ERA09FA039

The pilot's failure to maintain the proper glidepath during an instrument-landing-system (ILS) approach. Contributing to the accident were the pilot's decision to initiate the ILS approach with weather below the published minimums, and the pilot's self-induced pressure to expeditiously transport an organ recipient to a hospital.

The pilot of the multiengine airplane was flying two passengers at night on an instrument-flight-rules flight plan. One of the passengers had been on an organ recipient waiting list and his wife was accompanying him. A viable matched organ was available at a distant hospital and the passenger had to arrive on short notice for surgery the following morning. All radio communications during the flight between the pilot and air traffic control (ATC), a flight service station (FSS), and a fixed-based operator (FBO) were routine. The pilot was aware of the weather at the destination airport, and had commented to ATC about 75 miles from the destination that the weather was "going up and down…like a real thin fog layer.” Additionally, better weather conditions prevailed at nearby suitable airports. The pilot mentioned one of those airports to ATC in the event he decided to divert. According to an employee at an FBO located at the destination airport, the pilot contacted him via radio and asked about the current weather conditions. The employee replied that the visibility was low due to fog and that he could not see the terminal lights from the FBO. The pilot then asked which of the two alternate airports was closer and the employee stated that he did not know. The employee then heard the pilot “click” the runway lights and contact the local FSS. About 5 miles from runway 29, just prior to the initial approach fix, the pilot radioed on the common traffic advisory frequency and reported a 5-mile final leg for runway 29. The FSS reported that the current weather was automated showing an indefinite ceiling of 100 feet vertical visibility and 1/4 mile visibility in fog. The pilot acknowledged the weather information. The weather was below the minimum published requirements for the instrument-landing-system (ILS) approach at the destination airport. Radar data showed that the flight intercepted and tracked the localizer, then intercepted the glideslope about 1 minute later. There were a few radar targets without altitude data due to intermittent Mode C transponder returns. The last recorded radar target with altitude indicated the airplane was at 600 feet, on glideslope and heading for the approach; however, the three subsequent and final targets did not show altitude information. The last recorded radar target was about 1.4 miles from the runway threshold. The airplane flew below glideslope and impacted 100-foot-tall trees about 4,150 feet from the runway 29 threshold. On-ground facility checks and a postaccident flight check of the ILS runway 29 approach conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration did not reveal malfunctions with the ILS. The cabin and cockpit area, including the NAV/COMM/APP, equipment were consumed by a postimpact fire which precluded viable component testing. Detailed examination of the wreckage that was not consumed by fire did not reveal preimpact mechanical malfunctions that may have contributed to the accident. Given that the pilot was aware of the weather conditions before and during the approach, it is possible that the pilot’s goal of expeditiously transporting a patient to a hospital for an organ transplant may have affected his decision to initiate and continue an instrument approach while the weather conditions were below the published minimum requirements for the approach.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On November 7, 2008, at 0246 eastern standard time, a Partenavia SPA P68C, N681KW, operated by Florida Aero Charter Inc., doing business as Air Key West, crashed during approach to the Gainesville Regional Airport (GNV), Gainesville, Florida. The on-demand air taxi flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. Night instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. The certificated airline transport pilot and two passengers were killed and the airplane received substantial damage. The flight originated from Key West International Airport (EYW), Key West, Florida, at 0037. The pilot worked for Air Key West and was based out of EYW. According to the pilot's girlfriend, the pilot previously flew on Monday, November 3. He was then off-duty on Tuesday and Wednesday, November 4 and 5. The pilot was on-duty Thursday, November 6; however, no flights were scheduled. The pilot went to bed early Thursday night, as he had a flight scheduled for 0600 on Friday, November 7. At 2223 on Thursday night, the pilot received a telephone call from an individual, who was on an organ recipient waiting list. The individual stated that an organ was available in Gainesville, and that he’d have to get there quickly for surgery the following morning. The pilot then called the airplane owner/operator, and the owner/operator decided to fly the 0600-trip so that the pilot could conduct the flight to GNV. According to data from Lockheed Martin, the pilot telephoned about 2336 on November 6, 2008, and filed two IFR flight plans with the Miami Flight Service Station (FSS). The first IFR flight plan was for a direct flight from EYW to GNV, with three persons on board. The pilot advised the FSS specialist that he was transporting a kidney transplant patient and although he was not a Lifeguard or Angel Flight, he was requesting priority handling. The pilot indicated that he would be at GNV for only a short time and filed a second IFR flight plan for a return to EYW, with one person on board. The accident flight checked in with Jacksonville terminal radar approach control (TRACON) at 0215, approximately 75 miles south of GNV. The controller provided the pilot with the Jacksonville altimeter and advised that no weather information was available at GNV. The pilot advised, “the weather looks like it’s going up and down…like a real thin fog layer,” and added, “we’re kind of a priority trying to get a kidney transplant ah but if it’s undoable at Gainesville we’re probably be looking at Saint Augustine, just to give you a heads-up.” At 0216, the controller asked the pilot if he wanted an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to GNV. The pilot responded that he wanted an ILS approach to runway 29. At 0242, 6 miles from the WYNDS initial approach fix (IAF), the controller cleared the flight for the ILS runway 29 approach. At 0243, the controller terminated radar services and approved a radio frequency change to the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF). The pilot acknowledged the CTAF frequency and advised “…we’ll talk to ya on the way out…” At 5 miles from runway 29, just prior to the WYNDS IAF, the pilot radioed on the CTAF and reported a 5-mile final leg for runway 29. Gainesville FSS advised that automated GNV weather observation was indicating an indefinite ceiling of 100 feet vertical visibility, 1/4 mile visibility in fog, wind calm, temperature 11 degrees Celsius, dew point 10 degrees Celsius, altimeter 30.02 inches of mercury, and that no known airport traffic information was available. The pilot acknowledged the weather and traffic information. There was no further air traffic control or FSS communication with the flight. According to an employee at a fixed based operator (FBO) located at GNV, the pilot contacted him via radio between 0200 and 0300, and asked about the weather and runway lighting conditions. The employee replied that the visibility was low due to fog, and he could not see the terminal lights from the FBO. The employee also stated that the runway lights were pilot-controlled-lighting, and they were not currently on the highest setting. The pilot then asked about which was a closer alternate airport, Leesburg Florida or St. Augustine Florida, and the employee stated that he did not know. The employee then heard the pilot “click” the runway lights and contact Gainesville Radio. He did not hear any further communications from the accident airplane. According to radar data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the flight intercepted and tracked the localizer about 0243, and intercepted the glideslope about 0244. There were a few radar targets without altitude data, due to intermittent Mode C transponder returns. The last recorded radar target with altitude was at 0246:30, which indicated the airplane was at 600 feet and on glideslope; however, the three subsequent and final targets did not have altitude information. The last recorded radar target was at 0246:44, about 1.4 miles from the runway threshold. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot, age 45, held an airline transport pilot certificate, with a rating for airplane multiengine land. He held a commercial pilot certificate, with ratings for airplane single-engine land, rotorcraft helicopter, and instrument helicopter. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on November 21, 2007. At that time, the pilot reported a total flight experience of 8,300 hours. The pilot's logbooks were not recovered; however, the operator was able to provide his flight experience. According to the operator, of the 8,300 total hours of flight experience, 7,400 hours were in multiengine airplanes, 1,500 hours were in the same make and model as the accident airplane, 1,100 hours were at night, and 1,800 hours were in actual IMC. The pilot flew 50 hours and 130 hours during the 30-day period and 90-day period preceding the accident, respectively. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The seven-seat, high-wing, fixed-gear airplane, serial number 273, was manufactured in 1983. It was powered by two Lycoming IO-360, 200-horsepower engines, equipped with Hartzell propellers. The operator stated that the airplane was in “good shape,” and he used the airplane the previous week for an FAA-checkride. The airplane’s most recent 100-hour inspection was completed on September 19, 2008. The operator further stated that the airplane was equipped with an IFR-certified Apollo GX50 global positioning system. The airplane was not equipped with a radar altimeter, ground proximity warning system, or a terrain awareness and warning system. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION During the telephone call with Miami FSS, the pilot received an abbreviated weather briefing, which included airmen's meteorological information (AIRMET) Sierra for IFR conditions north of Tampa Bay, up through Daytona and points north, developing through the evening. Specifically, the IFR conditions were forecast as ceilings below 1,000 feet and visibility below 3 miles due to mist and fog. At the time of the briefing, the FSS specialist noted he has seen some of the lower visibilities during the past hours; however, Gainesville was visual flight rules with clear skies, 10 miles visibility, and calm winds. The reported weather at GNV, at 0153, was: wind calm; visibility 1/2 mile in fog; overcast ceiling at 100 feet; temperature 11 degrees Celsius; dew point 10 degrees Celsius; altimeter 30.03 inches of mercury. The reported weather at GNV, at 0253, was: wind calm; visibility 1/4 mile in fog; vertical visibility 100 feet; temperature 11 degrees Celsius; dew point 10 degrees Celsius; altimeter 30.02 inches of mercury. The reported weather at GNV, at 0353, was: wind calm; visibility 1/4 mile in fog; broken ceiling at 100 feet and overcast ceiling at 900 feet;