ERA12FA146

The pilot’s failure to maintain directional control during takeoff following loss of power to the left engine due to fuel starvation. Contributing to the loss of control was the pilot’s failure to feather the left propeller following the loss of left engine power.

On the day of the accident, a mechanic taxied the airplane onto the runway and performed a full power check of both engines, exercised both propellers, and checked each magneto drop with no discrepancies reported. Following the engine run, the mechanic taxied the airplane to the fuel ramp where the fuselage fuel tank was filled; after fueling, the fuselage tank had 41.5 gallons of usable fuel. The mechanic then taxied the airplane to the ramp where the engines were secured and the fuel selector switches were placed to the off position. The mechanic reported that, at that time, the left fuel tank had 4 to 5 gallons of fuel, while the right fuel tank had about 2 to 3 gallons of fuel; the unusable fuel amount for each wing tank is 3 gallons. The pilot taxied the airplane to the approach end of runway 18 and was heard to apply takeoff power. A pilot-rated witness noted that, at the point of rotation, the airplane pitched up fairly quickly to about 20 degrees and rolled left to about 10 to 15 degrees of bank. The airplane continued rolling left to an inverted position and impacted the ground in a 40 degree nose-low attitude. A postcrash fire consumed most of the cockpit, cabin, both wings, and aft fuselage, including the vertical stabilizer, rudder, and fuselage fuel tank. Postaccident inspection of the flight controls, which were extensively damaged by impact and fire, revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Although the flap actuators were noted to be asymmetrically extended and no witness marks were noted to confirm the flap position, a restrictor is located at each cylinder’s downline port by design to prevent a rapid asymmetric condition. Therefore, it is likely that the flap actuators changed positions following impact and loss of hydraulic system pressure and did not contribute to the left roll that preceded the accident. Examination of the engines and propellers revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction that would have precluded normal operation. Postaccident examination of the fuselage fuel sump revealed the left fuel selector was in the crossfeed position, while the right fuel selector was likely positioned to the on position. (The as-found positions of the fuel selector knobs were unreliable due to postaccident damage.) The starting engines checklist indicates that the pilot is to move both fuel selectors from the on position to the crossfeed position, and back to the on position while listening for valve actuation/movement. The before takeoff checklist indicates that the pilot is to verify that the selectors are in the on position. Although the left engine servo fuel injector did not meet flow tests during the postaccident investigation, this was attributed to postaccident heat damage. Calculations to determine engine rpm based on ground scars revealed that the left engine was operating just above idle, and the right engine was operating about 1,315 rpm, which is consistent with a left engine loss of power and the pilot reducing power on the right engine during the in-flight loss of control. Examination of both propellers determined that neither was feathered at impact. Although the as-found position of the left fuel selector knob could be considered unreliable because of impact damage during the accident sequence, given that right wing fuel tank had no usable fuel, it is unlikely that the experienced pilot would have moved the left fuel selector to the crossfeed position in response to the engine power loss. It is more likely that the pilot failed to return the left fuel selector to the on position during the starting engines checklist and also failed to verify its position during the before takeoff checklist; thus, the left engine was being fed only from the right fuel tank, which had very little fuel. There was likely enough fuel in the right tank and lines for the pilot to taxi and takeoff before the left engine failed, causing the airplane to turn to the left, from which the pilot did not recover.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On January 16, 2012, about 1242 central standard time, an Aerostar Aircraft Corporation PA-60-601P, N700PS, registered to M & H Ventures LLC, experienced a loss of directional control during the initial takeoff and crashed in an open field near Philadelphia Municipal Airport (MPE), Philadelphia, Mississippi. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight from MPE to Key Field Airport, Meridian, Mississippi. The airplane sustained substantial damage due to impact and a postcrash fire. The airline transport pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured. The flight was originating at the time of the accident. A witness in an airplane waiting short of the runway for the accident pilot to depart watched the takeoff roll from runway 18 and reported the accident airplane became airborne just before the intersection of the ramp and runway. After becoming airborne, the witness noted the airplane immediately, “got squirrelly” and went to the left. The witness stated he taxied onto the runway and back taxied to the approach end of runway 18, where he initiated his takeoff roll; the wind at the time was from 160 degrees at 15 knots with gusts to 20 knots. After becoming airborne, he noted the airplane had crashed and reported the event on the airport UNICOM frequency. Another witness saw the airplane while it was airborne and noted it rolled left and “it looked like the wind caught the wing.” The witness reported the airplane rolled onto its left side and pitched nose down impacting the ground. Still another witness who was located northeast of the accident site reported hearing the airplane begin the takeoff roll. The witness walked outside the building and noticed the airplane, “…veering to the left like it was turning out…” then noticed the airplane rolling onto its left side and pitching nose down impacting the ground. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot, age 48, held an airline transport pilot certificate with airplane multi-engine land rating, and also a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single engine land rating. At the airline transport level he was type rated in several transport category airplanes. He held a first class medical certificate with no limitations issued on July 27, 2011. On the application for his last medical certificate he listed having a total time of 6,200 hours. In December 2011, the pilot undertook initial ground and flight training in the airplane. The training was conducted by a pilot who had 16,000 hours in Piper Aerostar airplanes. The ground instruction consisted of 24 hours over the course of three full days, and the flight instruction consisted of 2.0 hours dual flight in the accident airplane, which occurred on December 15, 2011. The ground school consisted of systems instruction, while the flight training consisted of stalls, pitch and power demonstration, climbs, turns, flap demonstration, air velocity minimum control (VMCa), engine failures after takeoff, in the traffic pattern, and on final approach. Twelve takeoff’s and landings with and without flaps were performed, and go-arounds and aborted takeoff’s were also performed. The notes section of the flight review checklist indicates “Great Job-.” AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The airplane was manufactured in 1977 by Ted Smith Aerostar Corporation, as model PA-60-601P, and was designated serial number 61P-0427-157. It was certificated in the normal category and originally equipped with two turbocharger equipped Lycoming IO-540-S1A5 engines rated at 290 brake horsepower at 2,575 rpm, automatic controlled turbochargers installed in accordance with (IAW) supplemental type certificate (STC) SE60WE, and Hartzell constant speed full manual feathering HC-C3YR-2UF propellers with FC8468-8R propeller blades. In December 1996, the airplane was modified by supplemental type certificate (STC) SA1658NM which removed the original engines and installed 350 horsepower Lycoming TIO-540-U2A engines; the same make and model propellers remained installed. The airplane type certificate holder reported that as a result of the engine change, flight testing confirmed there was no change to the airplane’s original Vmca, which is 97 miles-per-hour indicated airspeed. The airplane’s fuel supply system in each wing consists of integral wet wing tanks located outboard of the engine nacelle. Each tank has a total capacity of 65 gallons, of which 62 gallons are considered usable. The airplane also has a bladder-type fuselage fuel tank located between the rear cabin bulkhead and the forward bulkhead of the baggage compartment, which has a total capacity of 43.5 gallons, of which 41.5 gallons are considered usable. An annunciator light labeled “LOW FUEL” installed in a group in the annunciator panel in the glare shield by design illuminates continuously when 12 gallons fuel remain in the fuselage tank. The light will remain on as fuel is depleted from the fuselage tank until it is serviced above 12 gallons. The airplane was not equipped with a crossfeed annunciator light when the airplane was manufactured and the maintenance records do not reflect a crossfeed annunciator light was installed after manufacture in accordance with Kit 764-493. A multiple sump assembly installed below the fuselage fuel tank has a “center sump” which is the low point for the fuselage tank, and two wing sumps which are the low points for each wing tank. Each sump can be drained by depressing its respective drain valve located on the lower aft side of the fuselage just aft of the wing. Fuel from the left and right wings are supplied via lines and hoses to each respective wing sump through a flapper check valve installed on each respective wing sump. Flapper check valves are also installed on each side of the fuselage fuel sump; the check valves prevent back-flow of fuel from one tank to another. Fuel from the fuselage tank flows through flapper check valves into each respective wing fuel sump, then to the each respective engine through valves, hoses, auxiliary fuel pumps, servo fuel injector, flow divider, injector lines, and fuel injector nozzles. Four electrically operated valves are installed on the fuel sump assembly, and are controlled from two fuel selector switches (one for each engine) mounted on the instrument panel. Each valve on the fuel sump assembly has two positions (open or closed) and the switches have three detent positions (off, on, and crossfeed). The left switch is mounted on the pilot’s lower panel, while the right switch is mounted on the co-pilot’s lower panel. For example, when either fuel selector is in the on position, fuel is supplied from its respective wing tank if fuel is available and also from the fuselage tank. With either fuel selector positioned to the crossfeed position, fuel is supplied to the engine from only the opposite wing tank and not the fuselage tank. If both fuel selectors are positioned to crossfeed at the same time, no fuel will be consumed from the fuselage tank; the left engine will only be supplied fuel from the right wing and the right engine will only be supplied fuel from the left wing. The FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual indicates that the crossfeed position is only to be used in level coordinated flight only, and double crossfeed is prohibited except in emergency when the “LOW FUEL” warning light on the annunciator panel is illuminated. Review of the maintenance records that begin with an entry dated July 18, 1977, associated with an entry related to a production test flight, to the last entry dated January 16, 2012, revealed no entry indicating removal or replacement of either fuel selector switch, or fuel selector knob. Further review of the maintenance records revealed the airplane was last inspected in accordance with an annual inspection on December 27