CEN13FA476

The loss of engine power for reasons that could not be determined during postaccident examinations due to postcrash fire damage.

According to air traffic control (ATC) recordings, the pilot contacted ATC and requested radar flight following services. About 30 minutes later, the pilot cancelled flight following services and changed his destination airport. Radar data indicate that the airplane was at an altitude of 10,300 feet mean sea level (msl) at this time. During the next 5 minutes 11 seconds, the airplane descended 5,400 feet (about 1,000 feet per minute) and made a left turn from a southerly to a northerly heading. The pilot reported to ATC that he had turned back toward the destination airport but that the airplane was having some fuel issues, and he then requested the closest airport. The air traffic controller stated that the destination airport was the closest airport, and the pilot replied, "Uh, roger that, I am gonna..." No further communications were received from the pilot. The airplane wreckage was located 9.17 miles north-northeast of the last known radar location. During the forced landing to the field, the airplane struck trees and brush, and a postimpact fire ensued. Several witnesses in the area reported observing the airplane flying low to the ground as if the pilot was preparing to land. One witness stated that the wings rocked back and forth several times as the airplane continued to descend. Another witness stated that the airplane hit a tree and "exploded." An examination of the airframe and engine revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The fuel system was damaged by the fire and could not be fully examined. The extent of the postimpact fire was consistent with the airplane having an adequate amount of fuel onboard. The source of the fuel issue and the reason for the subsequent loss of engine power could not be determined due to postcrash fire damage.

The fuel selector valve was secured and examined further. The fuel selector valve was impact and fire damaged. Several nozzles had separated from the valve. Two nozzles were impact and fire damaged. The seals within the valve assembly were fire damaged and their preaccident condition could not be determined. The bearing and tract for the selector detent positions were fire damaged but otherwise unremarkable. According to the Pilot Operating Handbook for the accident airplane, a normal decent procedures includes closing the cowl flaps, setting the power as required (avoiding prolonged idle settings and low cylinder head temperatures), and enriching the mixture as required. The autopsy was performed on the pilot by the Southwestern Institute of Forensic Sciences – At Dallas, on August 12, 2013, at the request of the Justice of the Peace, Precinct 1, Place 1, Ellis County, Texas. The autopsy concluded that the cause of death was thermal injuries and the report listed the specific injuries. The report also stated that the pilot had severe atherosclerosis of the left anterior descending coronary artery and that a cardiac event due to severe coronary atherosclerosis may have contributed to the pilot's death. The FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological tests on specimens that were collected during the autopsy (CAMI Reference #201300155001). Results were negative for all tests conducted. The closest official weather observation station was the Lancaster Regional Airport (KLNC), Lancaster, Texas, located 15 nautical miles (nm) north of the accident site. The elevation of the weather observation station was 501 feet msl. The routine aviation weather report (METAR) for KLNC, issued at 1035, reported, wind 190 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 10 miles, sky condition, clear, temperature 29 degrees Celsius (C), dew point temperature 22 degrees C, altimeter 30.08 inches. The accident scene was located on the west edge of a dormant corn field. The first identified point of contact was at the top of a deciduous tree, approximately 10 feet tall. The branches at the top of the tree were broken in the direction of impact. A second point of contact was at the base of a coniferous tree, to the south and west of the main wreckage. Branches in the tree were crushed down and broken and white paint chips were imbedded in the bark of the tree. Eleven feet southeast of the tree trunk, a ground scar 4 feet long and 8 inches wide initiated a series of ground scars which extended an additional 22 feet to the main wreckage. One additional point of contact was documented in a deciduous tree, approximately four feet up from the base of the tree. The damage to the tree included red paint transfer and broken bark. The red and white paint transfer appeared consistent with the paint finish of the accident airplane. The main wreckage came to rest on a small tree, on an approximate heading of 007 degrees magnetic, at a field elevation of approximately 500 feet. The wreckage included the engine, wings, the fuselage, and the empennage. The burn area surrounding the main wreckage was 85 feet at its widest point (east to west) and 160 feet at its longest point (north to south). The fuselage included the forward cabin, the aft cabin, and the instrument panel. The forward fuselage including the instrument panel, the upper portion of the aft fuselage, and cabin was charred, melted, and partially consumed by fire. The lower portion of the aft fuselage, including the two rear seats, exhibited exposure to heat and fire. Two lap-belt buckles were located in the wreckage and remained latched with their respective ends. The empennage included the horizontal stabilizers, vertical stabilizer, rudder, and elevators with attached trim tabs. The forward portion of the empennage exhibited exposure to heat and fire. The leading edge of both horizontal stabilizers exhibited exposure to heat and fire. The right tip of the elevator separated and was located to the east of the empennage. The elevators were otherwise unremarkable. The vertical stabilizer and rudder were unremarkable. Flight control cables were continuous from the rudder and elevators forward to the flight control surfaces in the cabin. The trim tab actuators on both the left and right side of the elevator measured 7/8 of an inch. The fuel lines to both wings were destroyed by the postimpact fire. The burned remains of the fuel selector valve were recovered from the bottom portion of the forward cabin. The valve was selected to the left fuel tank. After the melted debris was removed from the valve, it rotated without difficulty and each detent was noted and correct. The left wing remained attached to the fuselage and included the left aileron and left flap. The fuel tank was partially intact and did not contain fuel. The left wing tip tank had separated from the wing; it was located 28 feet south of the main wreckage and did not contain fuel. The inboard portion of the wing exhibited exposure to heat and fire. Impact damage was noted 55 inches inboard from the wing tip. An additional 16 inches of the outboard leading edge of the wing was crushed aft 12 inches and was semicircular in its shape. Brown scratch marks were documented on the inner circumference of the crush area. The left main landing gear was folded under the left wing and exhibited fire damage. The left flap remained attached and was buckled at midspan. The left flap actuator measured approximately 1 and 11/16 inches which is consistent with the flaps being retracted. The flight control cables were continuous from the aileron inboard to the flight controls in the cockpit. The right wing remained attached to the fuselage, and included the right aileron and the right flap. The main fuel tank was charred, melted, partially consumed by fire, and did not contain fuel. The right wing tip tank remained attached and did not contain fuel. The right flap remained attached and was buckled up at midspan. The right flap actuator measured approximately 1 and 7/8 inches which is consistent with the flaps being retracted. The aileron and outboard leading edge of the wing exhibited fire damage. The inboard portion of the wing was charred, melted, and partially consumed by fire. The right main landing gear assembly separated from the right wing and came to rest 60 feet east of the main wreckage. The flight control cables were continuous from the aileron inboard to the flight controls in the cockpit. The engine separated from the airframe and came to rest just north of the main wreckage. The propeller separated from the engine and came to rest 65 feet northeast of the wreckage. The propeller blades were labeled "A" and "B" for identification purposes only. Blade A was bowed aft and exhibited leading edge scoring and chordwise scratches on the cambered surface of the blade. Blade B was unremarkable. The spinner on the propeller assembly was crushed aft in a rotational direction. The crankshaft propeller flange was fractured and remained attached to the propeller hub. All of the cylinders remained attached to the crankcase. The exhaust system and the induction system exhibited impact damage. The starter, starter adaptor, and both alternators remained attached to the engine and were unremarkable. The crankshaft was rotated by hand using a tool and adaptor in an accessory drive. Thumb compression and valve train continuity was obtained on all six cylinders. Continuity to the accessory section was confirmed when the crankshaft was rotated. Both magnetos remained attached to the engine and did not exhibit damage. During engine rotation the magnetos produced spark on all six top spark plug leads, with impulse coupling engagement observed. The top spark plugs exhibited light colored combustion deposits and the electrodes exhibited worn out - normal in accordance with the Champion aviation check-a-plug chart. The bottom spark plugs