Primary finding
Probable cause
The pilot's failure to maintain airspeed while maneuvering after takeoff, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall, loss of aircraft control, and collision with trees.
Investigator assessment
Analysis narrative
After an engine runup, the pilot taxied onto the runway and commenced his takeoff roll. The airplane lifted off approximately 1/3 of the length down the runway. After liftoff, one witness thought she heard popping and the airplane immediately turned approximately 40 degrees to the right in the approximate direction of the pilot's destination airport, which one witness stated was the pilot's usual practice. What appeared to be a thin trail of dark gray smoke or black smoke was observed trailing from the airplane. The airplane then reached a height of approximately 60 feet above ground level, leveled off, and the smoke stopped. Upon approaching a tree line that ran perpendicular to the right side of the runway, the airplane was observed to climb. The airplane cleared the trees by approximately 50 feet, stalled, entered a spin, and impacted the ground. A post crash fire then ensued. The airplane had been in a previous accident and it was reported to the NTSB that it may have had a preexisting engine problem. A postaccident examination of the airplane and engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact failure or malfunction of the airplane or engine. During the takeoff, light rain was falling. This may have resulted in the formation of visible vapor during power application which could have appeared to the witnesses as smoke. It is also possible that the smoke may have been residual oil being burned off from a replacement of the oil cooler, which occurred 16 days prior to the accident, recent engine oil servicing, seepage of oil past the seals or rings while the airplane was parked, or a richer than normal mixture due to the atmospheric conditions that existed at the time. The popping that may have been heard could also have been caused by a richer than normal mixture. Had the pilot flown a normal departure which continues straight ahead along the extended runway centerline and continues until reaching a point at least 1/2 mile beyond the departure end of the runway and within 300 feet of the traffic pattern altitude. Following Federal Aviation Administration guidance for departing traffic patterns would have kept the airplane clear of the treeline.
Source record
Factual narrative
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On April 18, 2010, about 1915 eastern daylight time, a Maule M-5-235C, N9196E, operated by AirSign Inc. was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain after a loss of control during initial climb, from Orlando North Airpark (FA83), Zellwood, Florida. The certificated commercial pilot was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight destined for Dunnellon/Marion County Airport (X35), Dunnellon, Florida. A visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan was filed for the positioning flight conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. According to Air Sign Inc., the pilot of the accident airplane had flown a "banner towing job", over the Shingle Creek Golf Club in Orlando, Florida on the morning of the accident and was scheduled to fly another banner tow flight over the same golf course at approximately 1800 that evening. The operator cancelled the flight due to rain in the area. The pilot then advised the operator that he would therefore return to X35. According to witnesses, at the time of the accident light rain was falling at FA83. After doing an engine runup, the pilot taxied on to the runway, and commenced his takeoff roll to the west. The airplane lifted off approximately 1/3 of the length down the runway. After liftoff, one witness thought she heard a "pop, pop", and the airplane immediately turned approximately 40 degrees to the right in the approximate direction of X35, which one witness stated was the pilot's usual practice. What appeared to one witness to be a thin trail of dark gray smoke, and to another witness as a larger amount of black smoke, was observed trailing from the airplane. The airplane then reached a height of approximately 60 feet above ground level, leveled off, and the smoke stopped. Upon approaching a tree line which ran perpendicular to the right side of the runway, the airplane was observed to climb. The airplane cleared the trees by approximately 50 feet turned to the west, rolled rapidly to the left, pitched nose down, and impacted the ground. Total flight time was approximately 15 seconds. PERSONNEL INFORMATION According to FAA and pilot records, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine-land, multi-engine-land, and instrument airplane. He also held an airframe and powerplant mechanic certificate. The pilot had accrued approximately 673 total hours of flight experience. His most recent application for a FAA first-class medical certificate was on February 16, 2010. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The accident airplane was a steel-tube and fabric high-wing braced-monoplane with a cantilever tailplane with a single fin and rudder. It had a fixed-tailwheel landing gear, was equipped for banner towing operations, and was powered by a 235 horsepower Lycoming O-540-J1A5D engine. The airplane had been involved in a previous accident on April 13, 1979, after accruing 1,326 total hours, when the airplane nosed over during landing in Lord Flat, Oregon. During the accident the airplane received substantial damage which required, replacement of the vertical stabilizer, rudder, both wings, both ailerons, both wing flaps, and the lift struts. The airplane was donated to the owner specifically so the pilot could build flight time, and gain experience maintaining the airplane, to prepare him to become a missionary pilot. According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and airplane maintenance records, the airplane was manufactured in 1977. The airplane's most recent 100 hour inspection was completed on March 23, 2010. At the time of the inspection, it had accumulated 2,838.2 total hours of operation. The engine had accumulated 137 hours of operation since major overhaul. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION A weather observation taken about 25 minutes prior to the accident, at Leesburg International Airport (LEE), located approximately 10 nautical miles northwest of the accident site included; wind at 160 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 10 miles, light rain, broken clouds at 7,000 feet, overcast at 8,500 feet, temperature 19 degrees C, Dew point 16 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 29.91 inches of mercury. AIRPORT INFORMATION According to the FAA's Airport Master Record, FA83 had one runway oriented in a 09/27 configuration. Runway 27 was asphalt and in good condition. The total length of the runway was 2,577 feet, and its width was 50 feet. Obstructions existed on both sides of the departure end of runway 27. These included two rows of trees that ran perpendicular to the runway on both the north and south sides of the runway. A clear area (cabbage field) existed directly off the departure end of the runway. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The airplane came to rest in the cabbage field. Examination of the wreckage revealed that a postcrash fire had occurred. The fabric covering had burned away, and the tubular structure was exposed. The wreckage and ground scarring exhibited evidence that the airplane had been rotating about the longitudinal axis during impact. No evidence of any preimpact structural failure was discovered. No preimpact failures or malfunctions of the primary or secondary flight controls were identified. Examination of the flight control system revealed impact damage and multiple separations of the cables that made up the system. The breaks in the flight control system were consistent with overload, and control continuity was confirmed from the ailerons, elevators, and rudder to the cockpit area. Continuity could not be established to the control yokes or rudder pedals due to fragmentation and crush damage. Examination of the remains of the cockpit revealed that the instrument panel was heavily damaged due to the post impact fire. The magneto switch was in the "both" position, the mixture control was in the full rich position, and the propeller control was set to high RPM. The carburetor heat knob was in the off position. Further examination also revealed that the vertical speed indicator indicated an approximate 2,100 foot per minute rate of descent. The airplane was equipped with a 2-blade, constant speed propeller. Examination of the propeller revealed that the pitch control mechanism was intact and the propeller blades had remained attached to their hubs. Both blades exhibited impact damage and chordwise scratching. One blade was bent back approximately 45 degrees at the 3/4 span position, and approximately 4 inches of its blade tip was missing. The other blade exhibited S-bending. The propeller governor was still attached to the engine and it exhibited fire damage. Its drive shaft and coupling were intact. Examination of its casket screen revealed that it was clean and free of debris. The engine was partially separated from its mounts. Examination of the engine revealed that the lower front section of the engine had sustained impact damage and the rear accessory section had been crushed against the airplanes firewall. The left rear engine cylinder had sustained impact damage to its pushrods. Fire damage was present throughout the engine; however the severity of fire damage was more severe on the left side of the engine. Oil was found to be present internally. A lighted borescope was used to examine the engine's internal top end components and no preimpact anomalies were revealed. Removal of the Nos. 2, 4, and 6, cylinders, and their respective valve assemblies was necessitated due to the fire damage so that a visual examination could be accomplished. Visual examination revealed that the parts most affected by the fire were the rocker arm bushings and valve guides. However, no evidence of lack of lubrication, unusual or excessive wear, or broken parts was discovered. The crankshaft was then rotated by hand, and no binding was noted. Internal gear, cam, and valve train continuity was confirmed. All of the cylinders on the right side of the engine (