ERA13IA294

The pilots’ failure to effectively use the airplane's primary (brakes), secondary (thrust reversers), and emergency braking systems to decelerate the airplane, which resulted in a runway excursion. Contributing to the accident was the pilots’ failure to conduct a go-around maneuver upon recognizing that the airplane had excessive airspeed while on final approach to the runway.

The pilot flying (PF) and the pilot monitoring (PM) were completing an airman competency check under the observation of a Federal Aviation Administration inspector. Following an uneventful flight, the pilots configured the turbofan-powered, transport-category airplane for landing on the 5,299-ft-long, dry runway. A review of the cockpit recorder (CVR) transcript revealed that, during the practice instrument landing system approach, the PM warned the PF that the airplane was approaching the runway at an airspeed 15 knots higher than its specified approach speed (Vref) as it descended to within 100 ft of the ground. The PM also warned the PF not to allow the airplane's airspeed to increase because the runway was "short." The airplane subsequently touched down within the airplane's touchdown zone about 1,000 ft beyond the runway threshold. The PM reported that he attempted to slow the airplane by applying the brakes and deploying the thrust reversers, but the airplane continued off the departure end of the runway and came to rest about 40 ft beyond its pavement. The runway distance required for the landing was calculated using the airplane manufacturer's Airplane Flight Manual. It was determined that, given the airplane's loading and configuration and the weather and runway conditions, sufficient runway was available for the landing. The landing distance calculations were predicated on the airplane crossing the runway threshold at Vref and did not account for the use of reverse thrust during the landing roll. Postincident examination of the airplane's braking and thrust reverser systems revealed no evidence of any mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Although the PF reported in postincident statements that the braking action during the landing was "nil," a review of the CVR transcript showed that neither of the pilots mentioned poor braking performance during the landing roll nor did they attempt to activate the emergency braking system. Additionally, the operator's chief pilot, who had been seated in the cabin during the flight, reported that the braking system cycled several times during the landing roll and that, although the reverse thrust system appeared to activate, he did not "feel or hear" a pronounced application of reverse thrust. Although the electronic engine control system recorded a limited set of parametric data during the landing, airspeed was not a recorded parameter. Analysis of the recorded data revealed that, about 3 seconds after touchdown, the throttle lever angles (TLA) were positioned for deployment of the thrust reversers and that the thrust reversers subsequently deployed; however, the TLAs remained at an idle-thrust position. The TLAs did not increase to the maximum reverse thrust position until about 17 seconds later, at which time, both engines increased power for about 8 seconds. Although the use of reverse thrust was not required for the landing, nor was the airplane's computed landing distance reflective of the use of reverse thrust, the PF's apparent delayed application of reverse thrust suggested that he may not have used maximum effort in his attempts to decelerate the airplane during the landing roll even after the outcome was in doubt. Additionally, although an exact account of the airplane's airspeed was not available for postincident analysis, the PM's airspeed callouts suggested that the airplane's airspeed while on final approach to the runway, and potentially throughout the touchdown, increased the total required landing distance. If the pilots had recognized this earlier in the approach, they could have conducted a go-around and avoided the possibility of a runway overrun. Alternatively, upon realizing that the airplane was not decelerating as desired, the pilots could have used all available means to slow the airplane during the landing roll, including the timely and complete activation of the airplane's thrust reversers, and if necessary, activation of the emergency braking system.

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn June 20, 2013, about 1410 eastern daylight time, an Israel Aircraft Industries Gulfstream 200, N500AG, overran the paved portion of the runway during landing at the Chautauqua County/Jamestown Airport (JHW), Jamestown, New York. The two airline transport pilots, two Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspectors, and the aircraft operator's chief pilot were not injured. The airplane sustained minor damage to the trailing edge of the left wing flap. The airplane was registered to a private individual and operated by Taughannock Aviation under the provision of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the instructional flight, which originated from the Greater Rochester International Airport (ROC), Rochester, New York, about 1350. According to written statements by the pilots, earlier in the day the airplane flew to ROC with the operator's chief pilot in the jumpseat for the purpose of conducting a Part 135.299 checkride. After landing at ROC, the two pilots completed an oral examination with the FAA inspectors, and completed weight and balance and performance calculations for the practical test portion of the examination. The pilot flying stated that during the incident flight, the airplane landed within the touchdown zone of runway 25, about 1,000 feet past the threshold, following a "normal stabilized approach." After touchdown, the pilot flying deployed the engine thrust reversers and applied steady brake pressure; however, the "braking/stopping ability was nil." According to a written statement provided by the operator's chief pilot, seated in the cabin section of the airplane, during landing rollout, that "noticeable yawing and a perception of the Braking and/or Anti-skid cycling and releasing separately three times as the aircraft slowed down." He further reported that he did not "hear or feel" a pronounced application of reverse thrust, and in the later part of the rollout he noted a "hard pull to the right just prior to a low speed exiting of the end of the runway." The FAA inspector seated in the cockpit jumpseat reported in a written statement, "the touchdown was normal and within the 1000 foot markers, the PIC [pilot in command] activated the thrust reversers, but no power increase was noted. The braking action or deceleration was noted as 'smooth.' The second-in-command [SIC] was calling out the airspeeds and runway remaining and was noted to be alarmed by the last 2000 foot markers, it was also noted that the SIC, attempted to stand on the brakes just prior to the end of the runway. The PIC was noted as alarmed and applying maximum braking pressure and attempted to steer the aircraft to the right towards the taxiway at the end of the runway, but then straighten the aircraft out just prior to the end of the runway." DAMAGE TO THE AIRPLANE According to an FAA inspector, the airplane came to rest about 40 feet from the end of the paved portion of the runway. During the overrun, the nose landing gear and the trailing edge of the left wing flap made contact with two runway end lights, which resulted in minor damage to the flap. According to photographs provided by an FAA inspector, the airplane created a furrow in the soft turf a few inches in depth. PERSONNEL INFORMATION Pilot In Command (PIC) The PIC, age 48, held an airline transport pilot certificate for airplane multiengine land, a commercial pilot certificate for airplane single-engine land, and several type ratings, including a type rating in the incident aircraft make and model. He also held an FAA first-class medical certificate issued April 30, 2013, with a limitation of "must wear corrective lenses." No flight time information was provided by the pilot or company. Pilot Monitoring The pilot monitoring, age 45, held an airline transport pilot certificate for airplane multiengine land, a commercial pilot certificate for airplane single-engine land, a flight instructor certificate for airplane single-engine and multiengine land, and instrument airplane, as well as several type ratings including a type rating in the incident airplane make and model. He also held a FAA first-class medical certificate issued May 7, 2013, with no restrictions. No flight time information was provided by the pilot or company. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The airplane, an Israel Aircraft Industries Gulfstream 200 model, serial number 158, was a low-wing, twin-engine, tail-mounted turbojet airplane certificated in the transport category. According to FAA records, the airplane was issued an airworthiness certificate on March 13, 2007, and was registered to a private individual on January 25, 2013, as N818TS and re-registered on March 22, 2013, as N500AG. It was equipped with two Pratt and Whitney PW306A turbojet engines. The most recent logbook entry dated June 4, 2013, indicated a total time of 1,321.9 hours. According to maintenance records, the left inboard main landing gear tire was replaced due to "tire wear" on December 8, 2012, with a recorded time of 1,206.5 hours and total cycles of 523. The remaining tires were also removed, inspected, and reinstalled. Both left and right brake assemblies, wheel speed transducers, emergency brake accumulator, and power brake valve were installed new during manufacture on March 13, 2007. The airplane was equipped with hydraulically actuated, retractable, tricycle landing gear; each main landing wheel was equipped with full powered multiple segmented brakes operated by toe action of the pilot's or co-pilot's rudder pedals. Application of the brake pedals at either seat position delivered pressure to the directly connected master cylinder, which transferred it to a power brake valve through mixing valves. The power brake amplified the master cylinder pressure, thereby increasing the pressure to the respective main landing gear brake. An electrically-controlled anti-skid system was also incorporated in the power brake system. A stationary wheel speed transducer was mounted inside each main gear axle, and it electronically sensed any change in wheel rotation speed. By design, with the system "ON," as a skid is detected by the stationary wheel speed transducer, an electrical signal was supplied to the system, which released brake pressure. The system would continue to operate as long as the brake pressure was sufficient to result in the skidding condition, but not below approximately 10 knots. A ground safety system was also installed, which allowed for safe operation of several systems either in flight or on the ground, including thrust reverser application for ground use only. Control was accomplished by the activation of the left, right, and nosewheel squat switches, which removed an electrical ground from the coils of ground safety relays. That, in turn, enabled or disabled their respective systems according to the position of the safety switches. Following the incident, the brake pins were examined, were of proper length, and the serial number for the brakes were, at the time of the incident, not affected by any manufacturer service bulletins. The thrust reverser system and weight on wheel system operated normally and no abnormalities were noted. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION The 1415 recorded weather observation at JHW, included calm wind, 10 miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 23 degrees C, dew point 09 degrees C; barometric altimeter 30.25 inches of mercury. AIRPORT INFORMATION The airport was a publicly-owned airport and at the time of the incident did not have an operating control tower. The airport was equipped with two runways designated as 7/25 and 13/31. The runways were reported as "in good condition" at the time of the incident. Runway 7/25 was a 5,299-feet-long by 100-feet-wide, and runway 13/31 was 4,500-feet-long by 100-feet-wide. The airport was 1,723 feet above mean sea leve