CEN18LA298

The Extra pilot’s failure to see and avoid the Cessna, which resulted in an in-flight collision. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the Extra pilot to tune his radio to the correct frequency, which resulted in no common traffic advisories being heard or recognized as relevant by either pilot.

An airline transport pilot in an aerobatic low-wing airplane, an Extra 300, with a passenger on board was landing while an airline transport pilot in a high-wing airplane, a Cessna 172, near maximum weight with two passengers on board was conducting a short/soft-field takeoff from an nontowered, island-based runway surrounded by tall trees. The Extra pilot and passenger reported that the pilot's landing intention was communicated on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) with no replies. They saw an airplane at the opposite end of the airstrip, and the pilot decided to land. The Cessna pilot reported that he monitored the CTAF and then taxied down the center of the runway; he heard a radio call on the frequency from an airport on a nearby island. The Cessna pilot made his departure radio call on the CTAF in the blind and conducted a rolling departure with as much runway ahead as possible; he did not hear or see any other airplanes. The Cessna lifted off about 5 to 7 ft above ground level and accelerated to best angle of climb speed plus 10 knots. The Extra pilot indicated that he did not see any aircraft while he was on final approach to landing until his airplane was about 20-30 ft above the landing surface just before the threshold when he saw a bright object out the right side just in front of the wing. The Extra and the Cessna then collided. The CTAF frequency at the accident airport is not recorded. However, a witness monitoring another CTAF frequency on a nearby island overheard the pilot of an airplane calling intention to land and remarked to a customer that the call was on the wrong frequency. It is likely that the Extra pilot was transmitting on the CTAF frequency for the airport on a nearby island; the Cessna pilot likely heard this transmission but attributed it to a pilot landing at the other airport. The airport leaseholder's website contained a link to pilot information, which included a safety briefing for the airport. The briefing recommended that the airport's CTAF, as well as another local airport's CTAF, be monitored. In addition, the briefing recommended that arriving aircraft fly over the airfield and scan for aircraft on the ground using a left traffic pattern. The briefing advised that the airport is in the Unimproved Airport Category and that pilots "land at your own risk." The Extra pilot's use of an incorrect CTAF precluded him from hearing the Cessna pilot's transmission of his intent to depart. In addition, trees surrounding the runway precluded the Extra pilot from seeing the Cessna's departure until it was too late to take evasive action.

Aircraft 2 On July 29, 2018, about 1435 eastern daylight time, an Extra EA300 LC airplane, N32WR, and a Cessna 172 airplane, N6021A, collided inflight over runway 25 at the North Fox Island Airport (6Y3), North Fox Island, Michigan. The the Extra EA300 LC was landing and the Cessna 172 was departing. The airline transport pilot and passenger on the Extra EA300 LC were uninjured and the airline transport pilot and two passengers on the Cessna 172 received minor injuries. The Extra EA300 LC sustained substantial right-wing damage and the Cessna 172 sustained substantial empennage, left wing, and fuselage damage during the collision and subsequent impact with terrain. The Extra EA300 LC was registered to Captain Property and Investment LLC and was operated by its pilot. The Cessna 172 was registered to and operated by its pilot. Both flights were being conducted as Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flights. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area about the time of the accident, and the flights were not operated on flight plans. The Extra EA300 LC departed from the Appleton International Airport, near Appleton, Wisconsin, and was destined for 6Y3. The Cessna 172 was originating from 6Y3 at the time of the accident. According to the pilot of N32WR, the flight was uneventful until the landing phase. He initiated the descent approximately 10 miles from 6Y3 and started self-announcing his intentions "in accordance with Advisory Circular 90-66B." At no time were there any responses or transmissions heard from other aircraft at 6Y3. Upon reaching the pattern altitude of 1,700 ft, the pilot continued the left-hand pattern to final. At approximately 30-40 feet above the surface, the pilot started to round out while slowing in order to land just beyond the threshold to maximize the runway surface for the rollout. He advised that there were no aircraft visible during the final and approach to landing until an estimated 20-30 feet above the landing surface just prior to the threshold which was marked by 3 yellow cones. Out of the pilot's right side, just in front of the right-hand wing, he saw a bright object which turned out to be a departing airplane. The pilot stated that N32WR aircraft impacted the other airplane. He said that the airplane yawed strongly to the right. The pilot was able to regain control and ended up coming to a stop about 800 ft beyond the resting place of the other airplane, near the imaginary runway centerline. The pilot determined his passenger was ok and he egressed to help the other airplane's occupants. The pilot then ran toward the other airplane, a Cessna 172. One Cessna occupant was already out of the airplane and another left the airplane through the right-hand door. The third occupant was still inside, but before the Extra pilot could reach the airplane, the third occupant had departed through the right-hand door as well. There was an observed fuel leak from the left-hand wing of the Cessna as fuel was exiting out of the topside wing vent. According to the passenger in N32WP, the flight was approaching North Fox Island and the pilot announced on the radio we were approaching with the intention of landing on the Island. He checked the weather on Beaver Island, the weather report was good and again on the radio said we were approaching, and we were minutes out. They heard no response. The passenger reiterated that the pilot announced on the radio at least 4 times saying we were heading to North Fox Island with the intention of landing and we never received a response. The pilot set up for final approach and the conditions of the field looked good. They saw a different aircraft at the opposite end of the airstrip, and the pilot decided to land. The passenger indicated that the other aircraft that came up under us was not observed. When the airplane came to a final stop the passenger's first response to ask the pilot "what just happened." The pilot responded that "we just hit another airplane." According to the pilot of N6021A, the airplane was flown into 6Y3 for overnight on a camping trip. The pilot of N6021A started engines on the south side of the airfield about 1422. The airplane was positioned in an open clearing on the south end of the airfield and the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF), 122.9 megahertz, was monitored. Preflight checks were conducted, and the airplane was taxied down the center of the runway. The pilot reported that he heard a radio call from Washington Island Airport. A radio call from the 172 announced the airplane's departure in the blind. The planned takeoff was a soft field, minimum run departure with anticipated obstructions, crosswinds, and wind shear at tree top level. No turning circle was present at the departure end of the runway and the pilot advised that a soft/short, close to gross weight takeoff was made for a rolling departure with as much runway ahead as possible. No other airplanes were heard or seen. The takeoff was as planned, and the airplane lifted off the ground into ground effect about 5 to 7 ft above ground level. The airplane was accelerated to best angle of climb speed plus 10 knots. About 1431, a loud explosion occurred, and the airplane swerved 100° to the right. Full counter control deployment brought the airplane to remain in ground effect. The airplane was right of centerline and a second explosion and "violent" stop occurred. During the stopping contact, the airplane was 50° off runway heading and the left main landing gear dug into the soft soil. The left wing remained on the heading and the rest of the airplane rotated to a stop about 30° off runway heading, which forced the left wing into the cabin where it trapped the pilot in the right seat. The passenger in the left seat assisted the right seated pilot to get out of the airplane. N32WR was a single-engine, two-place, low-wing, fixed tailwheel landing gear, monoplane, designed to be fully aerobatic. The airplane was powered by a 315-horsepower engine which drove a three-bladed, constant-speed propeller. The pilot reported that the airplane underwent an annual on December 7, 2017 and that the airplane accumulated 217 hours of total time at the time of the accident. The fuselage was constructed of a tubular steel frame covered with aluminum and fabric fairings; the wing's construction was carbon-fiber reinforced plastic (CRP). The ailerons were almost full span and there are no flaps. The airplane had two cockpits, in tandem, covered with a clear, one-piece canopy. The airplane stalls about 55 to 60 kts based on weight. N6021A, was a single engine, four-place, high-wing, fixed tricycle landing gear, all-metal design airplane. The airplane was powered by a 145-horsepower engine which drove a fixed pitch propeller. The pilot reported that the airplane underwent an annual in January of 2018 and that the airplane accumulated 2,800 hours of total time. The airplane had side-by-side seating in the front and a rear couch (two seats) in the back of the cabin. The airplane had dual flight controls. The airplane had a high wing that constituted the roof of the airplane's cabin. The airplane's checklist for an obstacle clearance takeoff indicated a best angle of climb speed of 60 mph (about 52 kts). The accident report from the pilot of N32WR contained a recommendation, which, in part, stated: With respect to "how could this accident/incident have been prevented," the following actions seem prudent and in my opinion would have prevented this accident: 1. Per AC 90-66B, section 9.1, General Operating Practices, "Use of...and CTAF procedures by radio-equipped aircraft are required at all airports without operating control towers." Section 10.1 states, "Departing aircraft should continuously monitor I communicate on the appropriate frequency from startup, during taxi, and until 10 miles from the airport, unless 14 CFR or local procedures require otherwise." 10. 1.1 states, "To a --- Aircraft 1 The Extra's pilot forwarded video files recorded by his passenger. The video starts and showed that the engine cowl blocked the lower third to half of the frame. The video showed the airplane aligning with the runway centerline in a right bank turn. Once aligned, the video showed airplane made minor banking maneuvers. However, no slips were noted on the video. The engine cowl blocked the view of the near edge of the airport clearing. About 14 seconds after the start of the video a drop in RPM is recorded. About 22 seconds after the start of the video, the engine RPM is increased and then decreased about 23.1 seconds. The first sign of another aircraft is observed about 22.6 seconds after the start of the video when the right wingtip of the Cessna appears from the right side of the Extra's engine cowling. The airplanes impacted about 24 seconds after the start of the video, the field of view changes to the inside of the Extra, and the sounds of impact continue through about 27.8 seconds when the video ends. The CTAF frequency at 6Y3 is not recorded. However, a witness monitoring the CTAF frequency, 122.8 megahertz, on Beaver Island, Michigan, overheard an aircraft calling their intentions to land at 6Y3. He remarked to a customer that the aircraft was making their calls on the wrong channel. The witness did not catch the N number or type of aircraft. The next morning the witness was told about the crash and what time it happened. He subsequently told coworkers that he was at the shop about that time and heard an aircraft calling on the wrong frequency. The German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU) investigated an inflight collision accident with an Extra EA300 airplane and an Xtreme 3000 airplane. Both airplanes were low-wing aircraft. The BFU produced a factual report that contains graphic depictions of a pilot's area of view that is restricted below the low-wing airplane's fuselage and wings. The BFU's report is appended to the docket material associated with this investigation. A review of a Cessna visibility study in reference to 172 airplanes revealed, in part, that the limit of forward visibility from the left pilot's seat was about a 54° arc between the cowling and the top of the windshield. It showed that the lateral visibility limit through the front windscreen from the left pilot seat was about a 137° arc between the left and right side of the windshield. The limit of vertical visibility from the left pilot's through the left door window was about a 55° arc between the lower surface of the left wing and the bottom of the left door's window. The limit of vertical visibility across the cabin through the right door window was about a 25° arc between the lower surface of the right wing and the bottom of the right door's window. The cabin ceiling restricts the pilot's overhead visibility. Top, rear visibility is obstructed by the left and right wings and the aft cabin ceiling. Visibility directly behind the airplane is accomplished through two aft cabin side windows, one on the left side and the other on the right. The limit of vertical visibility from the left pilot's through each aft cabin side window was about a 14° arc between the top and bottom of the respective aft cabin side window. 6Y3 was a public, non-towered airport, which was owned by the State of Michigan, Department of Natural Resources and was leased to the Recreational Aviation Foundation. It was located on North Fox Island about 24 nautical miles northwest of Charlevoix, Michigan and about 15 nautical miles southwest of Beaver Island, Michigan. The airport had one runway and an estimated elevation of 639 ft above mean sea level. Runway 7/25 was a 3,000 ft by 100 ft runway with a turf surface. The airport used 122.9 megahertz as its CTAF. Remarks listed on the FAA's airport master record at the time of the accident included: RWY 07 RWY & DISPL-D THRESHOLDS MKD WITH 3- YELLOW CONES ... TALL TREES ALL QUADRANTS. TREES OBSTRUCT WINDSOCK, READINGS UNRELIABLE The Michigan Department of Transportation, Office of Aeronautics published a Michigan Airport Directory and provided Android and Apple applications that included airport information on 6Y3. Their directory similarly listed the airport remarks indicated on the FAA's master record. However, the Michigan Airport Directory also listed the leaseholder's website and indicated it had a safety brief. The leaseholder's website homepage contained a link to pilot information. The pilot information dropdown menu included a safety briefing link where a safety briefing can be reviewed before landing at 6Y3. That 6Y3 safety briefing page, in part, stated: Airstrip Communication Frequency 122.9 CTAF (recommend monitor 122.8 also for other traffic in area) Closest AWOS Beaver Island Airport 15nm N.E. 118.075 Arrival Procedure Announce intentions on 122.9 Fly over airfield scan for aircraft on the ground Left hand pattern Departure Procedure 122.9 announce intentions before taxi Please be courteous and do not fly over South Fox Island (Horse Farm) Cautions or be aware of the following items: 60-80 ft trees surround airstrip Windsock blocked by trees (use wave direction for wind reference) Winds on approach and departures ... It is a Unimproved Airport Category and is listed as "Land at your own risk" At 1435, the recorded weather at the Beaver Island Airport, Beaver Island, Michigan, was: Wind 230° at 8 kts, variable from 210° to 270°; visibility 10 statute miles; sky condition clear; temperature 25° C; dew point 16° C; altimeter 30.06 inches of mercury. According to images and statements, the airplanes, after the inflight collision, came to rest beyond runway 25's displaced threshold cones. The Extra exhibited right-wing leading-edge damage forward of its outboard aileron hinge, displaced right landing gear, and separations of sections of all three propeller blades. The Cessna exhibited a semicircular impact mark about midspan on its rudder along with forward crushing of the rudder and deformation of the vertical stabilizer. An outboard section of the left elevator trailing edge exhibited forward crushing. The trailing-edge of the left wing exhibited a torn opening located about midspan near the junction of the flap and aileron. The left wing was rotated clockwise and its inboard leading-edge migrated under the forward cabin center top skin. The aft cabin center top skin sections exhibited a separation. Ground scars and liberated airplane parts are located between the displaced threshold and the Cessna. The accident report from the pilot of N32WR contained a recommendation, which, in part, stated: With respect to "how could this accident/incident have been prevented," the following actions seem prudent and in my opinion would have prevented this accident: 1. Per AC 90-66B, section 9.1, General Operating Practices, "Use of...and CTAF procedures by radio-equipped aircraft are required at all airports without operating control towers." Section 10.1 states, "Departing aircraft should continuously monitor I communicate on the appropriate frequency from startup, during taxi, and until 10 miles from the airport, unless 14 CFR or local procedures require otherwise." 10. 1.1 states, "To achieve the greatest degree of safety, it is essential that" 1. All radio-equipped aircraft transmit/ receive on a common frequency identified for that purpose of airport advisories, as identified in appropriate aeronautical publications." I would not have attempted a landing knowing there was another aircraft about to takeoff at 6Y3. Furthermore, if a radio transmission were received, we could have worked out a resolution to the possibility of a collision by agreeing on sequencing my arrival and his departure. 2. Per 9.2 of AC 90-668, Collison Avoidance, "The Pilot in command's (PIC) primary responsibility is to see and avoid other aircraft and to help them see and avoid his or her aircraft."