DCA23LA384

The first officer’s improper control inputs after the airplane touched down. Contributing to the severity of the damage was the flight crew’s lack of recognition that the speedbrakes were not armed, which led to their delayed deployment.

After a stabilized approach, the main landing gear of United Airlines flight 702 touched down and the nosewheel contacted the runway harder than expected. The airplane then bounced, and the first officer (the pilot flying) reacted by pulling the control yoke aft to keep the nosewheel from impacting the runway a second time. The first officer applied the thrust reversers, the speed brakes deployed, and the nosewheel bounced a second time. Subsequently, the nosewheel impacted the runway a third time and, the airplane began to decelerate normally. The abnormal nosewheel impacts with the runway resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage. Although the first officer stated he held aft pressure on the control column during the initial touchdown, flight data showed that he also made nosedown column inputs during the landing sequence. These nose-down inputs contributed to the nosewheel abnormally impacting the runway. Normal operation of the speedbrakes includes deployment during initial main gear touchdown, if the speedbrakes are in the armed position and the thrust levers are at idle. The only indication that the speedbrakes are armed is a demarcation line located on the control stand. If they do not automatically deploy during main gear touchdown, the pilot monitoring (in this case, the captain) announces the abnormal operation and slowly raises the speedbrake handle to the up position while the pilot flying slowly lowers the airplane’s nose to the runway. In addition, the speedbrakes will automatically deploy if the airplane is on the ground and either thrust lever is moved to the reverse idle detent. However, the speedbrakes were not armed before landing and after the airplane’s first bounce, data showed the speedbrakes automatically deployed with the first officer’s application of the thrust reversers, as designed. The deployment of the speedbrakes with the thrust reversers was while the nosewheel was still in the air. This likely contributed to the second abnormal runway contact of the nosewheel and the subsequent damage to the airplane. It is also likely that neither flight crewmember noticed that the speedbrakes were not armed before landing. Crew Performance De-rotation is the lowering of the aircraft’s nose gear to the runway following touchdown on the main gear during landing. The first officer’s nose-down column inputs were contrary to United Airlines’ procedures and training. The first officer’s training records showed inconsistencies in airplane handling as recent as a few months before the accident. He received an unsatisfactory performance rating and, upon re-evaluation, a satisfactory rating with a condition to recheck after 90 days (instead of 9 months). This was due to, among other things, marginal performance with landings. According to the check airman who completed the first officer’s second evaluation, the purpose of the recheck was to ensure, due to the first officer’s previous “struggles,” that his “proficiency is up to standards”. The first officer had accumulated about 129 flight hours in the accident airplane make and model. Due to the satisfactory performance rating on the first officers second evaluation, the investigation was unable to determine if the first officers training inconsistencies contributed to the accident.

IAH was equipped with an automated surface observing system. A review of the observations 15 minutes before and 10 minutes after the accident revealed that the wind was coming from the southsouthwest at a speed of 5 knots or less. The Captain The captain was hired by United Airlines in April 2001 as a first officer. At the time of the accident, the captain was based at EWR, and he held type ratings in the Airbus 320 and Boeing 737, 757, and 767. According to the captain’s training records, his most recently completed training included a proficiency check and emergency drill training on June 12, 2023, crew resource management on April 24, 2023, and initial operating experience on October 23, 2022. His most recent line check was completed on January 21, 2023. The First Officer The FO was hired by United Airlines on February 7, 2023. At the time of the accident, the first officer was based at EWR, and he held type ratings on several airplanes, including the Boeing 757 and 767. The first officer completed the required training and his initial line-oriented evaluation checkride on April 28, 2023, receiving an unsatisfactory performance rating due to deficiencies with takeoffs and aircraft control. During his second checkride, the FO obtained a satisfactory performance rating but received the minimum grade in three areas, one of which was landings, which resulted in a “short cycle.” A short cycle allowed the first officer to proceed with operating experience but required him to be evaluated in 90 days rather than the normal period of 9 months. According to the check airman who completed the FO’s second line-oriented evaluation, the purpose of the short cycle was to ensure that the FO’s “proficiency is up to standards” given his previous “struggles.” The speedbrake on the accident airplane was controlled by the speedbrake lever, which was located on the control stand. The speedbrake had three positions: down, armed, and up, which were identified by demarcation lines. The Boeing 767 Flight Crew Operations Manual, dated October 11, 2019, stated in part the following: The speedbrake lever can be placed in an intermediate position between ARMED and UP. In the ARMED position, when the landing gear is fully on the ground (not tilted) and the thrust levers are at idle, the speedbrake lever is driven aft to the UP position and the spoiler panels are fully extended. On the ground, when either thrust lever is moved to the reverse idle detent, the speedbrake lever is driven to the up position and the spoiler panels are fully extended. The speedbrake lever does not need to be in the ARMED position. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed damage to the crown of the upper fuselage. The fuselage skin was buckled and fractured, as shown in figure 1, with damage to the underlying stringers and frames. Figure 1. Close-up view of the airplane damage on the left side of the fuselage (Source: United Airlines). On July 29, 2023, about 1034 central daylight time (CDT), United Airlines flight 702, a Boeing 767-322, N641UA, sustained substantial damage while landing at George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH), Houston, Texas. The 202 passengers and crew aboard the airplane were not injured. The flight was operating as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 scheduled domestic passenger flight from Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey, to IAH. The first officer (FO) was the pilot flying, and the captain was the pilot monitoring. The flight crew reported that the departure from EWR and the cruise segment of the flight were uneventful. The airplane was cleared for the DOOBI2 arrival to IAH and then the instrument landing system approach to runway 26L. According to the flight crew, the airplane was fully configured for landing, on speed, and in compliance with the company’s stable approach criteria, and the initial touchdown on the main wheels was normal. The FO stated that, after the main landing gear touched down, he held aft pressure on the control yoke to keep the nosewheel from hitting the runway, but the nosewheel contacted the runway with “abnormal force.” The airplane seemed to bounce, and the FO reacted by pulling the control yoke aft to keep the nosewheel from impacting the runway a second time. Flight data recorder (FDR) data indicated that control column inputs ranged from about 5° nose high to 5° nose low during the landing. Data also indicated that the speedbrakes deployed simultaneously as the thrust reversers transitioned from not deployed to deployed, and the nosewheel bounced a second time. Subsequently, the nosewheel contacted the runway a third time and the airplane began to decelerate. The captain assumed control of the airplane, and the remainder of the landing rollout was normal. United Airlines 757-767 Flight Manual The United Airlines 757-767 Flight Manual, dated June 30, 2023, Normals, Landings, stated in part the following: [PF, PM] Touchdown and rollout. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Accomplish/monitor Ensure that the airplane is not allowed to pitch up after touchdown. Fly the nose down to the runway. For a normal landing, plan for touchdown at least 1000 feet from the threshold. Hold sufficient back pressure on the control column to keep the pitch attitude constant. Touchdown should occur at an airspeed of no less than VREF. This typically results in main gear touchdown approximately 1500-1800 feet from the threshold. If the EICAS advisory AUTOBRAKE displays or if deceleration is not normal, brake manually. [PM] Speed brakes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Monitor Announce abnormal operation. If automatic extension fails, the Captain slowly raises the speed brakes to the up position while the nose is smoothly lowered to the runway. Boeing 767 Flight Crew Training Manual The Boeing 767 Flight Crew Training Manual, dated June 30, 2023, provided the following landing procedure guidance: After main gear touchdown, initiate the landing roll procedure. Fly the nose wheels smoothly onto the runway without delay. IF the speedbrakes do not extend automatically move the speedbrake lever to the UP position without delay. Control column movement forward of neutral should not be required. Do not attempt to hold the nose wheels off the runway. Holding the nose up after touchdown for aerodynamic braking is not an effective braking technique and results in high nose gear sink rates upon brake application and reduced braking effectiveness. To avoid possible airplane structural damage, do not make large nose down control column movements before the nose wheels are lowered to the runway. The Boeing 767 Flight Crew Training Manual also provided the following flare and touchdown guidance: The techniques discussed here are applicable to all landings including one engine inoperative landings, crosswind landings and landings on slippery runways. Unless an unexpected or sudden event occurs, such as windshear or collision avoidance situation, it is not appropriate to use sudden, violent or abrupt control inputs during landing…. When the threshold passes out of sight under the airplane nose shift the visual sighting point to the far end of the runway. Shifting the visual sighting point assists in controlling the pitch attitude during the flare. Maintaining a constat airspeed and descent rate assists in determining the flare point. Initiate the flare when the main gear is approximately 20 to 30 feet above the runway by increasing the pitch attitude approximately 2° - 3°. This slows the rate of descent. After the flare is initiated, smoothly retard the thrust levers to idle, and make small pitch attitude adjustments to maintain the desired descent rate to the runway. A smooth thrust reduction to idle also assists in controlling the natural nose-down pitch change associated with thrust reduction.