DCA25LA114

The failure of the cabin crew to activate the evacuation alarm and to maintain coordinated communication with the flight crew following the cabin crew’s decision to command an evacuation, which resulted in an engine running during the initial evacuation. Contributing to evacuation difficulties were passenger noncompliance with cabin crew instructions, including retrieving carry-on baggage, ignoring instructions to remain seated and to return items to the overhead bins, and to wait for the L2 slide to fully deploy.

United Airlines flight 1382, an Airbus A319, experienced a contained failure of the right engine during its takeoff roll at George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH), Houston, Texas. The flight crew rejected the takeoff and stopped the airplane on the runway, and the aft flight attendants initiated an emergency evacuation. Although no injuries were reported among 107 passengers and 5 crew members, the event prompted an emergency response, partial evacuation, and subsequent investigation into passenger behavior and slide deployment issues. Figure 1. Photo of evacuation door slide 2L after aborted takeoff. (Source: United Airlines) The flight crew reported no operational or air traffic control (ATC) pressures during taxi and confirmed all checklists were completed. Takeoff commenced using reduced thrust and prior to reaching V1 (138 knots), a loud bang was recorded on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), followed by an “ENG 2 FAIL” indication, and a momentary yaw to the right. After initiating a rejected takeoff, the flight crew made a passenger announcement (PA) instructing passengers to remain seated, and they brought the airplane to a complete stop on runway 15R. The flight crew initiated the rejected takeoff checklist. Shortly thereafter, the procedure was interrupted by a call from a flight attendant (FA), who relayed that several passengers had reported observing a fire in the right engine. In response, the flight crew transitioned to the Engine Fire Checklist. Subsequent coordination with cabin crew confirmed that no smoke was present within the passenger cabin. The flight crew contacted ATC to report the situation and requested airport rescue and firefighting (ARFF) assistance. Evacuation There were three FAs assigned to the flight: the forward FA (FM1), acting as the purser, and two aft FAs—FA2 positioned at Door 2R and FA1 positioned at Door 2L. Following the flight crew’s PA announcement instructing passengers to remain seated, both the purser and FA2 repeatedly issued verbal commands reinforcing this directive. Despite these efforts, multiple individuals began shouting, “fire on the engine, let me get out!”—specifically referring to the right engine. This triggered widespread panic among the aftcabin passengers, many of whom stood up and began retrieving personal belongings. FA2 and the purser attempted to calm the cabin, instructing passengers to stay seated and return items to the overhead bins. Airbus’s Cabin Crew Operating Manual (CCOM) 14030, Evacuation Guidelines – Assessing the Outside Conditions, requires crew members to evaluate exterior conditions, ensuring the slide deployment area is free of smoke, fire, a running engine, or obstacles. According to United Airlines, in a situation where FAs must take immediate action in the interest of safety, FAs should attempt to contact the pilots prior to initiating an evacuation. However, if conditions exist where danger is obvious and imminent, or contact is not possible, flight attendants should evacuate as quickly as possible by using the appropriate commands. They must also assess conditions (look for fire or other hazards inside and outside the aircraft) and shout: “STAND BACK!” while assessing exits. If the route is usable, proceed with evacuation and then continue to assess conditions throughout the evacuation. For a FA to detect a running engine, an FA would need to utilize auditory cues or establish contact with the flight deck. According to statements from the cabin crew, FA1 conducted an external assessment using the 2L and 2R door viewing windows and observed no smoke, fire, obstructions, or other abnormalities. The statements did not indicate whether FA1 attempted to assess whether the left engine was still operating. FA1 next attempted to assess the interior cabin; however, passenger behavior impeded this effort. Passengers began shouting “fire,” climbing over seats, and obstructing the aisle with carryon baggage as they moved toward the aft galley. This congestion physically prevented FA1 from accessing the economy cabin area to conduct a more complete evaluation. Additionally, three tall and large male passengers moved toward Door 2L insisting that an evacuation occur. FA1 was forced to step back until positioned against the aft lavatory adjacent to 2L. One passenger was described as aggressive and vocal, repeatedly stating, “Open this door now!” and “We need to get out—there is a fire!” FA1 continued issuing instructions: “Please stand back and stay clear of the galley and door area. The flight attendants and pilots are assessing conditions. I need to assess conditions and can only do that if everyone remains seated.” Despite this, the passengers were described as panicked, fearful, and acting irrationally. FA1 attempted to contact the captain via interphone but received no response. FA1 then attempted to reach the purser, also without success. With passengers escalating their attempts to reach the doors, FA1 informed FA2 that a flight attendantinitiated evacuation was necessary, and FA2 agreed. FA2 asked which side to use, and FA1 indicated the left side. FA2 moved to block door 2R while FA1 proceeded to open door 2L. The aft FAs did not activate the evacuation alarm before or after opening the door because the passengers in the aft were already moving towards an emergency exit. The evacuation alarm serves as an auditory signal not only to passengers, but it also alerts crew that an emergency evacuation is required. Because the evacuation alarm was not activated, there was a delay in the flight crew’s awareness of the cabin evacuation which contributed to the left engine running during slide deployment. FA1 continued issuing “stand back” commands and attempted to verify full slide deployment. However, as soon as the door opened, the three male passengers pushed past FA1 and went down the 2L slide before it had fully deployed. Immediately following their descent, the slide began to deflate. Recognizing that the slide was no longer functional, FA1 blocked the 2L exit using “exit block—stand back” commands and instructed passengers to wait, as the exit was no longer usable. This highlights the challenges faced by cabin crews when attempting to manage passenger behavior during emergencies or perceived emergency situations, particularly when passenger fear and urgency result in disregard for crewmember authority and standard evacuation procedures. Cabin crew training emphasizes assertive command presence and passenger control during evacuations; however, this event demonstrates how rapidly escalating passenger behavior can affect evacuation dynamics even in the absence of confirmed fire or smoke conditions. Since passengers were now visible outside the airplane on the left side and firefighters were present near their vehicles, the captain instructed the FO to initiate the evacuation checklist. Five seconds later, the purser queried the flight crew regarding deployment of the forward left door (1L) evacuation slide, and the crew confirmed the deployment. The captain indicated that when the FA communicated with him about the evacuation at 1L, they immediately started to shut down the left engine. The captain also indicated that when the 2L and 2R doors opened, without his command, the left engine was still running. Post-incident review of airport surveillance footage confirmed the sequence of door openings, passenger egress and the erratic behavior of the 2L slide while the left engine was still running. Critical coordination challenges can exist between flight and cabin crew during emergency scenarios, particularly regarding communication, evacuation command authority, and procedural adherence. In this incident, the failure to activate the evacuation alarm and the premature opening of doors while an engine was running, contributed to evacuation complications and poten

Flight 1382 was a scheduled passenger flight, from IAH to LaGuardia (LGA) airport, New York, New York, with a planned departure time of 0805 CST. The flight crew reported that this was day three of a four-day trip. The captain was the pilot flying, and the first officer (FO) was pilot monitoring. According to the flight crew, there were no operational or ATC pressures while taxiing to runway 15R. All checklists were completed in advance, and the correct runway was verified prior to takeoff. Takeoff was conducted using reduced thrust, with a 10-knot tailwind, as per the runway 15R takeoff data message. V1, the takeoff decision speed, was calculated at 138 knots. According to the CVR, the flight was cleared for takeoff by the IAH local control (LC) controller at 0814:08. Flight data recorder (FDR) data showed that the airplane aligned with the runway heading at about 0814:33. At 0814:43, the CVR captured sounds consistent with an increase in engine rpm and the FDR showed that engine N1 (low-pressure compressor), the longitudinal acceleration, and the ground speed increased, consistent with the start of the takeoff roll. At 0815:00, the pilot monitoring made the standard 100-knot callout. At 0815:05, prior to reaching V1, a loud bang was recorded on the CVR, after which the flight crew declared a rejected takeoff. The flight crew reported that this event was followed by electronic centralized aircraft monitor (ECAM) indications of “ENG 2 FAIL,” accompanied by a momentary yaw of the aircraft to the right. At 0815:17, the flight crew then made a PA announcement instructing passengers to remain seated. According to United, during a rejected takeoff, pilots will make the “remain seated, remain seated” announcement. This announcement is meant to prevent passenger movement and allow for assessment of conditions and if necessary, secure the airplane for an evacuation. The flight crew will repeat this command if the FAs make them aware passengers are standing up. When FAs hear the “remain seated” command, according to the FA operating manual and their training, when the airplane comes to a stop, they will release their seatbelts and get out of their jumpseat and assess conditions inside and outside of their assigned exit(s) but will not initiate an evacuation. The FA operating manual permits FAs to initiate an evacuation independently if they believe that there is an imminent threat to the safety of the cabin and cannot reach the flight deck via the interphone. According to the FDR, during the takeoff roll, the indicated airspeed reached a maximum of 125 kts before decreasing. At 0815:30, the aircraft came to a complete stop on runway 15R. Three FAs were assigned to this flight; the purser (FM1), and two aft flight attendants—FA2 at Door 2R and FA1 at Door 2L. After the flight crew made the PA announcement instructing passengers to remain seated, the purser and FA2 repeatedly instructed passengers to “remain seated,” but heard multiple individuals shouting, “fire on the engine, let me get out!”—specifically referencing the right engine. This led to widespread panic among passengers seated in the aft cabin, many of whom stood up and began retrieving personal items. FA2 and the purser worked to calm the passengers, directing them to remain seated and return their belongings to the overhead bins. Both aft FA’s reinforced these instructions via PA announcement: “Please remain seated until further information from the captain.” According to Airbus’s CCOM 14-030, Evacuation Guidelines - Assessing the Outside Conditions chapter, the crew must assess the outside conditions, checking that the slide deployment area is clear of smoke, fire, or obstacles and engines aren’t running. According to United Airlines, in a situation where flight attendants must take immediate action in the interest of safety, flight attendants should attempt to contact the pilots prior to initiating an evacuation. They must also assess conditions (look for fire or other hazards inside and outside the aircraft) and shout: “STAND BACK!” while assessing exit. If the route is usable, proceed with evacuation and then continue to assess conditions throughout the evacuation. For a FA to detect a running engine, an FA would need to utilize auditory cues or establish contact with the flight deck to determine if an engine is running. According to cabin crew statements, FA1 assessed the outside conditions through the 2L and 2R door viewing windows and observed no obstructions, fire, smoke, or other abnormalities. The cabin crew statements did not include any information regarding if FA1 tried to evaluate whether the left engine was still running. FA1 then attempted to assess the economy cabin; however, passengers began shouting “fire” while climbing over seats and obstructing the aisle with carry-on baggage as they moved toward the aft galley. Due to the passenger congestion, there was no physical access from the aft galley into the economy cabin to further evaluate conditions. The passengers did not comply with crew instructions to remain seated. Additionally, three tall and large-in-size male passengers moved toward the aft exit, insisting on evacuating. According to cabin crew statements, FA1 had to take a couple steps back until she was up against the aft lavatory, located next to the 2L door. One customer was very aggressive and vocal. He stated, “Open this door now!” while pointing at the 2L door, and added, “We need to get out—there is a fire!” FA1 continued to issue directions to the passengers; “Please stand back and stay clear of the galley and door area, the flights attendants and pilots are assessing conditions. I need to assess conditions, and I can only do that if everyone remains seated.” FA1 tried to reach the captain, via interphone, and waited for him to answer, then tried the purser. FA1 was unsuccessful in getting any response.  FA1 then told FA2 they needed to do a flight attendant-initiated evacuation, and FA2 agreed.  FA2 asked which side to use, and FA1 confirmed the left side. FA2 blocked door 2R, while FA1 opened door 2L, in the armed position. FA1 continued to provide stand back commands and attempted to observe the slide’s full deployment. However, as soon as the door opened, the three male passengers moved past her and started sliding down the 2L slide before it was completely deployed. After they went down the slide, it started to deflate. She then blocked the 2L exit with the exit block “stand back” command and instructed the rest of the passengers to wait as the slide was no longer functional. The aft FAs reported that the evacuation alarm was not activated because the passengers in the aft were already beginning to move towards an emergency exit. The evacuation alarm serves as an auditory signal to passengers and crew that an emergency evacuation is required. About the same time in the forward cabin, the purser observed passengers towards the middle and back sections of the airplane standing up, opening overhead bins, and standing on their seats. The purser issued a command over the PA instructing all passengers to take their seats. Immediately following this announcement, the purser heard someone yell “fire.” The purser subsequently proceeded to the overwing exit area to assess the situation. By the time the purser got there, passengers were yelling “fire.” Without sufficient time to conduct a full assessment, the purser returned to the front of the aircraft and placed an emergency call to the flight deck. At 0815:49, the flight crew initiated the rejected takeoff checklist. Shortly thereafter, the procedure was interrupted by a call from a flight attendant, who relayed that several passengers had reported observing a fire in the right (number 2) engine. In response, the crew transitioned to the Engine Fire Checklist. Subsequent coordination with cabin