ERA14FA093

The pilot's continued visual flight rules flight into instrument meteorological conditions, resulting in controlled flight into trees and terrain.

The pilot had recently purchased the newly-manufactured airplane from the factory and was returning to his home airport when the accident occurred. The weather conditions initially forecast in the vicinity of the destination airport before the pilot's departure generally were consistent with visual meteorological conditions; however, by the time the pilot was within 50 miles of the destination airport, the forecast and actual weather conditions had deteriorated to instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). Shortly before the accident, a witness observed the airplane as it flew low above the ground in visibilities of about 150 yards in dense fog. The airplane subsequently impacted the tops of trees located near the peak of rising terrain before impacting the ground. The orientation and length of the wreckage path were consistent with a controlled flight into terrain impact sequence. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures. The accident airplane was not equipped for flight IMC, nor did the pilot hold an instrument rating. A handheld tablet computer along with a device capable of receiving in-flight weather updates was recovered from the wreckage. It could not be determined if the pilot had used the device to observe the changing weather conditions during the accident flight; however, the pilot also could have used outside visual references and could have tuned the onboard communications radio to weather reporting stations located along the route of flight and noted that weather conditions ahead had deteriorated to IMC. Upon encountering IMC, the pilot could have diverted the flight to allow weather conditions to improve rather than continuing to the planned destination.

N85 was located at an elevation of 480 feet, and was served by a single, non-precision instrument approach procedure. The airport was comprised of two crossing runways oriented in a 08/26 and 13/31 configuration. The closest airports with official weather reporting capabilities were located between 16 and 20 nautical miles away. Handheld GPS Data A Garmin GPSMAP 496 handheld GPS device was recovered from the wreckage and found to be in good condition. The portable GPS receiver was capable of storing date, route-of-flight, and flight-time information for up to 50 flights. A detailed tracklog – including latitude, longitude, date, time, and groundspeed information – was stored within the unit whenever the receiver had a lock on the GPS navigation signal. All recorded data was stored in non-volatile memory. The unit contained hardware and software permitting the download of recorded waypoint, route, and tracklog information to a PC via a built-in serial port. Power was applied to the unit using NTSB Vehicle Recorder Laboratory equipment, and device startup was consistent with normal operation. GPS data was downloaded using normal methods and Garmin's Mapsource software. The data extracted included 32 sessions from August 24, 2013 through January 15, 2014. A three-dimensional plot of the accident flight was prepared overlaying the GPS data onto an orthographically projected terrain map. Review of the plot showed that the airplane generally maintained a GPS altitude of between 2,000 and 3,000 feet for the enroute portion of the flight. About 1604, the airplane began descending from its previously established altitude of 3,000 feet, and for a period of 32 seconds between 1604:46 and 1605:18, descended at an average rate of about 1,600 feet per minute. By 1605:58, the airplane had descended to a GPS altitude of about 1,100 feet, which calculated to be about 600 feet above the terrain in that area. At the point where the airplane overflew the witness's farm, it was about 375 feet above the terrain, and when the airplane's final GPS position was recorded at 1607:24, it was about 270 feet above the terrain. The airplane's final recorded track was oriented roughly toward the destination airport, which was located about 5.6 nautical miles east of the accident site. FAA Advisory Circular 61-134 In April 2003, the FAA published Advisory Circular 61-134, General Aviation Controlled Flight into Terrain Awareness. The circular stated in part: "Operating in marginal VFR [visual flight rules]/IMC conditions is more commonly known as scud running. According to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and FAA data, one of the leading causes of GA accidents is continued VFR flight into IMC. As defined in 14 CFR part 91, ceiling, cloud, or visibility conditions less than that specified for VFR or Special VFR is IMC and IFR [instrument flight rules] applies. However, some pilots, including some with instrument ratings, continue to fly VFR in conditions less than that specified for VFR. The result is often a CFIT [controlled flight into terrain] accident when the pilot tries to continue flying or maneuvering beneath a lowering ceiling and hits an obstacle or terrain or impacts water. The accident may or may not be a result of a loss of control before the aircraft impacts the obstacle or surface. The importance of complete weather information, understanding the significance of the weather information, and being able to correlate the pilot's skills and training, aircraft capabilities, and operating environment with an accurate forecast cannot be emphasized enough." The circular concludes with several recommendations to avoid CFIT-type accidents which in part included: "(1) Noninstrument rated VFR pilots should not attempt to fly in IMC. (2) Know and fly above minimum published safe altitudes. VFR: Fly a minimum of 1,000 feet above the highest terrain in your immediate operating area in nonmountainous areas. Fly a minimum of 2,000 feet in mountainous areas." An autopsy was performed on the pilot by Forensic Pathology Services, LLC at the Hunterdon County Medical Examiner's Office, Flemington, New Jersey. The stated cause of death was, "multiple blunt force trauma." The FAA's Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological testing on the pilot. No carbon monoxide, ethanol, or drugs were detected in the samples submitted. The National Weather Service (NWS) Surface Analysis Chart for 1600 depicted a cold front extending from eastern New York and Pennsylvania, and into western New Jersey, Maryland, and southward into Virginia. The accident site was located in the immediate vicinity of the cold front. Numerous station models depicted light winds, overcast clouds, with visibility restricted in fog, temperatures around 5 degrees Celsus (C), with temperature-dew point spreads several degrees C or less. The general route of flight from Indiana to New Jersey was characterized by overcast clouds with scattered snow showers. The NWS Weather Depiction Chart for 1400 showed a large area of marginal VFR conditions over Illinois, Indiana, into Ohio and then into Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia, with IFR conditions over eastern Pennsylvania and western New Jersey in the vicinity of the accident site due to fog. The national radar mosaic for 1615 depicted a small band of very light intensity echoes along the Appalachian mountains in the vicinity of the accident site associated with stratiform clouds and potential drizzle, and an area of light reflectivity further west stretching from New York southwestward into West Virginia. The Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite 13, infrared and visible images at 1615 depicted an area of low to mid-level stratiform clouds and fog over eastern Pennsylvania and northwestern New Jersey, which extended over the accident site. The radiative cloud top temperature over the accident site was 265 degrees Kelvin or -8.16 degrees C, which corresponded to cloud tops near 10,000 feet. The area forecast encompassing the accident site was updated at 1345, and for the area of New Jersey and Southeastern Pennsylvania, forecast broken clouds at 5,000 feet with cloud tops at 7,000 feet. Through 1600, occasional periods of visibilities between 3 and 5 statute miles in mist were forecast, and at 1600, a broken ceiling at 6,000 feet. The outlook advised of visual meteorological conditions. The area forecast was amended by an AIRMET issued at 1436, and for the area encompassing the accident site, included ceilings below 1,000 feet, visibilities below 3 statute miles in mist and fog, with those conditions forecast to end by 1600. An updated AIRMET was issued at 1545 which advised of ceilings below 1,000 feet, visibilities below 3 statute miles in precipitation and mist, continuing beyond 2200. Lehigh Valley International Airport (ABE), Allentown, PA, was located approximately 15 miles west of the accident site at an elevation of 394 feet. The weather conditions reported at 1551 included winds from 320 degrees true at 4 knots, 1/4 statute mile visibility in fog, vertical visibility 300 feet, temperature and dew point of 3 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 29.91 inches of mercury. At 1724, the reported weather conditions at ABE improved to a visibility of 2 statute miles in mist, and a broken ceiling at 1,600 feet. ABE was located 20 nautical miles west of the destination airport, and issued several updated terminal aerodrome forecasts (TAF) throughout the accident day, which forecast local weather conditions around the time of the accident. The TAF issued at 0900 anticipated that conditions between 1300 and 1900 would include winds from 230 degrees true at 6 knots, greater than 6 statute miles visibility, and broken clouds at 3,500 feet. An amended TAF issued at 1233 anticipated that those same conditions would predominate between 1500 and 1900. T