DCA19LA070

the captain's decision to continue the landing with an unsafe gear indication.

The flight from LRD to the TCL area was normal, with no weather or operational issues. As the flight was on final approach, with the power near idle, the captain called for flaps 15 and gear down. A red status light for the nose gear illuminated indicating it was not down and locked. All flight crewmembers reported they saw the light. The flight engineer recommended recycling the gear lever, and the First Officer recommended a go-around to troubleshoot. The Captain declined and continued the approach. He did not call for or conduct any checklists for abnormal gear operation. The airplane landed long, and upon derotation, the forward fuselage contacted the runway with the nose gear retracted, resulting in substantial damage. The airplane came to rest with less than 500 feet of pavement remaining. The aircraft operation manual notes that attempting to extend gear while simultaneously operating flaps at idle power may result in unreliable gear operation. A crew operating the accident airplane two days prior reported having a gear issue under those conditions. Recycling the gear lever cleared the problem. It is likely that if the crew had conducted a go-around and completed the abnormal checklists and/or cycled the gear, the nose gear would have extended. Had it not extended, a go-around would have allowed for a more stabilized approach and landing with more runway available.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On January 28, 2019, at 20:08 central standard time (CST), Kalitta Charters II, LLC flight 720, a Boeing 727-2B6, N720CK, landed with the nose gear retracted on runway 4 at the Tuscaloosa Regional Airport (TCL), Tuscaloosa, Alabama. The airplane was substantially damaged and there were no injuries to the three flight crew and one non-revenue company mechanic onboard. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 as a cargo flight from Laredo International Airport (LRD), Laredo, Texas. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The flight departed LRD at 18:26 CST on an IFR flight plan. There were no irregularities or operational issues reported during the takeoff and enroute portion of the flight. According to the flight crew, the captain was the pilot flying when the accident occurred. At 19:58, the Birmingham Approach air traffic controller advised the crew that the wind at TCL was from 200 degrees at 4 knots. The crew acknowledged and advised that they would use runway 4. The controller instructed them to report the airport in sight. At 20:01, the crew reported the airport in sight, and the controller cleared them for the visual approach. There was no communication regarding any difficulty with the airplane. According to the flight crew, about 12 miles from the airport the captain called for flaps 15 and gear down. After the gear was selected down, the CVR recorded the first officer stating, "yeah it's down, but [unintelligble] the lights [unintelligble]" The crew reported that they noted a red warning light for the nose gear position, and heard the audible gear warning horn. The CVR recorded the captain queried, "what horn was that?" and the first officer (FO) responded, "[unintelligible] gear warning horn." The flight engineer (FE) stated that he recommended that they recycle the gear, the captain declined. The FO stated that he recommended that they go around to troubleshoot, the captain declined. The CVR recorded multiple automated "sink rate, pull up" warnings and the captain responded, "yeah, yeah, I got it." The FO then queried, "you gonna go around?", and the captain responded, "ah I'm gonna go… I got, it, I got it." The captain reportedly stated that the airplane had a history of a microswitch issue, and pressed on the gear handle and light. As the power was reduced to idle, the gear warning horn and the GPWS audible alerts sounded. The captain stated in an interview that he asked for the gear to be recycled, and also that he smelled smoke and did not want to delay. Neither the FO, FE, or non-revenue mechanic, reported these items, nor were any of these items audible on the CVR. The captain continued the approach and after landing, upon derotation, the forward fuselage contacted the runway and the airplane quickly slid to a stop with the nose gear retracted. After the airplane came to a stop, the captain stated, "it wasn't down," and the FO made a radio call to tower. About five seconds later the FO stated, "shoulda gone around," and the captain responded, "yeah, shoulda." INJURIES TO PERSONS None. DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT Skin and stringers in the vicinity of the nose gear well were substantially damaged, the nose gear assembly required replacement. The forward pressure bulkhead was damaged in the vicinity of the forward accessory compartment. OTHER DAMAGE There was minor damage to runway pavement. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The Captain, age 60, reported 23,700 total time, including 6,800 in the B727. He held an ATP certificate for airplane multiengine land and commercial certificate for airplane single engine land. He had an FAA first class medical dated 10/23/2018 with a restriction for corrective lenses. He held type ratings for the Boeing 727, 737, 757, and 767. He also holds a flight engineer certificate and private pilot (foreign based) certificate. He was hired by Kalitta Charters II, LLC on 9/30/2017. His last simulator proficiency check was on 9/22/2018. In the 90 days preceding the accident, he flew 104 hours and 6 hours in the preceding 30 days. He was hired as a captain with previous flying experience in the Boeing 727. He reported to the company that his logbook was destroyed in a natural disaster so his total times prior to employment with Kalitta Charters II, LLC are estimates. The first officer, age 46, held an ATP certificate with airplane multiengine land and a commercial certificate for airplane single engine land. He also held a Commercial certificate with ratings for rotorcraft- helicopter and instrument helicopter. He held a First Class Medical dated 10/30/2018 with no restrictions. He held type ratings for the Boeing 727 and Cessna Citation (CE-500). He was hired by Kalitta Charters II, LLC on 7/11/2018 and completed his line operating experience on 11/13/2018. His last simulator consolidation check was on 12-01-2018. His total flight time for all aircraft is 1,850 hours with 105 hours in the Boeing 727. He had a total of 810 hours airplane multiengine time. The Flight Engineer, age 60, held a Flight Engineer certificate with a turbojet powered rating and an A&P certificate. He was hired by Kalitta Charters II, LLC on 12/02/2013. He logged 315 hours as a flight engineer in the past 12 months AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The accident airplane was a Boeing 727-2B6, serial number 21298, manufactured in 1977. It was equipped with three Pratt & Whitney JT8D-15 engines. The aircraft had a maximum gross weight of 194,800 lbs. The weight at the time of the landing accident was 145,049 lbs. The aircraft's last continuous airworthiness inspection was 1/20/2019 and the total airframe hours were 57,932. The nose landing gear was removed, replaced and signed off 2/12/2010. The nose landing gear actuator was replaced on 4/08/2017 after a discrepancy was reported that the nose gear would not extend and had to be cycled up and down. The nose gear operates via System A hydraulic pressure. When the landing gear lever on the flight deck is placed into the down position, a cable drives the landing gear selector valve in the main wheel well. Hydraulic fluid is then ported to the pressure side of the nose gear lock actuator and nose gear extend/retract actuator. A transfer cylinder mounted on the aft bulkhead of the wheel well momentarily equalizes hydraulic pressure on the nose gear actuator at the start of each extension cycle to relieve the nose gear of the actuator force until the uplock is released. During the neutral force period the lock actuator unlocks the gear and starts the drag brace folding. According to the Kalitta Charters II, LLC Boeing 727 Aircraft Operations Manual Vol. II Ch. 20, Landing Gear: "The nose gear transfer cylinder assists in unlocking the nose gear during normal gear extension and requires full System A hydraulic pressure for normal operation. Simultaneous operation of the landing gear and flaps will cause a large volume demand on the system and with engines at or near idle RPM, hydraulic pump volume output may not be sufficient to maintain normal system pressure of 2800-3100 psi. With this condition the nose gear transfer cylinder may not operate properly to assist in unlocking the nose gear and noisy or unreliable nose gear operation may result." One day prior to the accident, a different flight crew experienced an indication that the nose landing gear failed to extend. This flight was also landing at TCL, and the crew reported they were high and fast, and that power was near idle, and flaps were in transit when the gear was selected down. After extending the landing gear, the crew received a red warning light for the nose gear. The green nose gear down and lock light was not illuminated. The crew requested delaying vectors and referenced the abnormal checklist for landing gear indications. They attempted to swap out the green down