DCA26FA194

On May 3, 2026, about 13:50 eastern daylight time (EDT), United Airlines flight 169, Boeing B767-424ER, N77066, struck a light pole on the New Jersey turnpike while on final approach to runway 29 at Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey. Debris from the light pole subsequently impacted a tractor-trailer traveling southbound on the New Jersey turnpike. The airplane landed and taxied to the gate without further incident. The 3 flight crew members, 8 cabin crew members and 220 passengers deplaned at the gate without any injury. The driver of the tractor-trailer sustained minor injuries. The damage to the airplane was substantial. The flight was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 as a scheduled international passenger flight from Venice Marco Polo Airport (VCE), Venice, Italy to EWR. As part of the investigative process, the NTSB invited qualified parties to participate in the investigation. These included the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), United Airlines, Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), and the Boeing Company. An operations group was formed, and the accident flight crew were interviewed. The flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) were shipped to NTSB headquarters for download by the Research and Engineering Recorders Lab. Both recorders were downloaded successfully and a CVR group was formed. A vehicle performance specialist reviewed data from the FDR, CVR, Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B), and radar, along with security video. The ground proximity warning computer was also shipped to NTSB headquarters and will be downloaded at the manufacturer at a later date. Recovered pieces of the struck light pole were collected. Crew Experience The flight times for the 3 flight crew members were as follows: the captain had 2,724 hours in the B757 and B767 with 378 hours as captain. The first officer had 1,958 hours and the relief officer (for the international flight) had 853 hours in the B757 and B767. Total time with United; the captain had 16,385 hours with 5,205.5 as captain and 11,179.5 as first officer, the first office had 1,958 hours, and the relief officer had 1,075 hours. Note: the flight crew members’ flight time is their time at United and does not include their flight time before being hired at United. History of Flight The flight crew was originally scheduled to depart May 1st in a Boeing 757-200 from EWR, fly to Shannon Airport (SNN) in Shannon, Ireland, and back to EWR. However, the flight crew was reassigned by crew scheduling to a different airplane and route shortly before their planned departure to SNN. They were now to depart EWR in a Boeing 767-400, fly to VCE, and return to EWR. The first officer was the pilot flying (PF) on the outbound leg to VCE, and the captain was the PF for the return leg to EWR with the first officer the pilot monitoring (PM). Everything on the flight from VCE was normal until the descent. The flight crew planned to land on runway 4R but was changed to runway 22L during the descent. The crew was asked to prepare for holding while the airport arrival and departure pattern was changed. However, the flight did not have to hold. The crew slowed to 250 knots in anticipation of holding. The runway was changed again, this time to runway 29 and the crew was assigned the RNAV W RWY 29 approach, see figure 1. The captain stated he briefed the new approach after each change and that even though they were compressed briefings, all required items were covered. Figure 1. RNAV (GPS) W Rwy 29 approach into Newark. Note: after crossing AXELL, a visual approach is to be flown along the depicted track to runway 29. The captain stated they had no CRM [crew resource management] issues on the flight. The captain was not concerned about the approach. He stated that he expected to fly the final portion of the approach at 3 red and 1 white on the Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI). This was his desired sight picture for runway 29. The CVR did not capture any discussion of PAPI lights for runway 29 prior to landing. The captain stated that he turned off the autopilot and the auto-throttles at approximately 880 ft MSL or just around AXELL. He said that he “got fast” while he turned the airplane into the headwind and pulled the power levers back to compensate. The airplane shortly returned to a stable airspeed even though the wind gusts were producing “moderate turbulence.” The captain stated he heard the first officer call out “airspeed slow” while on short final (inside ½ mile). He mentioned that he did not receive any windshear alerts and that he always felt that the airplane was in a safe position to land. He responded to the automated 500 ft callout with the statement “stable”. At 500 ft, the first officer stated, they were on speed and on profile, and the captain was maintaining his planned profile of 3 red and 1 white on the PAPI. Once again, the CVR did not capture any discussion of PAPI lights for runway 29 prior to landing. Additionally, the captain, as the PF, was looking outside the airplane, and the first officer as the PM was “more committed to being inside the airplane, looking for trends.” As they descended, the airspeed began to decay, and the first officer recalled that he stated, “hey you are slow,” followed moments later by, “you are still slow and a little low.” The PM then looked back outside, and at that point recalled “I thought we were low”, however they were just about to touch down, and he didn’t process the information in time to get a go-around callout verbalized. The airplane landed, taxied to the gate, and all passengers and crew deplaned normally. The captain stated that just before touchdown “he heard a thump”. The first officer recalled feeling a mild jolt as they neared the threshold. The relief officer stated that he heard an audible thump as they went over the airport boundary a second or two before landing. After the flight landed, the purser called the flight deck and said the aft flight attendants heard a loud bang just prior to landing. After parking at the gate, the captain went outside to assess the airplane and found damage along the aft fuselage. Figures 2 and 3 show the accident flight track for the RNAV approach. Figure 4 shows airspeed, ground speed, and throttle information. Figure 2. Google Earth image with accident airplane’s flight path overlayed. Figure 3. Google Earth image showing the New Jersey turnpike, light post and approach end of runway 29. Note: the turnpike is 5 ft higher than the runway and altitude is depicted as height above ground, so the airplane descended a total of 6 ft between 1350:04 and 1350:05. Figure 4. The upper plot depicts FDR pressure altitude corrected for the barometric setting, ADS-B groundspeed, FDR airspeed and the programmed target airspeed. The lower plot indicates when the auto-throttles were on/off and the throttle lever angle. At the last Meteorological Aerodrome Report (METAR) prior to landing (16:51 UTC), the wind was at 290 degrees at 19 knots, gusting to 30 knots, visibility was 10 statute miles, and the altimeter was 29.88 inches of mercury. The Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) issued at 17:24 UTC forecasted gusts up to 30 knots. The TAF issued at 14:32 UTC forecasted gusts up to 28 knots. Figure 5 shows the wind speed and direction from the FDR. Postaccident inspection showed all three altimeters (the captain’s, first officer’s and the standby) were accurately set to the reported altimeter setting of 29.88 Inches of mercury. To view the captain and first officer’s altimeter settings, the APU had to be started. Figure 5. Plot depicts wind speed (blue line) and direction (yellow line) from the FDR. There is a gust just prior to the airplane reaching NOWAY at 1349:25. Runway 29 A precision