ERA09LA464

The pilot's failure to arrest the helicopter's descent, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain.

The emergency medical services (EMS) helicopter was on a night, over-water flight in visual meteorological conditions when the accident occurred. The pilot and two medical crewmembers were en route to pick up a patient on a barrier island. The pilot flew over the water with the autopilot engaged (altitude acquisition mode), at an altitude of 1,000 feet. While en route, the pilot unsuccessfully attempted to contact the fire department on the island to obtain landing zone information. When the helicopter was approximately 3 minutes from landing, the pilot selected 500 feet using the autopilot and the helicopter initiated a descent to that altitude. Unable to contact the fire department, the pilot likely became preoccupied with the task as well as the visual acquisition of the landing. The descent-power setting, which was manually controlled by the pilot, was not adequate to capture the selected altitude, and maintain 60 knots. As designed, the helicopter likely continued its descent with the autopilot engaged until it impacted the water. The pilot observed an amber indication on the primary flight display just before impact, which indicated the autopilot was engaged, and confirmed this most likely scenario. A post-accident examination of the helicopter revealed no pre-impact mechanical anomalies. After the impact, the dispatcher initiated a re-boot of her computer, rather than a search for the helicopter, when the helicopter's movement stopped on her screen. However, the fire department on scene initiated a search, and the crewmembers were rescued within a short timeframe. Had the crewmembers sustained serious injuries during the accident, the dispatcher's failure to initiate a search may have reduced the survivability of the accident.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On August 17, 2009, at 0031 eastern daylight time, a Eurocopter EC-145, N911LZ, operated by the Lee County Division of Public Safety, as MedStar 1, was substantially damaged when it impacted water near North Captiva Island, Florida. The pilot and two medical crewmembers were not injured. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight that originated at Page Field Airport (FMY), Fort Myers, Florida. The medical evacuation positioning flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. According to the pilot, she received a call around midnight for a patient pickup on North Captiva Island. After departure from FMY, she flew west over the water, with the autopilot engaged (set on altitude hold), at an altitude of 1,000 feet. The helicopter remained at 1,000 feet to assure obstruction clearance (towers on Pine Island). After passing over the towers, the pilot descended to 800 feet, using the autopilot. At the same time, she was attempting to contact the Captiva Fire Department (FD) on the radio. The pilot reported she tried to call the FD 4 or 5 times with no response, and then contacted Lee County Dispatch to confirm which frequency the FD was using. When the helicopter was approximately 3 minutes from landing, the pilot selected 500 feet using the autopilot and the helicopter initiated a descent to that altitude. She continued toward the airfield and made a final transmission to the FD that she was "one minute out." The pilot commented to the medical crew that she could see the FD moving fire trucks to the center of the landing zone (a grass airstrip). She stated she wasn't concerned that she could not reach the FD since she was landing on an airfield, and was familiar with the obstructions in the landing zone. The pilot could not remember the exact sequence of the final 500-foot descent; however, at some point she remembered the medical crew commenting they "couldn't see anything." She responded, that the flight to Captiva is usually very dark over the water and there's "never anything to see." She remembered turning on the search light and shortly after, impacting the water. She also stated she thought she "pulled power and cyclic" when she saw the water; but didn't have time to warn the crew. After the helicopter impacted the water, it flipped over and was submerged within seconds. The pilot had flown to North Captiva Island numerous times prior to the accident flight. She reported that the "sight picture was the same as previous flights;" however, the pilot did remember that during the accident just prior to impact, she saw an amber altitude alert on the primary flight display. The pilot did not remember ever disconnecting the autopilot during the flight, and knew she was "at the controls at impact." The pilot additionally reported no mechanical problems with the helicopter. Both paramedics reported the flight was routine (with the exception of being unable to contact the FD), until they were within a few minutes of landing at North Captiva Island. At that time, they commented that they "couldn't see anything" outside of the helicopter. They observed what appeared to be rain outside the helicopter; however, since they knew it was not raining at the time, they thought this was the rotorwash from the water below. The helicopter then immediately impacted the water, flipped over, and the cabin filled with water within 5 seconds. According to the Upper Captiva Fire Department, MEDSTAR transport was requested at 0000 EDT, for a head trauma patient. At 0015, the personnel on-scene could hear the helicopter, but were unable to reach the pilot on the radio. They attempted contact with the helicopter on VHF frequency 122.750 and the "air ops" 800 MHz frequency. They attempted to contact MEDSTAR until 0021, at which time a witness reported that he observed an aircraft impact the water. The Fire Department launched their rescue boat, while they continued to attempt to contact MEDSTAR on the radio. At 0044, personnel on the Fire Department rescue boat reported all three crewmembers had been rescued and were on the boat. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter. She also held a commercial pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. The pilot's most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on February 24, 2009. At that time, the pilot reported 5,800 hours of total flight experience. The pilot reported 21 years of EMS flying experience. She began her career in fixed-wing aircraft, and in 1982, completed U.S. Army Flight School. She flew helicopters for the National Guard and in 1988 began employment with another Part 135 EMS operator. The pilot was hired by Lee County in 1998. Since then, she flew the Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm/Eurocopter BO-105 and then the EC-145 (beginning in 2003). According to records provided by Lee County, the pilot had accumulated 6,061 hours of total flight experience, 621 of which were in the accident helicopter. She had 4,810 hours of total rotorcraft flight experience, 28 of which were in the previous 90 days, and 11 were in the previous 30 days. The pilot had accumulated 1,975 hours of night experience, 14 of which were in the previous 90 days and 5 of which were in the previous 30 days. The pilot' most recent training was employer provided factory recurrent training in July 2009. The factory recurrent training included ground instruction and flight instruction in the accident aircraft. The pilot's also completed a Part 135 Airman Proficiency Check on April 9, 2009 in the accident helicopter. The check flight was completed in 1.5 flight hours, and the pilot received a "satisfactory" rating. In a post-accident interview, the pilot was asked about the possibility of fatigue during the accident flight. She stated she did not feel fatigued at all. Although this was her seventh night on duty, she had adapted to the night shift. She normally slept from about 1000-1500 when she worked nights. On the night prior to the accident, she did not receive any calls while on duty so she rested between 2200-0000, and 0400-0700. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The Eurocopter EC-145 helicopter was manufactured in 2003, and Lee County was the only owner. The helicopter was powered by two Turbomeca Arriel 1E2 turboshaft engines. The most recent inspection performed on the helicopter was a 100-hour inspection, completed on August 14, 2009. At that time, the helicopter had accumulated 2,979 hours of total time. Radar Altimeter (RA) The accident helicopter was equipped with a radar altimeter. According to the pilot, she could not remember to what altitude the radar altimeter was set for the accident flight. She additionally reported that a pilot must set the radar altimeter prior to every flight, as it defaults to 0 at shutdown. The accident pilot stated that the company procedure required setting the radar altimeter at 500 feet for night flights, and 300 feet during the day. According to an email sent from the chief pilot to all pilots on April 30, 2009, pilots were required to set the radar altimeter to at least 250 feet as a warning on all flights. According to the helicopter manufacturer, the decision height flag on the radar altimeter is displayed when the radio height is lower than the selected decision height. In addition to the decision height flag, an audio alarm is also given, as well as a brown colored symbol (radio height zero) displayed on the barometric altimeter. Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) The accident helicopter was equipped with TAWS, which would have given the pilot an aural and visual indication of the helicopter's proximity to terrain. The accident pilot reported the TAWS was selected to the terrain page during the approach to