ERA12FA127

The crew's failure to use proper emergency procedures during an uncommanded right roll after takeoff, which led to a forced landing with a quartering tailwind. Contributing to the accident was a faulty right roll spoiler actuator, which allowed the right roll spoiler to deploy but not close completely.

The crew stated that the preflight examination, takeoff checks, takeoff roll, and rotation from runway 26 were "normal." However, once airborne, and with the landing gear down and the flaps at 20 degrees, the airplane began a roll to the right. The captain used differential thrust and rudder to keep the airplane from rolling over, and as he kept adjusting both. He noted that as the airspeed increased, the airplane tended to roll more; as the airspeed decreased, the roll would decrease. The captain also recalled thinking that the airplane might have had an asymmetrical flap misconfiguration. Both pilots stated that there were no lights or warnings. As the airplane continued a right turn, runway 13 came into view. The captain completed a landing to the right of that runway, landing long and in the grass with a 9-knot, left quartering tailwind. The airplane then paralleled the runway and ran into an airport perimeter fence beyond the runway's end. The cockpit voice recorder revealed that the crew initially used challenge and reply checklists and that after completing the takeoff checklist, engine power increased. About 7 seconds after the first officer called "V1," the captain stated an expletive, and the first officer announced "positive rate." During the next 50 seconds, the captain repeated numerous expletives, an automated voice issued numerous "bank angle" warnings, and the first officer asked what he could do, to which the captain later told him to declare an emergency. There were no calls by either pilot for an emergency checklist nor were there callouts of any emergency memory items. Each of the airplane's wings incorporated four hydraulically-actuated spoiler segments. The outboard segment, the roll control spoiler, normally extends in conjunction with its wing aileron after the aileron has traveled more than about 3 degrees, and extends up to 50 degrees at full control wheel rotation. When the airplane was subsequently examined in a hangar, hydraulic power was applied to the airplane via a ground hydraulic power unit, and the right roll spoiler elevated to 7.9 degrees above the flush wing level. Multiple left/right midrange turns of the yoke, with the hydraulic ground power unit both on and off, resulted in the roll spoiler being extended normally, but still returning to a resting position of 7.8 to 7.9 degrees above the flush position. When the yoke was turned full right and left, whether the aileron boost was on or off, both wings' roll spoilers extended to their full positions per specifications; however, once the full deflection testing was completed, the right roll spoiler returned to 6.1 degrees above the flush position. A final yoke turn resulted in the roll spoiler being elevated to 5.5 degrees. The right wing roll spoiler actuator was subsequently examined at the airplane manufacturer, and the roll spoiler was found to jam. The roll spoiler actuator was disassembled, but no specific reason(s) for the jamming were found. The roll spoiler parts were also examined and no indications of why the actuator may have jammed were found. According to the flight manual, if any of the spoiler segments should float, moving the spoiler hold-down switch to "Spoiler Hold Down" locks all spoiler panels down. The roll control spoilers may then be used in the roll mode by turning on the auxiliary hydraulic pump. Also, an "Aileron/Spoiler Disconnect" T-handle is available to release the tie between the ailerons and the roll control spoilers in the event of a jam in either system. When used, the pilot's yoke controls only the ailerons, and the copilot's yoke controls only the roll control spoilers. Although the jamming of the right spoiler initiated the event, the crew's proper application of emergency procedures should have negated the adverse effects. Memory items for an uncommanded roll include moving the spoiler hold-down switch to the "on" position, which was not done; the spoiler hold-down switch was found in the "off" position.  (The captain thought that he may have had an asymmetrical flap configuration; however, if an asymmetry had been the initiating event, the flap system would have been automatically disabled and the flap segments would have been mechanically locked in their positions.) The aileron/spoiler disconnect T-handle was found pulled up, which the crew indicated had occurred when the first officer's shoe hit it as he evacuated the airplane. While pulling the aileron/spoiler disconnect T-handle would have been appropriate for a different emergency procedure to release the tie between the ailerons and the roll control spoilers in the event of a jam in either system, it would have actually hindered the captain's attempts to control the airplane in this case because it would have disconnected the left roll spoiler from the captain's yoke, making it more difficult to counter the effects of the displaced right roll spoiler. Although the crew indicated that the t-handle was pulled during the first officer's exit of the airplane, its position, safety cover, and means of activation make this unlikely. In addition, precertification testing of the airplane showed that even with the right roll spoiler fully deployed, as long as the pilot had the use of the left roll spoiler in conjunction with that aileron, the airplane should have been easily controlled.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On December 28, 2011, about 0951 eastern standard time, a Cessna 650, N877G, was substantially damaged when it impacted an airport perimeter fence while returning for landing at Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport (FXE), Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The two crewmembers and six passengers were not injured. The airplane had just taken off from FXE in visual meteorological conditions on an instrument flight rules flight plan to Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New Jersey. The personal flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. According to the first officer, the takeoff roll and rotation from runway 26 were "normal," but once airborne, the airplane began rolling to the right. Positive-rate climb was called, but the landing gear remained down and the flaps remained at 20 degrees. The first officer noticed that the captain was having "extreme" difficulty in rolling the airplane level, but eventually accomplished it through rudder and asymmetric thrust. As the right turn brought the airplane around to runway 13, the captain was able to land long, but the airplane then left the runway and impacted the airport perimeter fence. The first officer also noted that there were no warning lights or advisories in the cockpit during the event. According to the captain, the preflight examination of the airplane was "normal," as were the pre-takeoff checks, including the ailerons and all flight control surfaces. After taking off and obtaining a positive rate of climb, the captain found that he needed a "little left control," and the airplane started a slow right turn which he could not stop. The captain then found that he needed differential thrust and rudder to keep the airplane from rolling over, and as he kept adjusting both, another runway came into view, and he completed the landing. In a follow-up telephone interview, the captain further stated that as the airspeed increased, the airplane tended to roll more. He recalled thinking that the airplane might have had a flap misconfiguration, but there were no lights or warnings. As he reduced power, the right wing would start to come back up, and as he added differential thrust to maintain altitude, airspeed would increase and the right wing would then fall again. The captain found himself going through the same series of actions over and over again to maintain flight, and as he did so, he saw that the airplane was gradually lining up with runway 13 through the right window. As the airplane came around toward the runway, the captain felt that he only had a "one time shot," and did the best he could to get the airplane onto the runway. The first officer and a passenger estimated that the maximum roll angle approached 90 degrees of bank. According to air traffic control radio transmissions, At 0948:47, the airplane was cleared for takeoff. At 0950:51, a voice from the airplane stated "got an emergency return." The tower controller then gave the airplane the winds, and the voice said, "say again," to which the controller stated use caution, cleared to land, runway three one is open. There were no further transmissions from the airplane. The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder that was auditioned at the NTSB Recorders Laboratory. According to the specialist's factual report, the recording began at 0902, with one of the crew members on the telephone discussing technical details of the flight management system. The passengers arrived at 0932. After passenger arrival, the crew briefed the flight, including speeds of "twenty two, twenty three, and one thirty three" along with a single engine climbout speed of 165 knots. At 0936:57, the crew began to perform checklists to start both engines, followed shortly thereafter by a taxi clearance to runway 26. During the ensuing taxi, the crew verified taxi routings while performing the taxi checklist in a challenge-response manner. At 0944:39, as part of the checklist, the first officer stated, "speed brake, spoiler levers." After a "snapping sound," the captain responded about 12 seconds later with, "check…comin' up on the right T-R…after left T-R…check," At 0945:11, the captain began to brief the takeoff and departure, followed by his noting that the aileron boost was on. At 0948:36, the airplane was cleared for a departure from runway 26 with a right turn to 315 degrees. The first officer acknowledged the takeoff clearance and the crew executed the last checklist before takeoff. As part of the checklist, the first officer called out "control lock and controls," to which the captain responded, "okay, it's off." At 0949:45, the captain stated, "here we go," which was followed by the sound of increased engine noise. Shortly thereafter, the first officer confirmed power, engine instruments, and airspeed alive. At 0950:07, the first officer called out "90 knots," followed 3 seconds later by two low frequency thumps about 0.6 seconds apart. At 0950:15, "V1" was announced. At 0950:23, the captain stated an expletive, followed 1 second later by the first officer calling "positive rate." During the next 50 seconds, until airplane touchdown, the following was stated with an occasional overlap: - Captain repeated expletive. - First officer asked what was going on. - Captain repeated expletive. - Automated voice announced, "Bank angle." - First officer stated, "Say again," and asked what he could do. - Automated voice announced, "Bank angle." - Captain repeated expletive. - Automated voice announced, "Bank angle." - Captain repeated expletive. - Automated voice announced, "Bank angle." - Captain stated, "let go, let go, let go." - Automated voice announced, "Sink rate, pull up." - A sound of two high frequency beeps about 0.25 seconds apart. - Automated voice announced, "Pull up, don't sink." - Captain stated, "Declare an emergency, declare an emergency," - Automated voice announced, "Don't sink, bank angle." - The first officer made a radio call declaring an emergency and the intent to return to the airport. - Automated voice announced, "Bank angle, bank angle." - A sound of two high frequency beeps about 0.25 seconds apart. - Automated voice announced, "Bank angle." - The tower controller made an unintelligible transmission to the airplane, plus the winds. - At this point, about 0950:58, the background noise decreased. - Automated voice announced, "Terrain, terrain, too low, terrain…too low, terrain." - The first officer asked the tower to say again. - The tower controller made an unintelligible response, in part mentioning runway 31 and "caution." - The captain exclaimed, "Emergency, call emergency." - Automated voice announced, "Too low, terrain." - The captain exclaimed, "Call emergency." - Automated voice announced, "Bank angle, bank angle." At 0951:13, there were sounds similar to airplane touchdown followed by intermittent thumps. Eight seconds after touchdown, there was an increased sound of rushing air and engine noise. At 0951:24, and for the next 11 seconds, there were multiple sounds of rattles, snaps and clunks. About 0951:47, there was a rapid decrease in background noise, coincident with the sound of a single chime. At 0951:49, the crew announced the evacuation, and the captain stated, "I had no control." Surveillance video at the airport captured the majority of the last part of the flight. It showed that the airplane descended to the ground in a left-wing-low flight attitude before it rolled to the right and landed on the grass to the right of runway 13 in a right-wing-low flight attitude. The airplane crossed a taxiway and continued through the grass until it went through an airport perimeter chain link fence and struck the far side of a shallow drainage ditch. There was no fire. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The captain, age 57, held an airline transport pilot certificate with airp