DCA18IA092

the fracture of a fan blade due to P&W's continued classification of the TAI inspection process as a new and emerging technology that permitted them to continue accomplishing the inspection without having to develop a formal, defined initial and recurrent training program or an inspector certification program. The lack of training resulted in the inspector making an incorrect evaluation of an indication that resulted in a blade with a crack being returned to service where it eventually fractured. Contributing to the fracture of the fan blade was the lack of feedback from the process engineers on the fan blades the inspectors sent to the process engineers for evaluation of indications that they had found.

The airplane, a Boeing 777-222, experienced a full length fan blade fracture in the No. 2 (right) engine, a Pratt & Whitney (P&W) PW4077 turbofan, while in cruise flight shortly before top of descent. The examination of the No. 2 engine revealed most of the inlet duct and all of the left and right fan cowls were missing. Two small punctures were found in the right side fuselage just below the window belt with material transfer consistent with impact from pieces of an engine fan blade. The examination of the engine's fan blades revealed fan blade No. 11 was fractured transversely across the airfoil directly above the fairings that are between the base of each blade. The other fan blade, which was identified as fan blade No. 10 and was the adjacent trailing blade, was fractured across the airfoil at about midspan. Laboratory examination of fan blade No. 11 revealed a low cycle fatigue (LCF) fracture that originated on the interior cavity wall directly below the surface. The entire fan blade set, including fan blade No. 11 had last been overhauled by P&W's Overhaul & Repair (O&R) facility in July 2015. As part of the overhaul process, the blades underwent a fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) and a thermal acoustic imaging (TAI) inspection. The records for the TAI inspection in July 2015 as well as an earlier TAI accomplished in March 2010 revealed a thermal indication in the same location as where the LCF crack occurred. The records for the fractured fan blade's July 2015 TAI inspection was annotated 'paint' that, according to the inspector, was consistent with him accepting the indication because he thought it was an issue with the paint. P&W developed the TAI inspection process in about 2005 to be able to inspect the interior surfaces of the hollow core PW4000 fan blade.  P&W in keeping with NDI industry practice when implementing a new inspection process classified the TAI as a new and emerging technology and therefore did not have to develop a formal program for initial and recurrent training, certify the TAI inspectors, or have a Level 3 inspector on staff, as is done in other established NDI techniques.  But in 2015, and still in 2018 when the incident occurred, P&W was still categorizing the TAI as a new and emerging technology after having inspected over 9,000 fan blades.  At one point, P&W did provide training on the TAI, however, neither of the two inspectors were permitted to attend the training so that they could work to clear out a backlog of blades in the shop. The TAI inspector who worked on the incident fan blade stated that they never got any feedback from the engineers about the blades that they had rejected.  When they would reject a blade, it would go to an engineer for further evaluation.  However, they never got any feedback from the engineers if the rejection was a valid rejection or if it was a false positive. After it was determined that the two previous TAIs of the fractured fan blade showed thermal indications at the location of the fatigue crack, P&W initiated an over-inspection of all of the digital images of the TAIs accomplished on PW4000 112-inch fan blades. Because the aluminum versus the CFRP structure has the ability to yield while absorbing the same amount of energy, it can redistribute the FBO loads between the fan case and the inlet without causing failure to the inlet, or the fan case to inlet interface. The inlet and fan cowl structural analyses showed that the CFRP aft bulkhead design was less capable than the aluminum bulkhead that was tested during engine certification test and determined that multiple possible scenarios could have led to their separation; 1) the inlet aft bulkhead load path damage caused by the unanticipated magnitude of the displacements induced by the displacement wave following the FBO combined with the anticipated inner barrel fragment induced damage progressed under rundown loads, resulting in portions of the inlet departing within one second following the FBO, 2) the departure of portions of the inlet including the lower aft bulkhead caused the static and/or dynamic loads to increase beyond the fan cowls capability, that lead to the departure of large portions of the fan cowl, 3) the fan cowl honeycomb core strength was reduced below its capability to react rundown loads due to moisture ingression at the hinge points leading to large portions of the fan cowl departing prior to the inlets departure.

The captain, age 57, reported a total of 13,592 hours total time, with 360 hours in the B777. He held an FAA Airline Transport Pilot certificate with type ratings in the B777, B747, B737, B757, B767, and SD-3. He held a valid first class medical certificate with a restriction for glasses for near vision. His most recent flight review was October 10, 2017. The first officer, age 60, reported a total of 11,318 hours total time, with 10,087 in the B777. He held an FAA Airline Transport Pilot certificate with type ratings in the B777 and B747. He held a valid first class medical certificate with a restriction for glasses for near vision. His most recent flight review was October 3, 2017. The Boeing 777-200 is a long-range, wide-body, twin-engine airplane, with a maximum takeoff weight of 545,000 pounds. The incident airplane was equipped with P&W PW4077 turbofans. The airplane had accumulated 89,723 hours and 16,339 cycles since new. The PW4077 is a dual-spool, axial-flow, high bypass turbofan engine that features a 1-stage 112-inch diameter fan, 6-stage low pressure compressor (LPC), 11-stage high pressure compressor (HPC), annular combustor, 2-stage high pressure turbine (HPT) that drives the HPC, and a 7-stage low pressure turbine (LPT) that drives the fan and LPC. According to United Airlines' maintenance records, the No. 2 engine had accumulated 77,593 hours time since new (TSN) and 13,921 cycles since new (CSN) and 8,579 hours and 1,464 cycles since the last overhaul. The engine was installed on the airplane on October 18, 2015, at an airplane time and cycles since new of 81,144 hours and 14,875 cycles, respectively. The engine had operated 8,579 hours and 1,464 cycles since it had been installed. The PW4000 112-inch engine fan blade is a hollow core, wide chord airfoil made of a titanium alloy with 6 percent vanadium and 4 percent aluminum as alloying elements. The fan blade is about 40.5-inches long from the base of the blade root to the tip of the airfoil and about 12.5- and 22.25-inches wide at the blade root and blade tip, respectively. A fan blade weighs a maximum of 34.85 pounds. The inlet is a cantilevered structure that directs the airflow into the fan case in a controlled and uniform manner. The inlet consists of two concentric cylinders (the inner and outer barrels) joined by forward and aft bulkheads and a lip skin. The inlet aft bulkhead was constructed of CFRP on the production airplanes. During engine fan blade out (FBO) certification testing the inlet cowl construction consisted of an aluminum bulkhead. The inlet is bolted to the forward end of the fan case though an attach ring using 44 bolted connections. Loads and displacements resulting from a fan blade out event (FBO) are transferred between the inlet and the engine fan case though the attachment bolts and the attachment ring. The fan cowls are two cylindrical halves located aft of the inlet that enclose the engine fan case and the external engine accessories which provides a smooth aerodynamic surface over the core of the engine fan case. The fan cowls are supported on the forward end by the inlet and on the aft end by the thrust reverser. Additionally, the fan cowls are attached to the fan cowl support beam using four hinges (total of eight) at the top and latched (four latches) at the bottom to allow for the fan cowls to be opened for maintenance. The engine is certified under FAR part 33 regulations. To comply with the regulations, the engine successfully demonstrated containment and safe shutdown of an engine after intentional fracture of a fan blade at redline speed. Although it is necessary to install an inlet for proper engine operation during these tests, it is not required that this inlet meet production standards. The test inlet used was of a different design which included an aluminum aft bulkhead instead of the production CFRP aft bulkhead. Additionally, these tests are conducted without the fan cowls attached. The inlet and fan cowls are certified under FAR Part 25 of which Boeing was responsible for. On February 13, 2018, about 1200 Hawaiian standard time (HST), United Airlines flight 1175, a Boeing 777-222, N773UA, experienced an in-flight separation of a fan blade as well as portions of the inlet and fan cowl of the No. 2 (right) engine, a Pratt & Whitney (P&W) PW4077, over the Pacific Ocean enroute to the Daniel K. Inoyue International Airport (HNL), Honolulu, Hawaii. While the airplane was in level cruise flight at flight level (FL) 360, the flight crew heard a loud bang that was followed by a violent shaking of the airplane followed by warnings of a compressor stall. The flight crew shut down the engine, declared an emergency, and proceeded to HNL without further incident. There were no injuries to the 374 passengers and crew onboard and the airplane received minor damage. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a regularly scheduled passenger flight from the San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco, California (SFO) to HNL. At the time of the event, there were three pilots on the flight deck: the captain, who was the pilot monitoring, the first officer (FO), who was the pilot flying, and a jump seat rider, who was an off-duty United Airlines 777 FO. The flight departed SFO on time and the push back, taxi, takeoff, and climb were normal. The flight was about 120 miles from HNL at flight level (FL) 360 when there was a violent jolt and very loud bang that both pilots stated was followed by extreme airframe vibrations. The pilots reported that immediately after the jolt and loud bang, the autopilot disconnected, and the airplane began to roll to the right. A positive exchange of controls was accomplished with the captain becoming pilot flying. The pilots stated that about 15 to 30 seconds after the jolt and loud bang, the engine instruments indicated a failure of the number 2 engine. After accomplishing the Severe Engine Damage checklist, the crew shut down and secured the engine. The jump seat rider stated that after the right engine was shutdown, the vibration subsided although the controllability of the airplane was not normal. The crew declared an emergency and began a drift down descent to FL 230. The captain directed the jump seat rider to go back into the cabin to assess the condition of the engine. The jump seat rider noted that the engine was oscillating and that the cowling was missing. He took a video of the engine to show the captain and the FO what they were dealing with. The pilots reported that concurrently, the purser had come to the flight deck and the captain briefed her about the emergency and that they would be landing at HNL. The airplane continued to HNL and made a visual approach and landed on Runway 8R without further incident. The fan blade in position No. 11 was fractured transversely across the airfoil about 1.44-inches above the fairing at the leading edge and slightly below the surface of the fairing at the trailing edge. There was a piece of fan blade found up against the leading edges of the fan exit guide vanes at about 4 o'clock. This piece of fan blade was about 15-inches wide chord wise, 23-inches long radially, and had a fracture surface on the inner end that corresponded to the fracture surface on blade No. 11. Metallurgical examination revealed a fatigue fracture that had initiated from a subsurface origin in a region of micro texturing consisting mostly of primary alpha crystals on the interior surface of the hollow core fan blade. The examination also revealed that the fan blade's material conformed to the specified titanium alloy's requirements. There was extensive damage to the interior surface of the fan case in the form of gouging and cracking. Although there were cracks in the case and the outer layer of the Kevlar wrap was split, there was no penetration of debris. The Kevlar® environmental wrap was in place around th