CEN25LA381

The manufacturer flight instructor’s failure to maintain proper airspeed and a proper descent rate during a demonstrated hover out of ground effect (HOGE) autorotation, which resulted in a hard landing. Contributing to the accident was the manufacturer flight instructor’s failure to perform corrective action during the HOGE autorotation with a power recovery in a timely manner.

The purpose of the flight with the manufacturer flight training academy was for a flight instructor to provide instruction to another flight instructor, who was a customer. About one hour into the flight at the manufacturer’s private flight training heliport, the manufacturer flight instructor was demonstrating a hover out of ground effect (HOGE) autorotation from a straight-in approach with termination on the lane. This was the first HOGE autorotation for the manufacturer flight instructor of the day. At the time of the maneuver, the manufacturer flight instructor reported the wind direction was variable, and the wind speed was light and variable with no gusting. He reported that he was late entering the HOGE autorotation due to a heliport traffic pattern restriction for noise abatement purposes. Near the end of the HOGE autorotation, with about 35 kts airspeed, he performed a small flare by pulling the nose up slightly. About 45 ft agl, he noticed the descent rate accelerated, requiring him to make a small input with the collective. He further noticed that the descent rate became excessive. About 20 ft agl he began pulling the collective to the top stop and he leveled the skids. The helicopter landed hard on the dry asphalt lane, the skids partially collapsed, and the helicopter came to rest upright on the right side of the lane with little forward motion. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the underside of the fuselage. The manufacturer flight instructor reported there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airframe or the engine that would have precluded normal operation. The manufacturer flight training academy reported that the accident was a mismanagement of the flight controls, and the manufacturer flight instructor should have identified the situation the helicopter was in sooner and executed a power recovery to arrest the descent rate. Postaccident investigation revealed that the manufacturer flight instructor, who had been employed with the manufacturer flight training academy for nine years, did not complete the required flight risk assessment tool before the instructional flight. The estimated density altitude for the closest meteorological reporting station was 2,484 ft.