CEN24FA160

The pilot’s encounter with convective weather conditions, which resulted in a loss of airplane control, the exceedance of the airplane’s never exceed speed, and the resulting overload failure of the horizontal stabilizer and subsequent failure of the airplane’s wings.

The airplane was on an instrument flight rules flight and air traffic control (ATC) provided the pilot with vector guidance to avoid an active military operations area (MOA). The controller informed the pilot that he would only be able to deviate to the left of his course due to the active MOA. At that time, the airplane was in an area of developing convective weather activity and likely in instrument meteorological conditions. The pilot reported to ATC that he encountered freezing rain. ATC communications revealed that the pilot requested to deviate to the left of his course due to weather, including mention of encountering freezing rain, which ATC approved. Flight track data showed the airplane entered a descending left turn. A performance study based on the aircraft track data showed that, during the turn, the airplane’s roll angle reached 70°, the pitch angle reached -17° and then -34°, and the calibrated airspeed exceeded both the airplane's published never exceed speed (VNE), and its maximum operating maneuvering speed (VO). During the turn, the airplane’s structure broke apart, and wreckage was distributed along a 3-mile path. The flight path depicted in the flight track data was consistent with a loss of airplane control. Postaccident examination of the airplane confirmed that the horizontal stabilizer and the wings failed in a downward direction. A failure of the airplane’s horizontal stabilizer would result in the airplane pitching forward and a high negative load to the wings. The examination noted that all identified failures in the airplane structure had signatures consistent with overload failure. Examination of the airplane’s flight control system did not reveal any preexisting anomalies. The cockpit avionics could not be tested due to impact damage. Based on the available data, the pilot encountered forecast adverse weather associated with convective activity. The pilot noted to ATC that he encountered freezing rain, however, the quantity of ice accumulation and its effect on the flight could not be determined. While attempting to deviate from his flight path to avoid this weather, airplane control was lost and it entered a steep descending turn. During the turn, the airplane’s speed exceeded its published never exceed speed, which resulted in overload failure of the horizontal stabilizer and subsequent failure of the airplane’s wings.

According to the pilot’s electronic flight logbook, he had accumulated 1,458.36 hours of total flight experience, of which 78.2 hours were in the accident airplane. He had 201.6 hours of actual instrument flight experience and 42.1 hours of simulated instrument flight experience. During the 90 days preceding the accident flight, he had 74.95 total flight hours, all of which were in the accident airplane, and 16.9 hours were in actual instrument flight conditions. The airplane was a single-engine, low-wing, pressurized monoplane of predominately aluminum construction. The airplane was powered by a turbocharged Lycoming TIO-540-AE2A engine rated to produce 350 horsepower. It could seat up to six occupants and had retractable landing gear. According to the Pilot’s Operating Handbook and FAA-approved Flight Manual, the airplane’s VNE was listed as 198 kts indicated airspeed (KIAS), or 200 KCAS. The airplane’s VO was dependent on the airplane’s operating weight, as shown below: Weight (lbs) KIAS KCAS 4,340 133 135 4,200 131 133 4,000 128 130 3,800 125 127 3,600 121 123 3,400 118 120 3,200 114 116 An autopsy of the pilot was conducted by the Boone/Callaway County Coroner. According to the autopsy report, the cause of death was blunt force trauma to the head, neck, chest, and extremities, cardiac laceration, and basilar skull fracture. The FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory performed toxicological testing on specimens from the pilot, which detected lisinopril, a high blood pressure medication, in blood and urine. On April 16, 2024, about 1205 central daylight time, a Piper PA-46-350P airplane, N451MA, was destroyed when it impacted the ground near Hartsburg, Missouri. The pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot filed an instrument flight rules flight plan from the Dane County Regional Airport (MSN), Madison, Wisconsin, to the Smith Field Airport (SLG), Siloam Springs, Arkansas, and was in contact with ATC from the time of his departure from MSN, about 0951. Review of flight track data provided by the FAA revealed that, after the airplane departed MSN, it turned to the southwest, and climbed to about 16,000 ft mean sea level (msl). The airplane’s course was a direct line to SLG. The airplane remained on this course and at this altitude until 1149 when it turned left to a 170° heading as instructed by ATC to avoid an active MOA. About one minute later, ATC instructed the pilot to turn the airplane to a 180° heading, and a few minutes later to a 190° heading. ATC informed the pilot that any deviation requests would need to be to the left of the airplane’s course since the MOA was to the right. About 1158, the ATC controller advised the pilot of precipitation at his one o’clock, to which the pilot answered that he would inform the controller if he wanted to deviate. At 1203:28, the pilot noted that he was encountering freezing rain and requested to deviate to the left of his course, which the controller approved. At 1204:05, the airplane entered a descending left turn. At the end of the recorded data, the airplane was heading north and had descended to about 9,400 ft msl. The airplane’s fuselage came to rest about 0.14 nautical miles (nm) north of the last in-flight recorded position of the airplane. A review of the airplane’s performance was conducted by the NTSB Office of Research and Engineering and used available ADS-B data and radar data. The airplane performance described by the radar data suggested that, shortly after 1204:05, the airplane started a descending left turn that steepened to a 70° roll angle while the pitch angle dropped to 17°, and then further dropped to -34° as the airplane accelerated past its VNE and reached a descent rate of about 17,000 ft/min (see figure 1). The sudden reversal in airspeed and the sudden slowing of the airplane’s descent (rate of climb) at 1204:46, at an airspeed of 240 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS)—40 kts above VNE—is consistent with the airplane starting to break up in flight at about this time. Figure 1. Plot of the final portion of the airplane’s flight path. The main wreckage consisted of the airplane’s fuselage, which came to rest on a wooded hillside next to a pasture. The tree canopy was mostly undisturbed and the few tree limb breaks were consistent with a near-vertical impact with the ground. The fuselage was upright. The engine was pushed rearward and the forward fuselage in the area of the forward baggage compartment exhibited accordion crushing. The inboard 4 ft of each wing remained attached to the fuselage. The fuselage sides over the wing exhibited some crushing damage. The roof of this area was folded back, consistent with efforts by first responders for occupant extraction. The fuselage aft of the front seats to the rear baggage compartment was fragmented. The aft fuselage from the tail cone forward about 8 ft was predominately intact. No tail surfaces were present at the main wreckage site. The tail surfaces and both outboard wings separated from the airplane. The wings, elevator, vertical stabilizer, and rudder were located along a line extending from the fuselage on an 18° heading for about 3.1 nm. The farthest piece of wreckage found was the vertical stabilizer of the airplane, with the other pieces found between the fuselage and the vertical stabilizer. The horizontal tail pieces were not located except for portions of the horizontal tail spar. Postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed that both outboard sections of the wings separated from the airplane near wing station 75 at the outboard ends of the main landing gear wheel wells. The inboard wing sections remained attached to the fuselage. The outboard wing sections separated from the airplane during the event and were recovered. The horizontal stabilizer, vertical stabilizer, flaps, ailerons, elevator, and rudder separated from the airplane during the event. The right aileron, right flap, and left flap were separated from the wings during the event and were recovered. Most of the left and right sides of the horizontal stabilizer aft spar and the center portion of the elevator (about 6 ft long) were separated from the airplane during the event and were recovered. The vertical stabilizer, vertical stabilizer aft spar, and rudder separated from the airplane during the event and were recovered. All the fracture surfaces examined had an angled, dull, grainy appearance consistent with overstress separation. There was no evidence of pre-existing cracking or corrosion noted. The right wing’s leading edge structure exhibited downward and inboard bending of almost 180°. The recovered outboard wing structure was predominately intact, and the flap and aileron had separated from the wing but were recovered. The left wing’s structure exhibited downward bending. The left flap and aileron were separated from the wing. The flap was recovered but the aileron was not. About 6 ft of the center of the elevator was recovered with the trim tab attached. This section was deformed downward on the left side and upward on the right side. Three separate sections of the horizontal stabilizer aft spar were recovered. The damage and deformation of the center section of the aft spar and the adjacent left and right sections were consistent with separation in a downward direction. Examination of the airplane’s control system did not reveal any pre-existing anomalies. The airplane was equipped with a Garmin G1000 avionics suite. All the avionics display units sustained impact damage, which precluded functional testing. The units were sent to the NTSB Recorder Laboratory for potential download of flight data; however, the units did not contain any data. Removable memory cards from the unit displays were not found in the unit's memory card slots. Two complete memory cards and a portion of a third