ERA09FA145

(1) The pilot’s failure to perform adequate preflight planning and to use available in flight resources in a timely manner and (2) his decision to continue visual-flight-rules flight in instrument meteorological conditions despite his lack of an instrument rating and proficiency in instrument flying, which resulted in spatial disorientation and impact with terrain.

The non-instrument-rated pilot departed Lake in the Hills Airport (3CK), Lake in the Hills, Illinois, on a cross-country trip to Raleigh-Durham International Airport (RDU), Raleigh Durham, North Carolina, in the accident airplane without filing a flight plan; therefore, the planned and most of the actual flight routes could not be determined. Further, no record was found that the pilot obtained a weather briefing before the flight. In addition, postaccident weight and balance calculations indicated that, when the airplane took off, it exceeded the allowable weight and center of gravity limits. Another pilot at the airport advised the accident pilot to file a flight plan, recalculate the weight and balance, and obtain a weather briefing; however, no evidence indicates that the pilot did so. Although visual meteorological conditions were recorded at RDU for the expected time of arrival, snow was forecast and instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) were observed for en route areas between 3CK and RDU for the time before, during, and after the flight. The noninstrument rated pilot exercised poor judgment by attempting a visual flight rules cross country flight, over mountainous terrain, without getting adequate weather information for the flight route, especially in January when snowy conditions are likely. The accident occurred near Huntington Tri-State Airport (HTS), Huntington, West Virginia, which was about 350 nautical miles (nm) from 3CK and 10 nm southwest of the direct flight route between 3CK and RDU. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) radar data first recorded the airplane about 1244 central standard time at an altitude of about 9,700 feet about 50 nm southwest of HTS and then showed the airplane turning northeast toward HTS. According to FAA air traffic control (ATC) transcripts, about 1305, the pilot transmitted a “mayday” call to the HTS ATC tower and then advised, “I’m flying VFR [visual flight rules], low on fuel, and need to land.” Subsequently, the local controller asked the pilot if he was capable of instrument flight, and the pilot responded, “yes,” even though he was not instrument rated. (The airplane was equipped for instrument flight, and no evidence indicated that an instrument malfunction occurred.) About 8 minutes later, the controller asked the pilot how much fuel was on board, and he answered, “not much.” For about 10 minutes, the controller attempted to vector the airplane to HTS. Although the pilot stated several times that he had visual ground contact, he was not able to maintain it, and he never acknowledged that he had the airport in sight. After about 12 minutes of providing detailed course headings and corrections to the pilot, the final approach controller was able to vector the airplane onto an extended final course for an airport surveillance radar approach to runway 30 at HTS. However, when the airplane was about 3 nm from the runway, it turned about 80 degrees off course to the left. The controller vectored the airplane back to the right, and the airplane turned so far to the right that it proceeded directly opposite the original inbound course. Additionally, the airplane descended below the minimum descent altitude, which the controller issued to the pilot, and which the pilot acknowledged, multiple times. Weather conditions recorded at HTS, which was about 4 nm northwest of the accident site, included an overcast ceiling at 1,000 feet and a visibility of 3/4 statute mile in snow. Witnesses at the airport and in the vicinity of the crash site described the snowfall at the time of the accident as “heavy” and estimated the visibility to be between 1/4 and 3/4 mile. The pilot did not request any in-flight weather assistance nor did he seek any ATC assistance before the situation had deteriorated. After the pilot contacted ATC, his communications became fragmented and intermittent, consistent with increased workload resulting from efforts to control the airplane in IMC. Although ATC attempted to guide the pilot to a landing at HTS using an airport radar surveillance approach, these efforts were not effective as evidenced by radar data showing that the pilot could not maintain assigned altitudes or headings, indicating that he was most likely experiencing spatial disorientation during the attempt to maneuver the airplane for landing. The spatial disorientation was likely caused by his operating in reduced visual conditions (clouds and falling snow), which obscured outside references, and his inability to consistently use the airplane’s instruments to positively maneuver the airplane when this occurred.

This report was modified on July 21, 2010. HISTORY OF FLIGHT On January 30, 2009, at 1331 eastern standard time, a Piper PA-34-200T, N8047C, was destroyed when it struck transmission lines and collided with terrain near Huntington, West Virginia. The certificated private pilot and five passengers were fatally injured. The personal cross-country flight was conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The airplane was maneuvering for landing at Huntington Tri-State Airport (HTS), Huntington, West Virginia, when the accident occurred. Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight, which originated at Lake in the Hills Airport (3CK), Lake in the Hills, Illinois, about 0845 central standard time. According to a friend of the pilot, the purpose of the flight was to look at airplanes for sale at Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina, and Clearwater, Florida. The friend had been asked to go along, but could not due to a scheduling conflict. On the day of the accident, the friend noticed there were six people on the airplane instead of the planned five and asked about weight and balance, and the pilot assured him that he had completed the proper calculations. The friend further advised the pilot to obtain a weather briefing and file a flight plan before departure. The pilot assured his friend that he would obtain a briefing and file a flight plan from the airplane using his cellular telephone. The friend then left for a hangar, and when he returned at 0845, the airplane was gone. According to fixed base operator records, the airplane was "topped off" with 68.3 gallons of fuel prior to departure. The planned route of flight and the route of flight actually flown were unknown. However, a direct flight would have resulted in a course of about 130 degrees true, for a distance of about 580 nautical miles (nm). The direct course would have passed about 10 nm northeast of HTS, which was about 350 nm from the departure airport. Radar data from the Federal Aviation Administration initially indicated, at 1244, a target, later identified as the accident airplane, with a VFR (visual flight rules) transponder code of 1200, at an altitude of 9,700 feet, about 50 nm southwest of HTS. The airplane subsequently proceeded to the northeast, and approaching HTS, it turned to the southeast, then turned to the east. According to FAA voice transcripts from the Huntington Air Traffic Control Tower, at 1305, the pilot contacted air traffic control by transmitting a "mayday" call, and further advised the controller, "I'm flying v-f-r...low on fuel, and need a place to land. I’m like, seven miles from you." At 1307, the controller advised the pilot that the airplane was in radar contact 8 miles southeast of HTS, and that that the Class D airspace was “i-f-r [instrument flight rules] at this time…ceiling one thousand broken, visibility two miles with light snow.” At 1308, the controller directed the pilot to turn to a heading of 360 degrees, which the pilot acknowledged, then advised the controller that the airplane was at 2,600 feet. The controller subsequently asked the pilot if he was “capable of i-f-r flight,” and the pilot responded, “yes.” The controller subsequently asked the pilot if he would like an IFR clearance, and the pilot responded that he would. The controller then issued a discrete transponder code and cleared the airplane to 3,200 feet. Radar data indicated that at the time of the clearance, the airplane was at 2,100 feet above mean sea level. It then climbed to 2,700 feet, descended to 2,000 feet, and climbed back to 2,700 feet. At 1312, the controller asked the pilot if he could accept a 150-degree heading, and advised the pilot that the airport was off to his left at 1 1/2 miles. The pilot responded, “you want me to go straight?” At 1313, the controller again directed the pilot to climb to 3,200 feet, and the pilot asked if the airport was behind him, which the controller affirmed that it was, about 3 miles. Just after that, the pilot stated that he had “ground contact,” and the controller responded, “I need you to maintain v-f-r and the airport is about three miles west of your position.” At 1314:07, the controller stated, “low altitude alert, make sure you maintain ground contact.” Radar data indicated that the airplane then descended to about 1,100 feet, but subsequently climbed to 1,400 feet. At 1314:14, the pilot stated, “I got ground contact, I can keep ah direction,” and the controller responded that the airport was 12 o’clock and 3 miles, which the pilot acknowledged. At 1314:38, the controller advised the pilot that the airport was at 2 o’clock and 2 1/2 miles, and about 10 seconds later, the pilot stated, “I lost ground contact.” Radar data indicated that the airplane was at 1,200 feet. At 1315:05, the pilot asked, “how far?” and the controller responded that runway 30 was at 2 o’clock, about 1 1/2 miles. At 1315:23, the controller asked the pilot what his heading was, with no reponse, and about 30 seconds later, the pilot asked, “how low can I go?” The controller responded that the airplane was below his minimum vectoring altitude, and that the field elevation was 820 feet. Radar data indicated that the airplane was about 1,500 feet. At 1316:15, the controller advised the pilot that on his current heading he was about to fly over the airport, and asked if the pilot still had ground contact. The pilot responded, “no.” At 1316:27, the controller asked the pilot how much fuel he had, and the pilot responded “not much.” At 1316:36, the controller advised the pilot, "we’ll give you a surveillance approach to runway three zero, maintain two thousand five hundred and fly a heading of one seven zero." At 1317:51, a “final” controller contacted the pilot, who acknowledged the transmission. At 1317:56, the controller advised the pilot to maintain 2,500 feet and fly heading 140 degrees. At 1318:30, the pilot stated, “I got it to two thousand,” and about 1 minute later, stated, “I’m turning right now to the left.” Radar indicated that the airplane was at 2,000 feet, and had climbed to 2,500 feet by 1318:45. At 1318:34, the controller advised the pilot, that when able, to fly heading 120, downwind leg to the surveillance final approach course to runway 30. The pilot did not acknowledge the call, nor the next three calls, but did “ident” when told, “if you hear me, ident.” At 1319:40, the controller stated, “ident received, are you capable of i-f-r flying i-f-r?” At 1319:47, the pilot responded, but it was unintelligible. At 1319:49, the controller stated, "this will be vectors to the surveillance final approach course to runway three zero, this will be a no gyro approach, I’ll just give you turns, the published minimum descent altitude I’ll give you momentarily, when you’re able turn ah left, make stan ah half standard rate left turn." The pilot did not acknowledge, but after two controller requests for a response, the pilot responded, at 1320:29, with, “I turning right now to the left.” Radar data indicated that the airplane was at 3,000 feet. The controller then responded, at 1320:33, with, “roger in a left turn you are presently about four miles southeast of the airport, when you’re able, descend and maintain two thousand five hundred.” The pilot did not respond. At 1321:03, the controller advised, “you’re correcting nicely now stop your turn stop the turn go wings level descend and maintain two thousand five hundred.” The pilot did not respond. The controller twice more directed the pilot to “go wings level” without a response, and at 1321:53, stated, “go wings level and hold one heading,” again without a response. At 1322:26, the controller asked, “do you still hear Huntingt