ERA09FA068

The pilot's failure to feather the left propeller and secure the left engine following the total loss of left engine power, and his subsequent failure to maintain airspeed, lateral, and directional control of the airplane. Contributing to the accident was the failure of maintenance personnel to properly tighten the fuel supply hose at the engine-driven fuel pump.

During flight in instrument meteorological conditions, the left engine experienced a total loss of power due to the separation of the flexible fuel supply hose between the left engine firewall fitting and the engine-driven fuel pump inlet fitting due to an inadequately torqued B-nut. The pilot informed air traffic control of a discrepancy, although he was not specific in the nature of the problem. A momentary change in heading to the left occurred consistent with the pilot’s failure to maintain directional control of the airplane following the loss of left engine power. Radar data indicated that the airplane was allowed to decelerate, followed by a loss of lateral and directional control and a subsequent flat spin to the left. The stall warning horn was recorded during the pilot's comment to the controller that he was in a spin. The airplane descended uncontrolled and crashed into a wooded area behind a home and was destroyed by impact and a postcrash fire. No preimpact mechanical failure or malfunction of the airplane or of either engine was noted. Acoustic analysis of engine rpm signatures reflect a steadily decreasing rpm to 1,760, most likely from the left engine, which is below the normal operating range. The analysis indicated an rpm signature of 2,140, most likely from the right engine, which was in the normal operating range. The pilot neither feathered the left propeller nor secured the left engine following the total loss of power per the Pilot's Operating Handbook and Aircraft Flight Manual, and there were no mechanical discrepancies with the propeller or propeller governor that would have prevented him from doing so. Operational testing of the left engine with an exemplar flexible fuel hose that was finger-tight resulted in the separation of the line from the inlet fitting. The test runs determined that when finger-tight the B-nut loosened and tightened varying amounts with different power applications. Rebuilt engines were installed 9 months earlier and there was no entry indicating that the flexible fuel hoses were replaced at that time. There was no record that the left flexible fuel hose was ever replaced since the airplane was manufactured in 1978. Although the airplane manufacturer recommends that flexible fuel hoses be replaced when conditions warrant, at engine overhaul, or 5 years, whichever occurs first, there is no evidence to suggest that the age of the hose contributed to its separation from the engine-driven fuel pump inlet fitting.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On November 24, 2008, about 1045 central standard time, a Beech 95-B55, N412ES, registered to and operated by a private individual, experienced an in-flight loss of control and crashed into a wooded area behind a house in Whites Creek, Tennessee. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 business flight from Memorial Field Airport (HOT), Hot Springs, Arkansas, to Nashville International Airport (BNA), Nashville, Tennessee. The airplane was destroyed by impact and a postcrash fire and the certificated commercial pilot and 2 passengers were killed. The flight originated about 0909, from HOT. Before takeoff, the pilot contacted the Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center and requested IFR clearance to the destination airport. The pilot was instructed that the flight was cleared as filed, to climb and maintain 5,000 feet, expect 7,000 feet ten minutes after departure, instructed as to the discrete transponder code (5524), and advised of the clearance void time. The pilot correctly read back the clearance, and at 0911, he established contact with the facility and advised the controller that the flight was climbing through 2,500 feet. The flight was radar identified and instructed to climb to 7,000 feet continuing towards the destination airport. Air traffic control (ATC) communications were transferred to several ATC facilities and at approximately 1024, while in contact with the Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center, the pilot was instructed to descend and maintain 4,000 feet. At approximately 1032, ATC communications were transferred to the Nashville Air Traffic Control Tower, and at 1033:12 while in contact with that facility, the pilot advised the controller that the flight was at 4,000 feet. Radar data indicated that the pilot maintained approximately 4,000 feet from 1032:53 until 1044:12. The controller acknowledged the pilot contact and advised him that the automated terminal information service (ATIS) sierra was current and to expect vectors for an ILS approach to runway 20R at the destination airport. The pilot correctly read back the ILS runway designator and approximately 3 minutes later, at 1036:24, the pilot was instructed to fly heading 055 degrees for sequencing, which he also correctly read back. The radar data indicated that from 1037:21, to 1042:21, the airplane proceeded on the approximate heading instructed by the controller, but beginning at 1042:30, heading deviation left of the assigned course was noted. At 1042:58, the controller advised the pilot of the location of another airplane and the pilot responded at 1043:05, "yeah well I’m all screwed up up here so stick with me." The controller asked the pilot if he needed assistance and the pilot asked the controller how far he was from the localizer. The controller advised the pilot that the flight was 12 miles from the localizer and asked the pilot to make sure he wasn’t confusing the John Tune Airport localizer setting (110.3 MHz) with the BNA Airport runway 20R localizer setting of 111.3 MHz. While the transcription of communications indicates the pilot responded at 1043:43 with, "(unintelligible) again one eleven three", Safety Board review of the voice tape from the facility revealed the pilot replied with words to the effect that he had 111.3 selected. The controller then instructed the pilot to fly his present heading and to expect a base and final turn to the localizer; the pilot did not respond. The controller again advised the pilot to expect a base turn in 5 miles and a turn south onto the localizer. The transcription of communications indicates the pilot replied "gotcha." At 1044:24, the controller repeated the partial call sign of the airplane, and the pilot responded, "two echo sierra I’ve got you but I'm having trouble hold." A pause was noted and then grunting sounds were recorded on the frequency. The controller asked the pilot if he needed help and he responded, "I got it into a spin and I can’t stop it." Heavy breathing/grunting sounds for several seconds were heard on the frequency. At 1044:54, the controller advised the pilot to climb immediately to 3,000 feet. The pilot responded with "got no climb." At 1045:09, the controller again advised the pilot to climb immediately; there was no further response from the pilot. The controller broadcast on the frequency advising the pilot that the flight was 6 miles north of John Tune Airport, and that rescue vehicles had been dispatched. According to the controller who was communicating with the accident pilot, he noticed the pilot was not tracking his assigned heading, and then noticed a descent from the assigned altitude below the minimum vectoring altitude. He issued climb instructions and reported the accident airplane kept descending. He marked the aircraft's position and asked to be relieved from his position. Radar data correlated with the transcriptions of communications revealed that at 1042:30 which was approximately 35 seconds before the pilot first advised the controller of a discrepancy, the airplane's heading changed to the left without instruction from ATC to a maximum northerly heading of 023 degrees which occurred at 1043:03. The airplane then turned to 030 degrees and remained on that heading for 3 radar returns between 1043:08 and 1043:17. Between 1043:21 and 1043:31, the airplane turned to the right flying the approximate heading instructed previously by the controller (055 degrees), and between 1043:31 and 1044:12, heading changes to the left and right were noted as well as a decrease in groundspeed to 155 knots. Between 1044:12, and 1044:27 which was the approximate time the pilot advised the controller that he was "…having trouble hold", the radar data indicates that the airplane's heading changed from 051 degrees to 344 degrees, the altitude decreased from 4,000 to 3,700, and the groundspeed decreased from 155 to 145 knots. Further review of the radar data correlated with the transcription of communications revealed that between 1044:27, and 1044:40 which was the time the pilot advised the controller that the airplane was in a spin and couldn't stop it, the radar data reflected that the heading changed from 344 degrees to 035 degrees, altitude deviations between 3,700 and 3,500 were noted, and the groundspeed decreased from 139 to 107 knots. Between 1044:40 and 1045:03 (last correlated radar return), heading changes left and right were noted, the altitude decreased from 3,500 to 1,300 feet, and the groundspeed decreased from 107 to 51 knots. The last radar target was located at 036 degrees 17 minutes 22.01 seconds North latitude and 086 degrees 50 minutes 38.38 seconds West longitude, at an altitude of 1,300 feet. The accident site was located approximately 52 degrees and 0.04 nautical mile from the last radar return. A witness located near the crash site reported he was inside his house and heard an airplane that sounded abnormal; the witness and his son reported hearing a whirring sound. The witness looked outside his window and saw the airplane flying in a southwesterly direction. The abnormal sound faded momentarily, and then returned. The airplane began spinning in a counterclockwise direction and was flat while spinning. He estimated the airplane spun 4 times before losing sight. Each 360 degree rotation took approximately 1 second. He called 911 and ran to the scene. When he arrived there he noticed a fire at the front of the airplane which spread out. He estimated the fire department arrived in 5 minutes. The witness further reported the weather condition at the time consisted of low clouds with light drizzle. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot, age 67, held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single engine land, airplane multi-engine land, and instrument airplane issued June 28, 2002. His most