DEN08GA076

The pilot's failure to maintain aircraft control following the jettison of the load during an aerial fire flighting mission, which resulted in an inadvertent stall and impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident were the improperly configured aircraft for the flight, the gusty wind conditions, and the pressure to complete the mission.

A state forest service representative contacted the operator, who had two single-engine air tanker (SEAT) airplanes, and requested aerial support to a wildfire, which was identified by local authorities as the TA25 wildfire. The interagency dispatch system coordinated flight following of the two SEATs from the operator’s airfield directly to the wildfire. Prior to the flight, the accident pilot checked the weather for the area and declined support to the TA25 wildfire, due to high winds, but accepted a mission to another wildfire, approximately 55 nautical miles east, because of its location relative to wind activity and terrain. While en route, the dispatch system informed the accident pilot that the airplanes were not needed for the other wildfire, but inquired whether they could support the TA25 wildfire. Being halfway into their flight, the pilots decided they would at least check out the flight conditions at the TA25 wildfire rather than cancel the mission. After arriving to the TA25 wildfire, the accident pilot coordinated the drop area with a ground contact, and the second pilot maintained aerial observation support. The accident pilot performed a dry run over the area and then told the ground contact that the winds and turbulence were too strong to do a drop. The drop zone was then moved to another location at the TA25 wildfire. Gusty winds and power line hazards were reported to the accident pilot by the ground contact. Witnesses observed the airplane drop the load, then enter a vertical climb, stall, and impact terrain. The last calculated groundspeed of the airplane was 81 miles per hour (mph), and estimated winds at the time of the accident were at least 30 knots and gusting from the southwest. Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no pre-impact anomalies. The flaps were found in the full-extended position, and the airplane flight manual for fire control operations recommended a flap setting of 10 degrees. Representatives of the land management agencies reported to the NTSB that due to the local procurement arrangement for this flight, several levels of personnel typically involved in the decision making and dispatch processes for wildfires, were not involved, and the airplane was not properly configured for aerial fire support.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On April 15, 2008, approximately 1815 mountain daylight time, an Air Tractor AT-602 single-engine air tanker (SEAT) airplane, N602AA, was destroyed when it impacted terrain while maneuvering near Fort Carson, Colorado. The commercial pilot, who was the sole occupant, sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was operated by the Department of Defense (DOD), Fort Carson, Colorado, for public use firefighting missions, and registered to Aero-Applicators, Inc., Sterling, Colorado. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company flight plan was filed. The flight originated from Mertens Airport (3CO2), a private airstrip, in Sterling, Colorado, at 1639. On April 14, 2008, a 9,800-acre wildfire, known as the Training Area 25 (TA25) wildfire, originated on the Fort Carson military reservation. In order to coordinate the fire suppression and rescue efforts, a unified command was in place with DOD, United States Forest Service (USFS), El Paso County, and the City of Colorado Springs, Colorado, personnel. On April 15th, two Aero-Applicators, Inc., aircraft were ordered by the DOD, Fort Carson, to support the TA25 wildfire. The aircraft were contracted directly to the DOD by the use of a local procurement agreement that the Colorado State Forest Service had with the vendor, Aero-Applicators, Inc. The interagency dispatch system provided contact information between the vendor and DOD, and coordinated flight following of the aircraft from the vendor’s airfield directly to the fire. Aero-Applicators Inc. Pilot’s Statement According to the pilot of the other Aero-Applicators, Inc. airplane, the company received a phone call from the Colorado State Forest Service, Fort Collins, Colorado, dispatch facility, inquiring whether they could assist in fire fighting efforts at the TA25 wildfire near Fort Carson (approximately 130 nautical miles (nm) southwest of Sterling). The company administrative assistant passed the phone call to the accident pilot, who was at another location at the time of the original call (the accident pilot was the one who was to make the decision because he was the lead air tanker pilot for Aero-Applicators, Inc.). Approximately 15 minutes after the original call was received, the accident pilot arrived at the company location. The accident pilot informed the second pilot that Fort Collins dispatch contacted him regarding the request, and he was going to check the weather because they were aware of high winds in the Fort Carson area. The accident pilot stated that "anything over 20 knots, they were not going." After checking the weather via the internet, he decided that support to Fort Carson was not an option due to the high winds. The accident pilot called back to Fort Collins dispatch and told them they could not go to Fort Carson. Fort Collins then asked them if they could go assist in fire fighting efforts at a wildfire that was near Ordway, Colorado (approximately 140 nm south of Sterling, approximately 55 nm southeast of Fort Carson). The accident pilot decided that they would give that location a try because it was in the plains/flat area, and the winds were probably not as high. Approximately 1645, the two airplanes (both AT-602s) were loaded full of fuel and 500 gallons of water and Class A foam, and they departed 3CO2 for Ordway. While en route, they still had not received the latitude/longitude coordinates for the Ordway fire from Fort Collins dispatch, so the accident pilot contacted them via radio. Fort Collins dispatch then told them to change their plans and go to the TA25 wildfire instead. The two pilots decided that since they were already halfway to Fort Carson or Ordway, and they would at least check out the flight conditions at the TA25 wildfire before they cancelled the mission. Fort Collins dispatch gave the pilots the coordinates for the TA25 wildfire, and the two airplanes diverted to that location. When the two airplanes arrived, the "incident commander (IC)" gave them instructions on what they wanted them to do. The IC asked the accident pilot to plan a drop at the head of the fire. The accident pilot performed a dry run over the area and then told the IC that the winds and turbulence were too strong to do a drop. During the dry run, the second pilot tried to stay above and behind the accident pilot in order to provide observation support. The IC then requested a different drop location along the road, which was an east/west road located north of one end of the wildfire and adjacent to Highway 115. Prior to the drop, the IC informed the accident pilot about gusty winds and power line hazards. The accident pilot made his drop, east to west, approximately 50 feet agl, where the IC told him to drop. The second pilot thought the drop looked good. After checking his position, the second pilot looked down at the accident pilot’s airplane and observed the accident airplane in a "180-degree vertical going down…the airplane impacted the terrain at a 45-degree nose-down angle, and then the airplane’s tail came down." The second pilot immediately turned his airplane and flew to the southwest, and "milked out his load" over sections of the fire. The second pilot called the IC and asked about the accident pilot’s condition. After hearing about the accident pilot, he then turned the east/northeast and headed back to Sterling. The second airplane landed at Sterling approximately 1900. The second pilot estimated the winds at the time of the accident to be at least 30 knots and gusting. He stated it was difficult to hold altitude and airspeed while maneuvering during the accident airplane’s drop, and he "rolled" in flaps at various times because his airspeed was getting slow once in awhile. Fort Carson Fire and Emergency Services Chief’s Statement According to the Department of Defense Fort Carson Fire and Emergency Services Chief, ground crews were working the TA25 wildfire near Highway 115. An Army CH-47 type 1 helicopter was being used for fire suppression until approximately 1100 when they were removed from the location due to winds. The wildfire was rapidly spreading to the north with various structures in the path. At 1354, the Chief requested Fort Carson dispatch to check with Pueblo fire desk for the availability of a heavy air tanker. At 1358, the Fort Carson IC requested the launch of a heavy air tanker. At 1411, Fort Carson dispatch advised the Chief that the tanker had been ordered and confirmed the ground contact frequency. At 1510, Fort Carson dispatch advised the Chief that the heavy air tanker would have an arrival time between 1700-1800, and they could possibly get a SEAT if the pilot would fly. Dispatch then confirmed that they were requesting two heavy air tankers and also advised that the SEAT would not fly due to winds. At that time, the wildfire was moving north threatening to jump across Highway 115, with a large life and property risk. USFS personnel assigned air operations on proper radio frequencies for the inbound heavy air tankers. Approximately 1600, the Chief was advised by Fort Carson dispatch that the heavy air tankers were diverted to another fire (Ordway fire) in eastern Colorado, and no aircraft would be coming to Fort Carson. At 1715, Fort Carson dispatch advised that two tankers were en route with an estimated time of arrival of 38 minutes. The frequency was confirmed and the air operations officer advised that the aircraft were en route. The Chief attempted to verify if the aircraft were heavy tankers or SEATs, and Fort Carson dispatch advised they were heavy air tankers; however, they would have a fast turnaround. Approximately 1800, the Chief observed a fixed-wing airplane overhead, and it was not a heavy air tanker. He advised dispatch that the aircraft was a SEAT. At the command post, the Chief overheard air operations in communication with the aircraft, and the pr