ERA11LA427

The inability of the pilot-in-command (PIC) to recover from an inadvertent spin following a stall demonstration for reasons that could not be determined because aircraft and engine examinations did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded recovery from the spin. Contributing to the severity of the accident were the PIC’s failure to remove the airframe parachute system safety pin before takeoff, the exceedance of the left-seat weight limitation, and the location of the parachute system activation handle behind the PIC’s seat, which prevented easy access during the uncontrolled descent.

The purpose of the flight was a demonstration flight for the pilot-rated student who had not flown in 16 years. The pilot-in-command (PIC) seated in the right seat stated that he performed weight and balance calculations before departure and based his calculations on the provided passenger weight (275 pounds); reporting the airplane was at the top of the envelope but within weight and balance. The PIC elected to depart with the aircraft parachute system activation handle safety pin installed because as he later stated he had not been trained on its use, and because he did not intend on flying above 3,000 feet. After departure the flight climbed to between 2,300 and 2,400 feet, where a stall was performed and the flight entered a spin. The airplane descended uncontrolled into a large tree then impacted the ground coming to rest upright. The left seat occupant advised the 911 dispatcher while summoning assistance that the PIC was unable to recover from the spin. Both occupants were airlifted to a hospital where the left seat occupant died while hospitalized 3 days later. The PIC reported the next day while hospitalized he could not recall how or why the airplane entered a spin. Postaccident inspection of the airplane following recovery revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of the aileron, elevator, or rudder flight control systems. The flaps were found fully extended, and there was no preimpact failure or malfunction of the primary or secondary flight controls, or of the structure necessary to sustain flight. Inspection of the engine-driven fuel pump revealed superficial cracks on the dry side of the diaphragm of the engine-driven fuel pump, which initial testing revealed it incapable of sustaining engine operation but subsequent testing revealed it did allow engine operation; the auxiliary fuel pump tested satisfactory. No other discrepancies were identified during the engine examination. While the airplane was equipped with a ballistic recovery system parachute, the safety pin was not removed which contradicted the procedures in the Pilot Operating Handbook. Further, the location of the activation handle behind the co-pilot’s seat rendered it difficult to access for the pilot-in-command seated in the right seat during the uncontrolled descent. While the left seat occupant indicated with the operator that his weight was 275 pounds, which was the same amount listed on his last FAA medical application from December 1989; the external examination indicated he weighed 340 pounds. The weight he did provide was 25 pounds in excess of the maximum weight allowed for the seat determined during design and testing. Further, the weight determined during the external examination resulted in the airplane being 64 pounds above maximum ramp weight at engine start. Although the left seat outboard attach structure separated during the impact sequence, that condition was attributed to the exceedance of the maximum allowed seat weight by 90 pounds. Although the airplane had been spin tested by the manufacturer, it was not approved for intentional spins. No determination could be made as to why the PIC was unable to recover from the inadvertent spin.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On July 29, 2011, about 1247 eastern daylight time, a special light sport airplane (SLSA) TL Ultralight sro TL 2000 Sting S3, N2442, registered to N2442 Aviation, LLC, operated by Universal Flight Training, LLC, descended uncontrolled and crashed into trees then the ground about 13 nautical miles southeast of the Sarasota/Bradenton International Airport (SRQ), Sarasota, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 demonstration local flight from the SRQ airport. The airplane sustained substantial damage, and the certified flight instructor (CFI) sustained serious injuries while the pilot-rated student sustained fatal injuries. The flight originated from SRQ about 1230. The purpose of the flight was demonstration of the airplane to the pilot-rated student. The pilot-in-command (PIC) seated in the right seat advised the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector-in-charge (IIC) when interviewed while hospitalized the day after the accident that they were practicing stalls and he did not recall how or why the airplane entered a spin. The FAA-IIC reported that the PIC was unable to recover from a spin and the airplane continued in a spin until contacting a tree then the ground. The CFI was able to exit the airplane; however, due to his injuries, waited on the ground next to the airplane for rescue personnel. While trapped in the wreckage the pilot-rated student called 911 and advised the dispatcher of their last known position, and that they had crashed through a tree canopy. During the conversation he advised the dispatcher that they were flying between 2,300 and 2,400 feet, and, “we were practicing stalls and it went into a spin and we were talking about how the plane was spin proof its not the instructor couldn’t pull it out of the spin….” The dispatcher remained on the call while rescue crews were en route to the crash site and continued to talk with the left seat occupant. Rescue teams arrived and the left seat occupant was extricated from the airplane. Both occupants were airlifted by helicopter to a hospital in St. Petersburg, Florida. The airplane was equipped with an airframe parachute recovery system; however, it was not deployed. The FAA-IIC asked the PIC why the aircraft’s ballistic parachute system was not armed or activated, and he responded that he does not arm the system on flights that are below 3,000 feet mean sea level (msl). He later stated that he was not trained in the use of the airplane parachute system and that is why he did not remove the safety pin. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The PIC seated in the right seat, age 56, holds a commercial pilot certificate with airplane multi-engine land, airplane single engine land, and instrument airplane ratings. He also holds a flight instructor certificate with airplane single engine issued August 13, 2010. He was issued a third class medical certificate with a limitation to wear corrective lenses on October 26, 2010. On the application for his last medical certificate he listed a total time of 1,100 hours. He estimated that at the time of the accident he had 1,200 hours total time, and 10 hours make and model, all as PIC. The left seat occupant, age 71, held a private pilot certificate with airplane single engine land rating. He was last issued a third class medical certificate with a limitation to wear lenses for near and distant vision on December 15, 1989. On the application for his last medical certificate he reported having 415 hours total time, and 12 hours in the last 6 months. He also reported weighing 275 pounds. The left seat occupant also completed an application with the operator on July 23, 2011, indicated his total time as pilot-in-command was 1,600 hours, and he weighed 275 pounds. While on the phone with the 911 dispatcher awaiting rescue, the left seat occupant stated that he had not flown in 16 years and the flight was a refresher flight for him. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The airplane was manufactured as a Light Sport Aircraft in 2008 by TL Ultralight, sro as TL 2000 model Sting S3, and designated serial number TLUSA174. It met the standard specification Design and Performance established by ASTM document F2245, but was not required to comply with FAA Part 23 certification processes. It was powered by a 100 horsepower Rotax 912ULS engine and equipped with a 3-bladed ground adjustable Woodcomp propeller. It was also equipped with a TruTrak Flight Systems electronic flight information system (EFIS), and a I-K Technologies AIM-Sport Engine Monitor; neither of which record and retain flight or engine data. The instrument panel was also equipped with a panel dock for a portable GPS receiver. Review of ASTM F2245-04, revealed section 4.5.9.1 pertaining to spins which indicates that for airplanes placarded “no intentional spins”, the airplane must be able to recover from a one-turn spin or a 3 second spin, whichever takes longer, in not more than one additional turn, with the controls used in the manner normally used for recovery. That condition is with flaps retracted and flaps extended, the applicable airspeed limit and limit maneuvering load factor may not be exceeded. The section also indicates that it must be impossible to obtain uncontrollable spins with any use of the controls. The airplane was equipped with a Galaxy GRS ballistic parachute rescue system which is activated by a red “T” handle installed behind the co-pilot’s seat. According to data provided by the manufacturer, the parachute system design is purposefully constructed for the fastest possible opening. Review of the maintenance records revealed the airplane was last inspected in accordance with an annual inspection on December 10, 2010. The airplane total time at that time was recorded to be 178.8 hours, while the hour meter reading at the time of the accident was 247.1, or an elapsed time of 68.3 hours since the annual inspection had been signed off as being completed. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION A surface observation weather report taken at SRQ at 1253, or approximately 6 minutes after the accident indicates the wind was from 080 degrees at 7 knots, the visibility was 10 statute miles, and scattered clouds existed at 4,000 feet. The temperature and dew point were 33 and 23 degrees Celsius, respectively, and the altimeter setting was 30.08 inches of Mercury. The accident site was located approximately 13 nautical miles and 119 degrees from SRQ. FLIGHT RECORDERS The airplane was equipped with a GPS; however, it was not located in the wreckage when it was examined by NTSB and a representative of the U.S. Field Technical Director following recovery. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION Examination of the accident site by an FAA airworthiness inspector revealed the airplane came to rest at the base of a large oak tree and was obscured from view by low branches. The accident site was located at 27 degrees 17.43 minutes North latitude and 082 degrees 20.55 minutes West longitude. The FAA-IIC reported that the first responders removed the left wing during the extrication process of the left seat occupant, while the right wing remained attached. All components necessary to sustain flight remained attached or were found in close proximity to the main wreckage. No fire was observed on any component. The right wing was cut to facilitate recovery of the airplane. Examination of the airplane and engine following recovery was performed with Safety Board oversight by a representative of the U.S. Field Technical Director of the airplane manufacturer and a representative of the engine manufacturer. The examination of the airframe revealed the fuselage was fractured circumferentially approximately 12 to 18 inches aft of the firewall. The rudder remained attached to the vertical stabilizer which also remained attached; however, evidence