DCA11LA045

Aircraft 1 the A380 flight crew's inability to identify that the wingtip path of their airplane would not maintain safe clearance from the CRJ701. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the CRJ701 flight crew to advise ATC that they were stopped with a portion of their airplane still extending onto the taxiway. --- Aircraft 2 the A380 flight crew's inability to identify that the wingtip path of their airplane would not maintain safe clearance from the CRJ701. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the CRJ701 flight crew to advise ATC that they were stopped with a portion of their airplane still extending onto the taxiway.

Aircraft 1 Information provided by Airbus indicates that the view from the A380 cockpit looking sideways to the left was limited to about 121 degrees that did not allow the pilot to see the wingtip.  Interviews with the Air France accident pilots indicated that they did not receive any guidance or training on wingtip clearance in the airplane. The pilots indicated that, during simulator training, forward visual lines were projected, cuing where the wingtips would pass but there was nothing in the airplane to provide an indication of wingtip clearance. The pilots did receive information about the A380 wingspan, restrictions on certain taxiways, and were advised to use caution during taxi. When the Comair crew contacted the ground controller, they were given a clearance to their ramp. Upon contacting their ramp controller, they were advised to hold at the Diamond 2 spot. This was due to ramp traffic that blocked access to their gate. When stopped at the Diamond 2 spot, the CRJ701's tail extended out of the ramp onto taxiway M. Neither the accident flight crew nor the Comair ramp controller advised ATC that a portion of the airplane was extended onto an active taxiway. The area where the CRJ701 was stopped was not visible from the JFK control tower. The AIM advises that a pilot "promptly complies with an air traffic clearance upon receipt except as necessary to cope with an emergency" and "advises ATC as soon as possible and obtains an amended clearance, if deviation is necessary". Therefore, the CRJ701 did not complete its clearance to the Comair ramp and should have advised ATC of this fact, which allowed a portion of the airplane to remain on an active taxiway.  Although having a portion of the stopped airplane remain on an active taxiway was a factor in this accident,  the primary responsibility to see and avoid contact between the two airplanes was with the A380.  The CRJ captain stated that he saw the A380 approaching and moved his airplane forward to try to give the A380 more clearance. Examination of the A380 Flight Crew binocular vision chart and the relative positions of the airplanes show that as the Air France A380 airplane was making the turn onto taxiway A, a 10 degree cone of vision obstruction may have momentarily blocked the left seat pilot's vision of the CRJ. However, once the A380 was established on taxiway A, the view of the CRJ should have been within the binocular vision of both the Air France left seat and right seat pilots, however, the two A380 pilots stated that they did not notice the CRJ on M taxiway.  The A380 captain in the right seat may have been momentarily distracted when he checked his taxi map for an intersection shortly before the collision occurred. The A380 pilot in the jumpseat said that he saw the CRJ but did not think there was a danger of collision with it. --- Aircraft 2 Information provided by Airbus indicates that the view from the A380 cockpit looking sideways to the left was limited to about 121 degrees that did not allow the pilot to see the wingtip.  Interviews with the Air France accident pilots indicated that they did not receive any guidance or training on wingtip clearance in the airplane. The pilots indicated that, during simulator training, forward visual lines were projected, cuing where the wingtips would pass but there was nothing in the airplane to provide an indication of wingtip clearance. The pilots did receive information about the A380 wingspan, restrictions on certain taxiways, and were advised to use caution during taxi.When the Comair crew contacted the ground controller, they were given a clearance to their ramp. Upon contacting their ramp controller, they were advised to hold at the Diamond 2 spot. This was due to ramp traffic that blocked access to their gate. When stopped at the Diamond 2 spot, the CRJ701's tail extended out of the ramp onto taxiway M. Neither the accident flight crew nor the Comair ramp controller advised ATC that a portion of the airplane was extended onto an active taxiway. The area where the CRJ701 was stopped was not visible from the JFK control tower. The AIM advises that a pilot "promptly complies with an air traffic clearance upon receipt except as necessary to cope with an emergency" and "advises ATC as soon as possible and obtains an amended clearance, if deviation is necessary". Therefore, the CRJ701 did not complete its clearance to the Comair ramp and should have advised ATC of this fact, which allowed a portion of the airplane to remain on an active taxiway.  Although having a portion of the stopped airplane remain on an active taxiway was a factor in this accident,  the primary responsibility to see and avoid contact between the two airplanes was with the A380.  The CRJ captain stated that he saw the A380 approaching and moved his airplane forward to try to give the A380 more clearance. Examination of the A380 Flight Crew binocular vision chart and the relative positions of the airplanes show that as the Air France A380 airplane was making the turn onto taxiway A, a 10 degree cone of vision obstruction may have momentarily blocked the left seat pilot's vision of the CRJ. However, once the A380 was established on taxiway A, the view of the CRJ should have been within the binocular vision of both the Air France left seat and right seat pilots, however, the two A380 pilots stated that they did not notice the CRJ on M taxiway.  The A380 captain in the right seat may have been momentarily distracted when he checked his taxi map for an intersection shortly before the collision occurred. The A380 pilot in the jumpseat said that he saw the CRJ but did not think there was a danger of collision with it.

Aircraft 1 The Airbus was equipped with an Onboard Airport Navigation System (ONAS) that dynamically presented a display of the airplane position on an airport moving map display in the cockpit. This display could be seen on either pilot's Navigation Display (ND) located on his instrument panel. The OANS display did not have the capability to display other airplanes, ground vehicles, or other obstructions. The Airbus is also equipped with an External Taxi Aid Camera System (ETACS) consisting of two video cameras designed to assist the flight crew by displaying the nose and main gear positions before and during taxi. The Belly Taxi Aid Camera System (BTACS) was located on the underside of the fuselage just aft of the nosewheel. It displayed a picture of the nosewheel and the taxiway and was used by the pilots to verify that they were on a taxiway centerline or the condition of the nosewheel. The Fin Taxi Aid Camera (FTAC) was located on the vertical tail and displayed a view of the airplane. The Fin Camera view extended from just outside the number one outboard engine to just outside the number four outboard engine. The Fin Camera did not display the airplane wingtips. The Fin Camera projected a visual indicator to show the location of the outer edge of each of the main landing gears. The wingtips do not appear on either of the camera views and neither of the ETACS cameras had the capability of recording. And last, Air France had a specific A380 taxi chart for JFK airport that indicated the approved routes for taxi. At the time of the accident, the A-380 accident airplane was using an approved route. The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) was obtained from the A380 and downloaded at the NTSB FDR laboratory. The recorder was in good condition and the data were extracted normally from the recorder using the manufacturer's recommended procedures. Cockpit Voice Recorders (CVR) were obtained from both the A380 and CRJ aircraft. A full transcript of CVR recordings for both airplanes were prepared and are included in the CVR Group Chairman's Factual Report. Although the Airbus pilots stated that the ground control frequency was very busy, this communication difficulty did not affect the accident sequence of events. Calculations revealed that if an A380 is on taxiway A with its nose wheel on the centerline and a CRJ701 is on taxiway M perpendicular to taxiway A with its nose wheel on "diamond 2", then there is an overlap between the wingtip of the A380 and the tail of the CRJ700. This overlap is about 16 feet long. A motion study, in the form of an animation, produced by the BEA depicted the relative positions of the two aircraft on taxiways A and M. The motion study was based on the FDR parameters of the A380 and assumes a still position of the CRJ on "diamond 2". The audio track of the GND frequency of KJFK ATCT was synchronized with the FDR data. A 10°-wide cone to the left of the A380 cockpit represented the area blocked by the window pillar when the pilot sitting on the left seat is in the normal position. The motion study showed that the CRJ701 was in the cone area during the end of the turn of the A380 on taxiway A (from 2006:10 until 2006:20). The CRJ701 was fully out of the cone from 2006:26. One second later, the local controller instructed the A380 crew to give way to an opposite traffic about 3,300 feet ahead. The collision occurred 15 seconds later, right after the A380 crew finished acknowledging the local controller's instruction. According to air traffic control personnel, the diamond markings on the Delta parking ramp were meant to be hold points for departing airplanes taxiing out to taxiway A, via taxiway M. They were not intended to be hold points for airplanes taxiing into the parking ramp after flight. In addition, the diamond markings are labeled "Aircraft Start Up" on Comair Jeppesen Plate 20-0C. An examination of historical aerial photography of the ramp revealed that the markings were applied sometime between November 24, 2006, and July 7, 2007. The investigation could not determine when Comair airplanes first began using the diamonds as stop points inbound to the ramp, prior to parking. The KJFK airport Operational Plan for the Airbus A380 movement (dated July 1, 2008) was developed in accordance with Modifications of Standards (MOS) submitted by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ). It was subsequently conditionally approved by the FAA for A380 operations at JFK. The conditions of acceptance of the MOS included operational restrictions that are required under certain conditions. These operational restrictions established for A380 operations at JFK include: Departures from Runway 13L are not permitted. Taxiway obstructions prohibit the ground maneuverability of the aircraft. Departures from Runway 31R are not permitted. Taxiway obstructions prohibit the ground maneuverability of the aircraft if a departure is aborted. Parallel Taxiways 'A' and 'B', 'P' and 'Q' are prohibited from simultaneous A380 operations Taxiway 'B' is restricted from normal A380 operations. South Bridges (Van Wyck Expressway) restrictions – See red area in the figure below. A380 must cross bridges alone. All simultaneous aircraft crossings with an A380 are prohibited. JFK – ATCT will instruct aircraft to hold at the intersections prior to the bridge. Aircraft traveling North will be held prior to the intersection with Taxiway 'NA'. Aircraft traveling South will be held prior to the intersection with Taxiway 'NB'. Intermediate Holding Position Markings will identify this holding point on the taxiways. An A380 must be established on the centerline of Taxiways A, B, C, K, P, U, YA or ZA, in order to be considered clear of the parallel runway. The Operational Plan identifies the preferred taxiing routes based on these restrictions. At 1951 EDT, the visibility was measured at 7 statute miles, with a few clouds at 10,000 feet and a broken ceiling at 25,000 feet. Sunset was at 1931 EDT. The FAA Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), dated August 25, 2011, Chapter 2 - Aeronautical Lighting and Other Visual Aids, section 3 – Airport Marking Aids and Signs, sub-section 2-3-4 – Taxiway Centerline, (b.)-Taxiway Centerline, (1.) Normal Centerline stated in part: "….being centered on the taxiway centerline does not guarantee wingtip clearance with other aircraft or objects." AIM, Chapter 5 – Air Traffic Procedures, section 5 – Pilot/Controller Roles and Responsibilities, sub-section 5-5-2 Air Traffic Clearance, a. – Pilot, stated that a pilot: "Promptly complies with an air traffic clearance upon receipt except as necessary to cope with an emergency. Advises ATC as soon as possible and obtains an amended clearance, if deviation is necessary." The four air traffic controllers present in the tower either shortly before or during the accident sequence of events were interviewed. Three stated that they would expect pilots to notify the tower if they stopped taxiing in the airport movement area. The fourth stated that pilots sometimes announce that they have stopped, and sometimes they do not. The CRJ701 Captain The captain, age 59, was hired by Comair Airlines on October 9, 1986. The captain estimated his total flying time at 23,000 hours, including about 3,000 hours as pilot-in-command and about 3,000 hours on the CL-65. The captain's most recent proficiency check (continuing qualification training) occurred on November 12, 2010. The captain held an airline transport pilot certificate, which included a type rating on the CL-65 and a first-class medical certificate with a limitation that stated, "must have available lenses that correct for near vision". A review of FAA records found no prior accident, incident or enforcement actions. The captain and first officer were on the second day of a scheduled three-day flight sequence when the accident occurred. The captain stated that the on the --- Aircraft 2 On April 11, 2011, about 2006 EDT, Air France fight 007, an Airbus A380, F-HPJD, collided with Comair flight 293, a Bombardier CRJ701, N641CA, while the A380 was taxiing for takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport (KJFK), Jamaica, New York. At the time of the accident, the CRJ was stationary with part of the airplane on the Comair/Delta parking ramp and its tail extended onto taxiway M. The CRJ was waiting for ramp clearance to its parking spot. There were no injuries to the 485 passengers and 25 crewmembers on the A380, nor to the 62 passengers and 4 crewmembers on the CRJ. Both the A380 and the CRJ sustained substantial damage. Flight 007 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 129 and the CRJ was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. The CRJ landed on runway 22L at KJFK and then were cleared to cross runway 22R and taxi to the Comair/Delta ramp via taxiway B and taxiway M. As the CRJ was approaching taxiway M, the first officer contacted the Delta ramp controller who advised the airplane to hold at Diamond 2, which was a painted spot on the ramp. The CRJ taxied into the ramp area and stopped with its nose landing gear on the Diamond 2 spot. In this stationary position, the CRJ's tail extended across a roadway located next to the ramp and onto taxiway M. The ramp area and associated taxiway where the CRJ was parked at Diamond 2 was not visible from the control tower and the CRJ crew did not advise ATC that they had not cleared the taxiway. While the Comair airplane was taxiing to its ramp, the A380 was being pushed back from its gate on the ramp adjacent to the Comair/Delta ramp. The crew of the A380 started its engines and contacted ATC for a taxi clearance to runway 22R. ATC advised the A380 crew to turn left on taxiway A and to hold short of taxiway E. The A380 exited its ramp via taxiway MA and began a left turn onto taxiway A. At approximately 20:06:25, the A380 completed its turn and was established on the centerline of the taxiway with a groundspeed of about 8 knots. The right seat captain said he checked the nose wheel camera display to be sure the nosewheel was on the centerline of the taxiways. Approximately 2 to 3 seconds later, ATC advised the A380 to give way to opposite direction traffic at taxiway KD. The right seat captain, who was controlling the A380, stated that he did not look at his taxi map because he knew the KD intersection was "at the end of Alpha [taxiway]". The left seat captain stated that he also knew where the intersection was located but looked momentarily at his taxi chart. Approximately fifteen seconds after being established on taxiway A, the A380's left wingtip collided with the tail section of the CRJ. Both the right and left seat captains stated that they never saw the CRJ before the collision. Both pilots indicated they had difficulty seeing clearly outside the A380 cockpit due to lights from the airport terminal, ground traffic and other airplanes. The right seat captain said he only looked forward outside the cockpit, not sideways. He said there were a lot of lights and flashes of light on the roadway to his left, so he did not look toward the roadway. He said terminal and vehicle lights bothered him if he looked 20 degrees left. The pilots of the CRJ stated that they noticed the A380 as it taxied out of its ramp. The captain said that when he noticed the A380 was on taxiway A, he decided to move his airplane forward a few feet to give the A380 some more room. After moving forward, he stopped the airplane and reset the parking brake. He said he thought the A380 would be able to pass behind him. After the A380 collided with them, the CRJ crew decided to evacuate the airplane. All passengers and the crew evacuated through the main cabin door. Injuries None of the passengers or crewmembers in either airplane were injured. Damage to Airplanes The outer part of the left wing's leading edge of the A380 was substantially damaged by the impact and the top part of the left winglet was sheared off. The CRJ sustained substantial damage to its left horizontal stabilizer and rudder. The Bombardier CRJ701 is 106 feet, 8 inches long. The Airbus A380 is 261 feet, 6 inches wide. A Boeing 747-800, the next widest aircraft utilizing KJFK taxiways, is 224 feet 7 inches wide. Regarding visibility from the A380 cockpit, the pilots, when sitting in the correct position, are about 23 feet, 7 inches, above ground and can see the ground from about 69 feet in front of the aircraft. Cockpit window pillars are partially blocking the pilot's view. When in the left seat, a 10°-wide blind area is situated approximately 40° to the left. The outline of the nose cone, the windshield and the side window panels were designed to obtain an outside visibility comparable to that of all modern aircraft. The visibility is greater than that defined by the Aerospace Standard: AS 580 B. An A380 binocular vision study revealed that when sitting in left seat in the "normal" position (i.e. 0° vertically), there is an area between about 38° and 48° to the left where neither the left nor the right eye can see. The FAA Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), dated August 25, 2011, Chapter 2 - Aeronautical Lighting and Other Visual Aids, section 3 – Airport Marking Aids and Signs, sub-section 2-3-4 – Taxiway Centerline, (b.)-Taxiway Centerline, (1.) Normal Centerline stated in part: "….being centered on the taxiway centerline does not guarantee wingtip clearance with other aircraft or objects." AIM, Chapter 5 – Air Traffic Procedures, section 5 – Pilot/Controller Roles and Responsibilities, sub-section 5-5-2 Air Traffic Clearance, a. – Pilot, stated that a pilot: "Promptly complies with an air traffic clearance upon receipt except as necessary to cope with an emergency. Advises ATC as soon as possible and obtains an amended clearance, if deviation is necessary." The four air traffic controllers present in the tower either shortly before or during the accident sequence of events were interviewed. Three stated that they would expect pilots to notify the tower if they stopped taxiing in the airport movement area. The fourth stated that pilots sometimes announce that they have stopped, and sometimes they do not. The CRJ701 Captain The captain, age 59, was hired by Comair Airlines on October 9, 1986. The captain estimated his total flying time at 23,000 hours, including about 3,000 hours as pilot-in-command and about 3,000 hours on the CL-65. The captain's most recent proficiency check (continuing qualification training) occurred on November 12, 2010. The captain held an airline transport pilot certificate, which included a type rating on the CL-65 and a first-class medical certificate with a limitation that stated, "must have available lenses that correct for near vision". A review of FAA records found no prior accident, incident or enforcement actions. The captain and first officer were on the second day of a scheduled three-day flight sequence when the accident occurred. The captain stated that the on the first day of the sequence, he awoke about 0800. They originated the flight sequence at Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky Airport (KCVG) in Covington, Kentucky. They flew from KCVG to Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport (KDTW), Detroit, Michigan. They then flew from KDTW back to KCVG and then flew to General Edward Lawrence Logan International Airport (KBOS), Boston, Massachusetts. They arrived in KBOS at about 2125. The captain said he went to sleep at about 2200. On the day of the accident he awoke about 0800 after a good night's sleep. After he woke, he took a five mile walk and then ate lunch. He departed the hotel at about 1700. He said the accident flight was scheduled to depart at 1815. During the flight sequence that included the accident flight, he said he felt rested and had no problems