CEN13FA010

The pilot's loss of helicopter control as a result of spatial disorientation due to dark night conditions and marginal visual flight rules weather conditions.

According to track data recovered from a handheld GPS receiver found in the wreckage, the helicopter was on the final leg of a cross-country flight that had originated earlier in the day. According to fueling documentation, the helicopter was refueled, and the flight departed and proceeded on a southeast course toward the intended destination. According to the plotted GPS data, while enroute, about 600 feet above ground level (agl), the helicopter entered a descending left turn to an east-northeast course. About 30 seconds later, after descending about 100 feet, the helicopter entered a climb while on a northeast heading. During the climb, the helicopter's groundspeed decreased from 73 knots to 27 knots. The final GPS data point, recorded about 1 minute after the initial turn from the intended course, showed the helicopter about 800 feet agl at 27 knots groundspeed and about 0.2 mile north-northwest of the accident site. The helicopter wreckage was located in a sparsely populated area with hilly terrain. The debris path was orientated on a south-southeast heading, and the length and distribution of the debris path were consistent with the helicopter impacting rising terrain at cruise speed. Postaccident examination of the helicopter revealed no evidence of a preimpact failure or malfunction that would have precluded normal operation. A postaccident review of meteorological data established that marginal visual flight rules conditions likely existed in the vicinity of the accident site at the time of the accident. The weather data supported increasing low-level cloud development and scattered light rain showers. No strong outflow winds or severe storm signatures were associated with the observed rain showers. The accident flight was conducted in dark nighttime conditions with minimal illumination from ground light sources. The helicopter's flight path during the last minute of GPS data was consistent with the pilot becoming spatially disoriented due to the lack of a discernible horizon that he could use to maintain control of the helicopter. Although the helicopter was equipped with basic attitude instrumentation and avionics, it was not certified for flight under instrument flight rules (IFR). Additionally, although the pilot held an instrument rating for helicopters, his IFR currency could not be verified from available logbook data. According to FAA correspondence, about 5 months before the accident, the FAA had notified the pilot that he was ineligible to hold any class of medical certificate because of his multiple alcohol-related offenses. Although he had been advised multiple times of his ineligibility to hold a medical certificate, flight documentation established that the pilot continued to exercise the privileges of his commercial and flight instructor certificates. Toxicological test results for the pilot were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, ethanol, and all drugs and medications. The helicopter operator reported that the accident occurred during an instructional flight; however, a review of available evidence did not support that the front-seat passenger was receiving flight instruction on the accident flight. According to FAA records, the front-seat passenger had never applied for a student pilot certificate or an aviation medical certificate. Additionally, a pilot logbook was not recovered during the investigation for the front-seat passenger. According to a business associate of both passengers, the front-seat passenger had coordinated the flight to attend a business appointment. According to photographs recovered from the front-seat passenger's mobile phone, on earlier flight legs, he had been seated in the left front seat. According to the helicopter manufacturer, the flying pilot typically would be seated in the right front seat, especially during initial flight instruction. Additionally, a review of the front-seat passenger's mobile phone established that he had been exchanging text messages with a business colleague in the minutes preceding the accident. Specifically, the final outgoing text message was sent about 26 seconds before the helicopter deviated from the direct course toward the intended destination. Therefore, it is unlikely that the passenger was operating the helicopter at the time of the accident.

The two passengers were employed by Venture Energy Services. According to a company representative, the purpose of the flight was to fly to Midland, Texas, so that the passengers could interview a potential employee. Venture Energy Services owned and operated their own airplane for business flights; however, on the day of the accident, the airplane was not available because it was undergoing maintenance. The owner of the company had other personal aircraft that were often used for business flights; however, those aircraft typically were not made available unless the owner was also going on the business flight. As such, one of the passengers had arranged the accident flight through Veracity Aviation LLC. According to the owner of Veracity Aviation LLC, the passenger who arranged the accident flight was an established customer who had previously obtained helicopter flight instruction. According to invoices, dated between May 2012 and September 2012, the passenger had completed 5 instructional flights in a Robinson R44 helicopter, totaling 7 hours of flight time. The owner of Veracity Aviation LLC reported that the passenger did not have a logbook in which the dual instruction had been recorded. Additionally, the passenger had reportedly paid for two of his friends to have introductory helicopter flights. According to FAA records, the passenger who arranged the accident flight had never applied for a student pilot certificate or an aviation medical certificate. A pilot logbook was not recovered during the investigation for the passenger. Beyond the 5 invoices for the instructional flights with Veracity Aviation LLC, no additional information was recovered during the investigation that indicated the passenger had been actively pursuing flight instruction. According to fueling documentation for the accident flight, the passenger who arranged the flight had used his company credit card, issued by Venture Energy Services, to purchase fuel at Midland International Airport (MAF) and Gillespie County Airport (T82). According to the owner of Veracity Aviation LLC, the advertised rental rate for the accident helicopter included the cost of fuel. He further stated that he did not know why the passenger would have paid for the fuel, but that he would have credited any fuel that had been purchased by the passenger. According to a Venture Energy Services company representative, the passenger who had arranged the flight told him that Veracity Aviation LLC had discounted the hourly rental rate for the helicopter if they agreed to purchase any required fuel. The passenger who had arranged the accident flight had a mobile phone that contained several text messages and photos which were aviation related. On September 22, 2012, the passenger and the owner of Veracity Aviation LLC discussed having a "charter" the following morning. The passenger noted that he had an investor in town that wanted to go on an aerial observation flight to "count his exotic animals." On September 23, 2012, the passenger sent a text message to his investor that read "We're getting the doors off and fueling up. I'll text you when we take off and I'll pick you up by the tennis court by the lodge." The passenger's mobile phone contained several photos that were taken on September 23, 2012, during a helicopter flight. Two of the photos established that the photographer was seated in the forward right seat of a Robinson R44 helicopter. The photographer's feet were flat on the floor; they were not positioned on the helicopter's anti-torque pedals. According to invoices provided by Veracity Aviation LLC, the flight on September 23, 2012, was invoiced as an instructional flight and the owner of Veracity Aviation LLC was listed as the flight instructor. On October 9, 2012, the passenger and the owner of Veracity Aviation LLC exchanged multiple text messages about another potential flight; however, the discussed flight was subsequently canceled by the passenger due to a scheduling change. On the day of the accident, the passenger's mobile phone had several text messages that were associated with the accident flight. At 1016:47, the passenger mistakenly sent a text message to an unintended recipient that read "Also I need your weight??? Lol its for fuel purposes." At 1034:41, the pilot sent the passenger a text message concerning a temporary airspace flight restriction (TFR), which ultimately was determined not to be active on the day of the accident. Between 1049:32 and 1050:28, the passenger and pilot exchanged 3 text messages about meeting at the airport, and the final message from the passenger read "it will be me and 187 lbs person." After landing in Midland, Texas, at 1529:08, the pilot sent a business related message that indicated that they had landed at Midland. At 1859:38, the pilot sent a text message that read "In helicopter headed back to Seguin from Midland I'm about 1 hr out." Between 1951:00 and 1956:24, the pilot and a colleague exchanged 5 text messages concerning a business related topic. The final 2 text messages of that conversation were sent by the passenger at 1956:17 and 1956:24. According to the recovered GPS track data, which was obtained from another handheld device, the passenger's final outgoing text message was sent about 26 seconds before the helicopter began the left descending turn, and 1 minute 25 seconds before the final recorded GPS data point. The passenger's mobile phone also contained several photos that were taken at various times on the day of the accident. At 1449:33, while the helicopter was en route to Midland, Texas, a photo was taken looking forward from the front left seat of a Robinson R44 helicopter. At 1503:47, shortly after the helicopter had landed at Midland, Texas, a photo was taken of an airport ramp, looking forward from the front left seat of the helicopter. At 1818:17, while the helicopter was en route to Fredericksburg, Texas, a photo was taken looking forward from the front left seat of the helicopter. At 1926:36, another photo was taken looking forward from the front left seat of the helicopter. At 1926:52, another photo was taken from the front left seat of the helicopter, and depicted the left edge of the instrument panel, the left cockpit floor, and the left cyclic control stick. In the photo the photographer's feet were positioned on the helicopter's anti-torque pedals, which were in a neutral position. Although the photo did not capture entire length of left cyclic control stick, there were no hands visible on the upper 1/3 of the control stick. At 1935:35 and 1935:44, two photos were taken of a dark airport ramp with runway and taxiway lights illuminated. At 1940:05 and 1940:08, two photos were taken while the photographer stood outside the helicopter. The photos were focused on the left side of a Robinson R44 helicopter that was sitting on an airport ramp. Although the horizon was still discernible in the photos, the ramp area was already dark. The helicopter's red beacon lights were illuminated and the main rotor was rotating at the time of the photographs. According to the helicopter manufacturer, the flying-pilot typically would be seated in the right cockpit position. Additionally, during flight instruction, the pilot-receiving-instruction typically would be seated in the right cockpit position and the flight instructor in the left cockpit position. On October 13, 2012, an autopsy was performed on the pilot by the Bexar County Medical Examiner's Office, located in San Antonio, Texas. The cause of death was attributed to multiple blunt-force injuries that were sustained during the accident. The FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology tests on samples obtained during the autopsy. The toxicological test results were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, ethanol, and all drugs and medications. At 1900, a National Weather Service (NWS) Surface Analysi