Primary finding
Probable cause
The pilot's rejected takeoff due to perceived flight control system anomalies, which led to excessive brake temperatures and resulted in a right main landing gear brake fire.
Investigator assessment
Analysis narrative
The pilot reported that the pretakeoff flight control check was "normal" with "no binding or resistance issues." During the initial takeoff, the pilot used the autothrottles. Shortly after, a triple chime and master warning indication activated, so he rejected the takeoff. However, the pilot observed no messages on the crew alert system nor any tripped electrical circuit breakers, so he chose to attempt another takeoff. During this takeoff, he did not use the autothrottles. As the airplane accelerated through 75 knots, the triple chime and master warning indication activated again. The engine low-pressure turbine speed was within the yellow arc, so the pilot reduced the engine thrust slightly to return to the normal operating range and continued the takeoff. At rotation speed, he pulled back on the control yoke, but the flight controls did not seem to respond normally. The pilot added that the controls had no "noticeable pressure resistance and felt unloaded with hydraulic pressure." He noted that the yoke was moved "forward and then back further aft" with the same result. The pilot subsequently rejected the takeoff and applied maximum braking and full reverse thrust. He taxied the airplane off the runway and stopped it on the parallel taxiway. A postincident examination of the airplane, including the flight control system, did not reveal any anomalies that would have compromised the effectiveness of the flight control system. Although minor variations in the inboard elevator control cable tension and elevator control surface deflections were noted, these variations also likely existed during the initial flight of the day; the pilots of that flight reported no discrepancies. After repairing the fire damage to the right main landing gear, the airplane manufacturer had two test pilots conduct an evaluation test flight. The pilots reported that the elevator response during takeoff was "positive, obvious, and 100% normal." The pilots continued the takeoff and subsequently returned for a full-stop landing. They reported that no anomalies occurred during the evaluation test flight.
Source record
Factual narrative
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On February 7, 2015, about 2136 mountain standard time, a Gulfstream Aerospace G-IV airplane, N701DB, sustained minor damage during a rejected takeoff on runway 25 (9,000 feet by 150 feet, asphalt) at the Eagle County Regional Airport (EGE), Eagle, Colorado. The five passengers and two pilots were not injured. The airplane was registered to GOAT Airways LLC and operated by Executive Air Charter of Boca Raton, Inc., dba Fair Wind Air Charter, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as an executive/corporate flight. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which was operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The flight was originating at the time of the incident. The intended destination was the Bob Hope Airport (BUR), Burbank, California.The incident occurred during the second flight of the day. The previous flight departed the McCarran International Airport (LAS), Las Vegas, Nevada, and arrived at EGE at 2049. The incident flight crew also operated the LAS to EGE flight, and no anomalies were reported with respect to that flight. The pilot reported that before taxing the airplane a flight control check was performed. He noted that the flight control check was "normal," with "no binding or resistance issues." He added that the flight control forces seemed "normally loaded." During the initial takeoff attempt, the pilot engaged the auto-throttles. He stated that about 75 knots, a triple chime sounded and a master warning illuminated. He immediately rejected the takeoff with "light" brake pressure and coasted to the end of the runway. The flight crew reported that they did not observe any message on the Crew Alert System (CAS), nor were there any exceedance events recorded. In addition, they did not observe any tripped circuit breakers. Based on this information, the pilot elected to attempt another takeoff. During this takeoff, he did not use the auto-throttles, electing to set the engine power manually. He reported that as the airplane accelerated through approximately 75 knots, the triple chime/master warning activated again. He observed that the engine low pressure (LP) turbine speed indicated within the yellow arc. He subsequently reduced engine thrust slightly in order to return the LP turbine speed to the white arc (normal operating range). The pilot continued the takeoff. At rotation speed, he pulled back on the control yoke but the flight controls did not seem to respond normally. He added that the controls had no "noticeable pressure resistance and felt unloaded with hydraulic pressure." He noted that the yoke was moved "forward and then back further aft" with the same result. The pilot subsequently rejected the takeoff, applying maximum braking and full reverse thrust. The pilot taxied off the runway at taxiway A7 and brought the airplane to a stop on taxiway A. The flight crew requested response by aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) crews due to high brake temperatures. A right brake fire subsequently ensued, which was promptly extinguished by the ARFF crews already on-scene. Airplane damage was limited to the right main landing gear. The flight crew and passengers evacuated the airplane without injury. PERSONNEL INFORMATION PILOT-IN-COMMAND The pilot-in-command (PIC), age 50, held an airline transport pilot certificate with single and multi-engine airplane ratings. The single engine rating was limited to commercial pilot privileges. The PIC held type ratings for Gulfstream G-1159 (G-II/III), Gulfstream G-IV, and Aero Commander IA-Jet airplanes. He was issued a first class airman medical certificate with a restriction for corrective lenses on December 2, 2014. The PIC was hired by the operator on November 4, 2014. At the time of his employment, the PIC reported a total flight time of 5,720 hours, with 108 hours within the preceding 90 days. He reported a total of 2,459 hours in G-IV airplanes, including 1,027 hours as PIC. The PIC reportedly met the requirements for a flight review (14CFR 61.56), recent flight experience (14CFR 61.57), and a PIC proficiency check (14CFR 61.58) at the time of his employment. He completed the operator's Part 135 Basic Indoctrination training on November 14, 2014, with recurrent and instrument proficiency training in the G-IV in January 2015 (14CFR 135.293 / 14CFR 135.297). A line check (14CFR 135.299) was pending, but had not been accomplished at the time of the incident. His employment was terminated on February 28, 2015, in conjunction with the incident airplane owner's decision to transfer management of the airplane. SECOND-IN-COMMAND The second-in-command (SIC), age 47, held an airline transport pilot certificate with single and multi-engine airplane ratings. The single engine rating was limited to commercial pilot privileges. The SIC held type ratings for Gulfstream G-1159 (G-II/III), Gulfstream G-IV, and Canadair CL-600 airplanes. He was issued a first class airman medical certificate without restrictions on August 6, 2014. The SIC was hired by the operator on November 4, 2014. At the time of his employment, the SIC reported a total flight time of 8,105 hours, with a total of 2,711 hours in G-IV airplanes. He had accumulated about 38 hours within the 90 days preceding the incident. The SIC reportedly met the qualifications for SIC (14CFR 61.55) at the time of his employment. He completed the operator's Part 135 Basic Indoctrination training on November 14, 2014, with recurrent (135 CFR 135.293) and instrument proficiency training for the G-IV (14CFR 135.297) on January 10, 2015. A line check (14CFR 135.299) was pending, but had not been accomplished, at the time of the incident. His employment was terminated on February 28, 2015, in conjunction with the incident airplane owner's decision to transfer management of the airplane. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The incident airplane was a 1987 Gulfstream Aerospace G-IV, serial number 1036. It was powered by two Rolls-Royce Tay 611-8 turbo-fan engines. At the time of the incident, the airplane had accumulated 12,473 hours and 7,319 cycles. The left and right engines had accumulated 11,953 hours and 12,232 hours, respectively. The airplane flight log included the inbound flight from LAS to EGE, with departure and arrival times of 1940 and 2049, respectively. The log also included discrepancies attributed to the incident flight as: "Flight control failure on takeoff" and "Both main gear tires flat (RH)." Those discrepancies were reported by the incident PIC. The incident PIC reported that on three separate occasions, the crew had received a configuration warning horn upon selecting the landing gear up after takeoff. The horn subsequently stopped after the wing flaps were raised. The most recent occurrence was on February 3, 2015, at which time the airplane entered maintenance. A preceding log entry denoted a flight from Van Nuys Airport (VNY) to LAS on February 3, 2015. The flight log included 3 discrepancies reported by the incident PIC, dated February 3, 2015. These included: (1) "Configuration horn activates on takeoff after gear retraction and stays on until flaps are retracted," (2) IRS #2 fault/fail," and (3) "VOR #2 fail (intermittent)." The airplane was maintained under an approved continuous aircraft maintenance program. The most recent inspection and maintenance activity was completed on February 7, 2015, the day of the incident, prior to departure from LAS. The maintenance work included the replacement of an inertial reference unit and the flight guidance computers. In addition, three switches located in the cockpit pedestal switch bank -- speed brake flap control warning (S11), speed brake takeoff alarm (S12), and speed brake lever autopilot control (S13) -- were replaced. Based on the documentation provided by the operator, the next inspection under the maintenance program was due at 12,586