ERA13FA059

The vehicle driver's failure to verify that the runway was not occupied by an airplane before crossing the runway, which resulted in the vehicle being struck by a departing airplane, and the pilot's continued takeoff with flight control damage, which subsequently resulted in an aerodynamic stall and spin at low altitude.

Shortly after the end of civil twilight and during the departure roll with about liftoff speed, the airplane collided with a private ground vehicle that was crossing the runway, which resulted in the separation of the airplane's right elevator. The vehicle driver reported that he did not see the airplane until after the collision as it was attempting to gain altitude. Witnesses observed the airplane attempting to climb, drifting left of the runway, and then beginning a left turn. Witnesses then observed the airplane in "slow flight" and subsequently spinning until impact. Examination of the vehicle revealed impact marks on the left front fender consistent in size and shape with the airplane's right elevator. One light bulb from the vehicle's headlights was located, and examination of the light bulb revealed that the filament was stretched, which is consistent with the light being on at the time of the collision. The driver stated that he did not, nor was ever required to, have a yellow beacon on his vehicle. After the accident, the airport required airport beacons to be placed on the top most portion of the vehicle and to be operational both day and night while that vehicle operates on the ramp, taxiway, runway, or any other areas that an aircraft may operate. Examination of the airplane's wingtip light bulbs revealed that the filaments were stretched, indicating that the lights were on at the time of the accident. Examination of the beacon and navigation light bulbs did not reveal any information about their operational status at the time of the accident. It could not be determined if the driver or pilot announced their intentions over the airport common traffic advisory frequency. A handheld radio was located on the vehicle's dashboard; however, it was found in the "off" position. When the radio was placed in the "on" position and the correct frequency was set, the radio transmitted and received with no anomalies noted. Although the airplane was close to or perhaps past liftoff speed, the pilot likely could have stopped the airplane on the remaining 3,600-feet of paved runway following the impact with the vehicle. However, the pilot did not discontinue the takeoff.

The airport is a publically owned airport and at the time of the accident did not have an operating control tower. The airport was equipped with two runways designated as runway 13/31 and 03/21. The runways were reported as "in good condition" at the time of the accident. Runway 13/31 was a 5,007 -foot-long by 100-foot-wide runway and runway 03/21 was a 4,000 -foot-long by 100-foot-wide runway. The airport was 55.4 feet above mean sea level. The airport lights were examined the following evening and operated as required. Photo documentation and video was produced about the time of the accident the following day in similar cloud conditions. From the threshold of runway 31 with the lights of an airport operations vehicle, parked on taxiway "A" could be detected with only the use of the vehicles headlights; however, when the airport runway and taxiway lights were illuminated to the full bright position the vehicle lights were unable to be differentiated from the surrounding lights. Cessna Model 172N "Information Manual" According to Section 4 "Normal Procedures" for a normal takeoff states 1. Wing Flaps – UP 2. Carburetor Heat – Cold 3. Throttle – FULL OPEN 4. Elevator Control – LIFT NOSE WHEEL (at 55 KIAS) 5. Climb Speed – 70-80 KIAS According to Section 5 "Performance", the ground roll required should have been 737 feet with a takeoff speed of 52 knots indicated airspeed at 2300 pounds. The manual further shows the distance needed for landing at the maximum weight over a 50 foot obstacle would have been about 1210 feet. FAA's Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3A), According to Chapter 5 "Takeoffs and Departure Climbs" states in part "Rejected Takeoff/Engine Failure. Emergency or abnormal situations can occur during a takeoff that will require a pilot to reject the takeoff while still on the runway. Circumstances such as a malfunctioning powerplant, inadequate acceleration, runway incursion, or air traffic conflict may be reasons for a rejected takeoff. Prior to takeoff, the pilot should have in mind a point along the runway at which the airplane should be airborne. If that point is reached and the airplane is not airborne, immediate action should be taken to discontinue the takeoff. Properly planned and executed, chances are excellent the airplane can be stopped on the remaining runway without using extraordinary measures…" According to Chapter 10 "Night Operation" states in part "Takeoff and Climb. Night flying is very different from day flying and demands more attention of the pilot. The most noticeable difference is the limited availability of outside visual references. Therefore, flight instruments should be used to a greater degree in controlling the airplane. This is particularly true on night takeoffs and climbs. The cockpit lights should be adjusted to a minimum brightness that will allow the pilot to read the instruments and switches and yet not hinder the pilot's outside vision. This will also eliminate light reflections on the windshield and windows. After ensuring that the final approach and runway are clear of other air traffic, or when cleared for takeoff by the tower, the landing lights and taxi lights should be turned ON and the airplane lined up with the centerline of the runway. If the runway does not have centerline lighting, use the painted centerline and the runwayedge lights..." Knox County Regional Airport Flightline Driving Manual According to the manual under the section titled "Movement Areas" which states in part "The movement area consists of taxiways and runways. You are required to must [sic] have a need to access the movement area, prior authorization from airport management and you must have (and monitor) an operating two-way radio (set to Unicom Frequency 123.05) at all times before entering/driving on any movement area…" The section titled "Driving on the Movement Areas" goes on to state: • Do not enter a movement area unless you have a legitimate need, authorization from airport management and two-way aviation radio communications. • Monitor your aviation two-way radio at all times, RDK Unicom frequency is 123.05 • After announcing your location and intentions on the radio, proceed only after you have looked in all direction, including up • Never drive your vehicle on or across runways unless absolutely necessary and limit your time within the runway safety area by driving at an expedited but safe speed. The manual goes on to state in part "…When driving on an AOA [airport operations area] make sure your vehicle is properly equipped for the area where you operated, i.e. radio, beacon, markings…use extreme caution at night and/or in poor weather conditions…aircraft always have the right of way…" An autopsy was performed on the pilot on November 18, 2012, by the Office of Chief Medical Examiner, Augusta, Maine. The autopsy listed the cause of death as "multiple blunt injuries" and the report listed the specific injuries. The FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute performed forensic toxicology on specimens from the pilot. The report stated no carbon monoxide, no cyanide or ethanol was detected in the blood. The 1655 recorded weather observation at RKD, included wind from 340 degrees at 3 knots, 10 miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 3 degrees C, dew point minus 3 degrees C; barometric altimeter 30.31 inches of mercury. According to information obtained from the United States Naval Observatory official sunset was 1609 on the day of the accident and end of civil twilight was 1640. According to FAA records, the airplane was issued an airworthiness certificate on August 23, 1979, and was registered to the flying club on April 18, 1991. It was equipped with a Lycoming O-320-H2AD, Serial number L1894-76T, 160-hp engine. It was also equipped with a McCauley propeller. The airplane's most recent annual inspection was recorded on December 4, 2011, and at that time a recorded hobbs time was 7601.9 hours. The engines most recent annual inspection was recorded on December 4, 2011, with a recorded tachometer time of 7601.9 hours and an engine total time in service of 1816.9 hours. The last recorded fueling was accomplished on November 16, 2012 at BGR. The airplane had been fueled with 10.5 gallons of fuel. Fuel samples acquired from the fixed base operator appeared to be blue in color, similar to 100 LL aviation fuel, and free of debris or foreign matter. According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. He held a third class medical certificate which was issued on June 30, 2011 and had a restriction "must wear corrective lenses." According to the pilots most recent Airman Certificate and/or Rating Application, dated June 15, 2012, he had 48.5 total flight hours, 17.4 of those hours were logged as solo flight, 3.8 flight hours of night instruction received, and 0.2 hours of night flight as pilot in command. However, an accurate amount of flight time at the time of the accident could not be achieved as no pilot logbook had been located at the time of this writing. Ground Vehicle The personal vehicle was a white pickup truck and owned by the driver. The vehicle exhibited damage along the front including the headlights and grill. The vehicle also had an impact mark along the left tire well located approximately 26 inches above the ground and the impact mark was similar in size as the right elevator. A light bulb from one headlamp was located and the filament was stretched similar to being utilized. A hand held two-way capable radio was located on the dash of the truck. The radio was in the "OFF" position, when found. The radio was turned to the "ON" position and the correct CTAF frequency was noted, transmissions and reception were confirmed on the radio over the CTAF frequency. According to the owner of the vehicle, it did not have nor ha