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION Local witnesses stated that the weather was mild with variable light wind. METAR KALS 102352Z AUTO 25004KT 10SM CLR M02/M09 A3032 METAR KALS 102252Z AUTO 26004KT 10SM CLR 01/M10 A3034 FLIGHT RECORDERS The airplane was not equipped with hardened recording devices. The investigative team searched the wreckage for any evidence of installed non-volatile memory devices. Due to the extent of the thermal damage to the airplane it is unknown at this time whether any of these memory devices were onboard the airplane. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION General The accident site was located at N37 degrees, 24.631 minutes, W105 degrees, 52.349 minutes, at an elevation of 7,544 feet. The site was 0.89 miles south of the departure end of Runway 20. Initial observations of the wreckage showed evidence that the rear propeller was not producing power at impact and the fuel valve to the rear engine was observed to be in the closed position. There was evidence that the forward engine was producing power at the time of impact. Neither the uplocks nor downlocks for the main landing gear were engaged, but due to impact damage, the actual landing gear position at impact could not be confirmed. Flight control cable continuity was confirmed from the cabin floor under the front seats to each flight control. Control cable continuity could not be fully assessed on scene due to extreme impact and fire damage to the front of the airplane. Airframe The aircraft impacted a relatively level cow pasture on a heading of approximately 070 degrees in a wings level, 45-degree nose down attitude. No ground contact marks were observed before the main wreckage. A post-impact fire consumed a majority of the fuselage, including the cockpit, between the rear and front firewalls. Portions of both wing roots were also consumed by the post impact fire. The post-impact fire initiated a small grass fire in front of the aircraft. The post-impact fire consumed mostly all of the cabin section and all of the cockpit fligh