ERA12LA131

A partial loss of engine power due to carburetor icing. Contributing to the accident was the lack of an installed manufacturer-recommended carburetor heat system.

Before the experimental, amateur-built, amphibious biplane's first test flight, the pilot/owner/builder ran the engine for about 20 minutes. He then taxied to the runway and departed. He flew for about 25 minutes before returning to the airport. After landing, he then taxied back to the runway, departed, circled the field for an additional 20 minutes, then returned to perform a touch-and-go landing. After touching down, adding power, and beginning the initial climb, the engine lost partial power and the engine's rpm decreased to about 3,000 rpm. Because the airplane was past the departure end of the runway, the pilot performed a water landing on a nearby reservoir. During the landing, the left lower wing struck the water and separated from its mounting location. After the airplane slowed, the pilot noticed that the engine was still running; however, when he advanced the throttle, the rpm would initially increase and then immediately decrease to 2,000 rpm. Examination of the airplane and engine revealed no mechanical failure or malfunction that would have precluded normal operation. It was further noted that the engine was not equipped with a carburetor heat system or insulated fuel hoses, as recommended by the engine manufacturer. Due to the ambient air temperature at the time of the accident, it was improbable that vapor lock caused the partial loss of power. Review of a carburetor icing probability chart revealed that weather conditions were conducive for serious carburetor icing. Therefore, it is likely that had a carburetor heat system been installed and the pilot had applied carburetor heat before his initial power reduction, the formation of carburetor ice would have been prevented.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On January 1, 2012 about 1211 eastern standard time, an experimental, amateur-built Seastar XP, N667JH, was substantially damaged during a forced water landing after a partial loss of power during initial climb at Windham Airport (IJD), Willimantic, Connecticut. The private pilot/owner was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the local personal flight that was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. According to the pilot, he ran the amphibious biplane's engine up for approximately 20 minutes before the airplane's first test flight. He then taxied to runway 27 and took off. He flew for about 25 minutes before returning to IJD. After landing he taxied back to the runway 27 and took off once again and "circled" the field for an additional 20 minutes. He subsequently landed on runway 27, but this time elected to do a "touch and go" After touching down, adding power, and initiating the initial climb, the engine lost partial power, the engine's rpm decreased from approximately 5,500 rpm to approximately 3000 rpm, and there was a decrease in cylinder head temperature. He realized that he was past the departure end of the runway and elected to perform a water landing on the Willimantic Reservoir which was close to the end of the runway. He realized that he had too much speed and not enough area to land in and turned 90 degrees to the right and then to the right again to reduce his airspeed. After the 2nd right 90 degree turn, the left lower wing struck the water and separated from the airplane. After the airplane slowed to taxi speed the pilot noticed that the engine was still running. However, when he advanced the throttle, the rpm would initially increase subsequently the engine rpm almost immediately would decrease to 2000 RPM. PERSONNEL INFORMATION According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and pilot records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane single-engine sea, and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on September 2, 2011. He reported that he had accrued 693 total hours of flight experience. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The aircraft was a two-seat amphibious strut braced biplane. The cockpit was contained in the hull and floats were attached to its lower wings. The ailerons were located in the upper wings and the tail was conventional, with the horizontal stabilizer mounted half way up the tail fin. It was constructed primarily of fiberglass, carbon fiber, Kevlar, and aluminum, and was reinforced by fiberglass/PVC foam bulkheads. It was powered by a 100-horsepower Rotax 912 ULS engine mounted on the upper wing pylon, aft of the cockpit, in a pusher configuration. The engine utilized a dual carburetor system and primarily used automotive fuel. According to the pilot and FAA records, the airplane was purchased as a kit from Amphibian Airplanes of Canada (AAC) and imported into the United States. The airplane's engine was also sold to the pilot by AAC. At the time of the accident, the airplane had accrued approximately 50 minutes of operation, and the engine had accrued approximately 3 total hours of operation. Review of the FAA's Listing of Amateur-Built Aircraft Kits did not list AAC as being evaluated and found eligible in meeting the "major portion" requirement of 14 CFR Part 21. Review of airworthiness and registration documents, as well as interviews of AAC's owner by Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSBC) investigators also revealed that AAC was not actually manufacturing the kit but was purchasing parts and kits from EDRA Aeronautica of Brazil (EDRA), rebranding, and then selling the airplane as the "AAC Seastar". Further inquires revealed that the airplane design had originated in France in 1983 as the Hydroplum. Over the intervening years the airplane had gone through a series of design changes which included changes in materials, powerplants, and size. It had been manufactured by multiple entities including the Societe Morbihannaise d'Aero Navigation (SMAN), Billie Marine, Stone Engineering, and eventually starting in 1996 by EDRA when EDRA purchased the design from SMAN. The airplane since that time has been marketed as the Paturi, and the Super Petrel, and was offered in kit form or as a fully assembled airplane. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION The 1151 recorded weather observation at Bradley International Airport (BDL), Windsor Locks, Connecticut, located 25 nautical miles northwest of the accident site, included wind from 160 degrees at 7 knots, 10 miles visibility, few clouds at 3,500 feet above ground level (agl), broken clouds at 25,000 feet agl, temperature 9 C, dew point 4 C, and an altimeter setting of 29.99 inches of mercury. AIRPORT INFORMATION At the time of the accident IDJ did not have an air traffic control tower and had two runways, which were designated as 18/36 and 9/27. Runway 9/27 was asphalt, and was listed in fair condition. The total length was 4,271-feet-long and 100-feet-wide. It was equipped with medium intensity runway edge lights and was marked with non-precision markings that were in good condition. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION Post-accident examination of the wreckage by an FAA inspector revealed that the left lower wing was separated from its mounting location and the left upper wing was bent aft approximately 30 degrees which resulted in substantial damage. Further examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The fuel selectors were in the auxiliary fuel tank feed, and return positions. The 10-gallon auxiliary fuel cell contained approximately 6 gallons of automotive gasoline and the 3-gallon header tank contained approximately 1 1/2 gallons of automotive gasoline. Continuity was confirmed from the throttle and mixture levers to the engine and both engine controls operated freely to their full extent of travel. The fuel lines were of a visible tubing design and appeared to be made of Tygon. They were covered in some instances with corrugated (ribbed) plastic tubing and in other instances with thin sleeves of fiberglass matting. After removal of the covering, fuel could be seen through them though they were slightly discolored and had a yellowish cast. They were non-rigid and could be easily pinched closed by hand, and where they should have been secured to their fittings with hose clamps they were secured instead with lock wire. Examination of the fuel filter revealed it was clear and no debris or contamination was visible. Testing of the carburetors revealed that they functioned normally. TESTS AND RESEARCH Examination of Photographic Evidence Examination of photographs taken during the post accident examination revealed that the engine fuel lines were in close proximity to the engine and though covered in a thin sleeve of fiberglass matting by the owner, were not insulated (fire sleeved). Further examination of the photographs also revealed that the airplane was not equipped with carburetor heat. AAC and Rotax Recommendations When asked by the TSBC if they recommended to Seastar kit purchasers that they install carburetor heat systems and/or fire sleeved engine fuel lines, the owner of AAC who had represented himself as the manufacturer of the kits replied that, they would not make those recommendations because they had not found either to be necessary and that they would inform kit purchasers that they (AAC) had chosen to use stiffer, thicker, black automotive fuel lines rather than the "softer PVC-type fuel line recommended by Rotax". Review of Rotax Guidance revealed however that Rotax recommended installation of carburetor heat and insulated fuel lines. This was discovered during review of