CEN14FA099

The flight crew's failure to maintain airplane control during landing following an unstabilized approach. Contributing to the accident were the flight crew's decision to land with a tailwind above the airplane's operating limitations and their failure not to conduct a go-around when the approach became unstabilized.

The airplane, with two flight crewmembers and a pilot-rated passenger on board, was on a cross-country flight. The departure and en route portions of the flight were uneventful. As the flight neared its destination, a high-altitude, terrain-limited airport, air traffic control (ATC) provided vectors to the localizer/distance measuring equipment (LOC/DME)-E approach to runway 15. About 1210, the local controller informed the flight crew that the wind was from 290º at 19 knots (kts) with gusts to 25 kts. About 1211, the flight crew reported that they were executing a missed approach and then requested vectors for a second approach. ATC vectored the airplane for a second LOC/DME-E approach to runway 15. About 1221, the local controller informed the flight crew that the wind was from 330° at 16 kts and the 1-minute average wind was from 320° at 14 kts gusting to 25 kts. The initial part of the airplane's second approach was as-expected for descent angle, flap setting, and spoilers. During the final minute of flight, the engines were advanced and retarded five times, and the airplane's airspeed varied between 135 kts and 150 kts. The final portion of the approach to the runway was not consistent with a stabilized approach. The airplane stayed nose down during its final descent and initial contact with the runway. The vertical acceleration and pitch parameters were consistent with the airplane pitch oscillating above the runway for a number of seconds before a hard runway contact, a gain in altitude, and a final impact into the runway at about 6 g. The weather at the time of the accident was near or in exceedance of the airplane's maximum tailwind and crosswind components for landing, as published in the airplane flight manual. Given the location of the airplane over the runway when the approach became unstabilized and terrain limitations of ASE, performance calculations were completed to determine if the airplane could successfully perform a go-around. Assuming the crew had control of the airplane, and that the engines were advanced to the appropriate climb setting, anti-ice was off, and tailwinds were less than a sustained 25 kts, the airplane had the capability to complete a go-around, clearing the local obstacles along that path. Both flight crewmembers had recently completed simulator training for a type rating in the CL-600 airplane. The captain reported that he had a total of 12 to 14 hours of total flight time in the airplane type, including the time he trained in the simulator. The copilot would have had close to the same hours as the captain given that they attended flight training together. Neither flight crew member would have met the minimum flight time requirement of 25 hours to act as pilot-in-command under Part 135. The accident flight was conducted under Part 91, and therefore, the 25 hours requirement did not apply to this portion of their trip. Nevertheless, the additional flight time would have increased the crew's familiarity with the airplane and its limitation and likely improved their decision-making during the unstabilized approach. Further, the captain stated that he asked the passenger, an experienced CL-600-rated pilot. to accompany them on the trip to provide guidance during the approach to the destination airport. However, because the CL-600-rated pilot was in the jumpseat position and unable to reach the aircraft controls, he was unable to act as a qualified pilot-in-command.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On January 5, 2014, at 1222 mountain standard time (MST), a Bombardier (formerly Canadair) CL-600-2B16 Challenger, N115WF, impacted the runway during landing land on Runway 15 at Aspen-Pitkin County Airport/Sardy Field (ASE), Aspen, Colorado. The copilot was fatally injured; the captain and the passenger received serious injuries. The airplane was destroyed. The airplane was registered to the Bank of Utah Trustee and operated by Vineland Corporation Company, Panama, South America under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The flight originated from the Tucson International Airport (TUS), Tucson, Arizona, at 1004. The departure and en route portions of the flight were uneventful. As the flight neared ASE, air traffic control (ATC) provided vectors to the localizer/distance measuring equipment (LOC/DME) approach to runway 15 at ASE. At 1210:04, the local controller at the ASE air traffic control tower (ATCT) informed the flight crew that the wind was from 290º at 19 knots (kts), with gusts to 25 kts. At 1211:18, the crew reported that they were executing a missed approach and then requested vectors for a second attempt. ATC vectored the airplane for a second LOC/DME-E approach. At 1220:35, the local controller informed the flight crew that the wind was from 330° at 16 kts and the 1-minute average wind was from 320° at 14 kts gusting to 25 knots. He then cleared the flight to land. For further information about the communications between ATC and the flight crew during the first approach and the accident approach, see the Communications section of this report. Airport surveillance video of the runway showed the airplane landing at ASE. The following sequence of events was seen in the video: the airplane above the runway in a slightly nose-down attitude, a flash of light consistent with a runway strike, the airplane in the air above the runway in a nose-down attitude, and the airplane impacting the runway in a nose-down attitude and being engulfed in light. About 4 seconds elapsed between the runway strike and the final impact. The airplane came to rest inverted on the west side of runway 15, halfway between taxiways A5 and A6. The ASE airport operations and aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) station was located on the west side of runway 15, about 0.3 miles north of the accident site. ASE ARFF had witnessed the accident occurring and responded immediately, requesting clearance onto the runway about 50 seconds after the accident occurred. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The captain, age 52, was a citizen of Mexico. He held a Mexican air transport pilot certificate that included an Airbus-320 type rating and ratings for airplane multi-engine land and instrument airplane. The captain also held a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) temporary airman certificate issued on November 9, 2013. The temporary commercial pilot certificate included a CL-600 type rating and ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multi-engine land rating, and instrument airplane. The certificate was subject to a limitation for English proficiency. Upon FAA review of the pilot's temporary certificate after the accident, it was determined that a limitation on the pilot acting as pilot-in-command for the CL-600 should have been included on the temporary certificate; however, the limitation had been overlooked by the designated pilot examiner who issued the certificate. The limitation would have restricted the captain from serving as pilot-in-command in the CL-600 airplane with revenue passengers on board until he had acquired 25 hours of actual flight time in the CL-600 with another qualified pilot. The captain was issued a first-class airman medical certificate on August 27, 2013, with the limitation: must have available glasses for near vision. On November 8, 2013, the captain completed training for the CL-600 type rating at Simuflight in Dallas, Texas. According to the training records, the pilot received a "satisfactory" rating at the completion of the training checkride. During post-accident interviews, the captain stated that he did not have any trouble during his flight training other than with use of the flight management system (FMS). His flight experience in CL-601 airplanes at the time of the accident consisted of a ferry flight from Dallas, Texas, to Toluca, Mexico and a flight from Toluca, Mexico, to Eagle County Airport, Colorado, and back to Toluca, Mexico. He stated that his total flight time in the CL-601 was 12 to 14 hours, which included his flight training at Simuflight. He explained that he had accrued 8,000 hours flying the Airbus 318, 319, and 320 before flying the CL-601 and had about 17,000 hours of total flight time. The Airbus time reported was completed under his Mexican Flight Certificate and did not transfer to his FAA issued certificate. The copilot, age 54, was a citizen of Mexico. He held a Mexican air transport pilot certificate that included an Airbus-320 type rating and ratings for airplane multi-engine land and instrument airplane. The copilot also held an FAA temporary airman certificate issued on November 14, 2013. The temporary commercial pilot certificate included a CL-600 type rating and ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multi-engine land and instrument airplane. The certificate was subject to a pilot-in-command limitation for the CL-600. This limitation restricted the copilot from serving as pilot-in-command in the CL-600 airplane with revenue passengers on board until he had accrued 25 hours of actual flight time in the CL-600 with another qualified pilot. The certificate was also subject to a limitation for English proficiency. A limited first class medical certificate was issued to the copilot on December 13, 2012, with the limitation: must have available glasses for near vision. A limited first class medical is valid for 6 months from the time of issuance for operations requiring a first class medical; it is valid for 12 months from the time of issuance for operations requiring a second class medical; and, after 12 months, it is valid only for operations requiring a third class medical. At the time of the accident, 13 months after the time of issuance, the copilot's medical certificate would have been equivalent to a third class medical certificate. The copilot reported on his most recent medical certificate application that he had accumulated 20,398 total flight hours, with 31 hours in the previous 6 months. The copilot's logbook was not located during the investigation. The flight time reported on the copilot's medical certificate application was completed under his Mexican pilot certificate and did not transfer to his FAA issued certificate. On November 9, 2013, the copilot completed training for the CL-600 type rating at Simuflight in Dallas, Texas. According to the training records, the copilot received an "Unsatisfactory" rating at the completion of the training checkride. Records indicate the copilot did not satisfactorily complete two tasks under the "missed approach" approach skills, including "from a nonprecision approach" and "engine out." On November 14, 2013, the copilot was re-tested and received a "satisfactory" rating at the completion of the second training checkride. The pilot-rated passenger, age 52, was a citizen of Mexico. The passenger also held an FAA, foreign-based commercial pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land and airplane multi-engine land ratings. No type rating for the CL-601 was included on the FAA- issued commercial certificate. The FAA certificate was issued on the basis of and only valid when accompanied by his Mexican pilot certificate. Additionally, the FAA certificate was not valid for the carriage of persons or property for compensation or hire or