ERA10FA283

The FAA inspector's rapid reduction of power which resulted in a loss of engine power and his decision to initiate a turn during the autorotation without sufficient altitude to clear obstacles. Contributing to the accident was the FAA’s lack of comprehensive currency requirements in the make and model helicopter and the inspector's specific limited recent flight experience related to this make and model helicopter.

The purpose of the accident flight was for the commercial pilot to complete her certified flight instructor (CFI) checkride with a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector. According to the commercial pilot, they were returning to the departure airport after satisfactorily completing all of the required maneuvers when the FAA inspector unexpectedly announced he was simulating an engine failure and chopped the throttle. As the commercial pilot attempted to recover the helicopter from the maneuver, she realized the helicopter had experienced an actual power loss. The FAA inspector attempted to troubleshoot the power loss and the commercial pilot prepared for a straight-ahead forced landing to a road. During the descent, the FAA inspector instructed the commercial pilot to turn the helicopter into the wind, and came on the controls to initiate a turn which resulted in a flight path toward wooded terrain, and away from the road. Shortly after, the helicopter impacted trees and terrain in an upright attitude. Examination of the helicopter revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The commercial pilot had accumulated 206 hours of flight experience, all of which was in light piston-powered helicopters, and a majority of which was gained exclusively in the make and model of the accident helicopter. The FAA inspector had accumulated a significant amount of flight experience in large turbine powered helicopters; however, he had only accumulated 2 hours of flight experience in make and model of the accident helicopter (a light piston-powered helicopter), during the previous 7 years. This experience was accumulated over four flights, all less than an hour in duration, during the 16 months prior to the accident. Examination of the flight manual for the helicopter revealed a warning to avoid "throttle chops" to full idle to prevent the possibility of engine stoppage. It was unclear whether the FAA inspector was familiar with this warning. On the day of the accident, several different pilots performed a number of simulated engine failures in the helicopter under the same atmospheric conditions, without experiencing a loss of power. At the time of the accident, FAA policy required inspectors in the "4040" flight evaluation program to maintain their currency by performing a certain number of tasks each quarter, assuring their proficiency through self-certification. There was no flight hour requirement for maintaining their proficiency. Additionally FAA inspectors in the "4040" program were not required to accumulate any recent flight experience in specific helicopter make and model/type. In contrast, the FAA did require designated pilot examiners who performed pilot evaluations on behalf of the FAA, to have logged at least 5 hours of PIC flight time in that specific helicopter make and model/type.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On May 26, 2010, at 1645 eastern daylight time, a Schweizer 269C-1, N73SJ, operated by Blue Hill Helicopters, was substantially damaged during an impact with terrain in Boxborough, Massachusetts. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) check pilot was fatally injured and the certificated commercial pilot received serious injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the instructional flight which was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The purpose of the flight was for the check pilot, who was an FAA inspector, to conduct a practical examination for the commercial pilot to obtain her flight instructor certificate. According to the commercial pilot, the practical examination began at Laurence Hanscom Field Airport (BED), Bedford, Massachusetts. A designated pilot examiner (DPE) accompanied her while she performed two touchdown autorotation maneuvers. Due to FAA policy, the FAA check pilot was prohibited from performing this maneuver in the helicopter, so he observed them from the ground. Upon completion of the autorotation maneuvers, the DPE exited the helicopter and the FAA check pilot boarded the helicopter. The commercial pilot then departed from the ramp and made a “left” departure toward Minuteman Airfield (6B6), Stow, Massachusetts. She completed a “settling with power” maneuver on the way to 6B6 and then several maneuvers once they arrived there, such as hovering flight, steep and normal approaches. After the maneuvers were completed, the commercial pilot departed from 6B6. After departure, the FAA check pilot stated, “ok we’re done, let’s go home.” The commercial pilot reported that she felt confident that she had passed the checkride at this point. She departed and turned the helicopter toward BED. The FAA check pilot then stated, “this will be a simulated engine failure,” and he proceeded to “chop the throttle.” The commercial pilot lowered the collective and looked at the rotor RPM gauge which was “good.” She also noted that the engine RPM gauge read “0,” and she informed the FAA check pilot that she thought they were experiencing a real engine failure. The FAA check pilot told her to “recover,” and she “rolled on the throttle,” but nothing happened. The FAA check pilot then said “let me try,” and he joined her on the controls. He continued to troubleshoot the problem to regain engine power, while the commercial pilot looked for a landing spot. The commercial pilot believed they were still in a turn when the FAA check pilot initiated the simulated engine failure. When they rolled out of the turn, the commercial pilot picked a straight section of road for the forced landing area. She selected a parking lot to the left of the road and a field to the right as alternate landing locations. The commercial pilot remembered the winds were calm at 6B6 when she departed, so she prepared for a straight-in approach to the road. She continued to scan the horizon, the landing spot and her instruments, noting the rotor RPM was “still good.” She also knew she would have a “long run,” since it was a “hot, calm day,” and based on her previous touchdowns that day. As she prepared for the landing on the road, the FAA check pilot asked, “where are you going?” The commercial pilot told him she was going to the road and he responded, “we need to turn right to be into the wind.” The commercial pilot thought to herself that there was little/no wind and the landing surface was a more important factor. The FAA check pilot stated they needed to turn to the right and the commercial pilot stated she was going to the straight part of the road. This exchange occurred several times during the descent. The next thing she remembered, the helicopter was facing to the right, and the commercial pilot was looking at the tops of the trees (which she knew were to her right previously). She saw the tree they were going to hit, and announced that they were going to impact it. The FAA check pilot confirmed they were going to strike the trees and shortly after the impact occurred. According to firefighters who were first on-scene, the commercial pilot was extricated from the helicopter and stated she wanted to tell someone what happened prior to the accident. She said, “I was in my final training flight before being certified as an instructor...we were performing a simulated engine stall and while performing the maneuver the engine actually stalled for real.” She continued, “I was attempting to make a landing on the road, when the examiner instructed me to turn into the wind.” She stated “there was not enough wind and I was trying for the road.” According to the commercial pilot, at some point “the examiner took control of the helicopter,” at which time she stated to the examiner, “we’re going to hit the trees,” and he responded “yes we’re going to.” According to radar data provided by the FAA, a target identified as the accident helicopter was observed at 1637 in the vicinity of Minuteman Airport. Between 1637 and 1644, the helicopter climbed to an altitude of 2,500 feet while completing a series of turns. During the final 60 seconds of the radar track, the helicopter performed a 180-degree turn, and descended from 2,500 feet to 700 feet, before the target was lost. The distance between the last radar target and the crash site was about 300 feet. One witness was walking to his car in a parking lot near the accident site. He observed the helicopter over his right shoulder, headed south. The helicopter then turned 180-degrees back to the north and descended out of view. The helicopter briefly reappeared above the tree line "to get to the field beyond the trees.” He then observed the helicopter descend into the trees and shortly afterward heard a woman yell for help. Two other witnesses were walking near the same parking lot. They reported hearing the helicopter overhead, flying about 100 feet above the trees. The witnesses reported hearing the helicopter's engine "sputtering," and "cutting in and out." Shortly after, the helicopter initiated a turn away from the trees and toward a field. The witnesses lost sight of the helicopter as it descended into the trees. PERSONNEL INFORMATION FAA Inspector The FAA inspector conducting the exam held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single and multiengine land, rotorcraft-helicopter, instrument airplane and instrument helicopter. He also held an airline transport pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single and multiengine land, and rotorcraft-helicopter. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on May 19, 2009. At that time, he reported 8,865 hours of total flight experience. The inspector began his employment with the Boston flight standards district office (FSDO) on June 23, 2008, and entered the FAA "4040" program (Flight Standards Flight Program) on the same date. Prior to beginning employment at the FAA, the inspector held various positions at a Part 135 helicopter emergency medical services (HEMS) operator, including: pilot, training captain, check airman, and chief pilot, from May 2000 – June 2006. Prior to working for the HEMS Part 135 operator, the inspector was employed with the FAA Milwaukee FSDO as a Principal Operations Inspector and Geographical Inspector from 1997-1998. Examination of the FAA inspector's pilot logbook revealed entries from June 20, 2003 to May 25, 2010. The first page of the logbook indicated 7,705 hours of total experience carried over from a previous logbook. According to the logbook, the FAA inspector had accumulated 8,898 hours of total flight experience as of May 25, 2010. An entry on June 17, 2008 (0.7 hours logged in an EC-135 helicopter) included a comment which indicated it was the pilot's last flight w