ERA14FA115

The pilot’s failure to maintain adequate clearance from trees during a takeoff at night. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s lack of recent night flight experience.

The pilot and two passengers departed on a local flight to a nearby airport. They arrived near sunset, dined at a local restaurant, and returned about 1 hour later. Multiple witnesses reported that the area where the helicopter was parked was dark on the night of the accident; the airport manager stated that the runway lights did not illuminate the trees at the end of the runway. After a preflight inspection, the pilot started the helicopter and announced his position and intentions over the common traffic advisory frequency. A passenger reported that she heard the pilot say, "here we go." The helicopter then impacted the tops of 50-ft-tall trees about 350 ft from the departure location. Examination of the airframe and wreckage revealed no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot had accumulated 1 hour of night flight experience in the 11 months before the accident flight. Given the dark night conditions at the time of departure and his lack of recent night flight experience, it is likely that the pilot was unaware of the trees and did not successfully navigate above the trees and away from the airport. Review of the pilot's medical records and toxicology report revealed that he had been taking a disqualifying medication (pramipexole) since 2006. He reported the use of the medication during his aviation medical exam in 2012, and, although the medication should have been disqualifying, the aviation medical examiner issued the pilot a medical certificate. While symptoms of the disqualifying medication included "falling asleep while engaged in activities of daily living, including operation of motor vehicles," witnesses reported no abnormalities in the pilot's sleep patterns or behavior, including on the day of the flight. Based on witness statements and the pilot's long history of using this medication, it is likely that he was not affected by the medication's published symptoms during the flight.

The departure airport was located about 350 feet east of the accident site. The airport comprised of one turf runway, which measured 2,590 feet long and 70 feet wide and was equipped with low intensity runway edge lights. There was a clear area at the north end of the airport, where the helicopter had departed from. According to the manager, the runway lights did not illuminate the trees that bordered the west side of the runway. A rural neighborhood surrounded the airport to the east and west. There was also a highway adjacent to the northern tip of the airport that ran northwest. 72-hour History Follow-up interviews with both the pilot's daughter and the pilot's girlfriend were used to construct a 72-hour history. On the night of Thursday, February 6, 2014, the pilot drove home to Tallahassee, Florida, from Jacksonville, Florida after a work related meeting. The following day the pilot drove to his girlfriend's house about 1600 and subsequently returned home about 1830. He conversed with his daughter for about 30 minutes before going to dinner with his girlfriend. At 1530 on the day of the accident, the pilot and his girlfriend picked up the second passenger from his home and subsequently drove to the pilot's house to collect his airport badge before driving to the airport. The pilot's daughter and girlfriend observed no abnormalities in the pilot's behavior or sleep patterns during these three days. Night Flight According to the Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge (FAA-H-8083-25A), "While the cones adapt rapidly to changes in light intensities, the rods take much longer. Walking from bright sunlight into a dark movie theater is an example of this dark adaptation period experience. The rods can take approximately 30 minutes to fully adapt to darkness. A bright light, however, can completely destroy night adaptation, leaving night vision severely compromised while the adaptation process is repeated." According to the Robinson Helicopter Company R-44 Helicopter Pilot's Operating Handbook (2-7 Limitations), "Orientation during night flight must be maintained by visual reference to ground objects illuminated solely by lights on the ground or adequate celestial illumination." Airport Lighting Safety Advancement The investigation revealed there were no lights to illuminate the trees that were struck by the helicopter during the accident. The Florida Department of Transportation installed a light at the northwestern end of the airport in March 2015 to illuminate the affected trees. An autopsy was performed on the pilot by the District Two Office of the Medical Examiner, Tallahassee, Florida. The cause of death was listed as "multiple blunt force trauma." The FAA's Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological testing on the pilot. No carbon monoxide or ethanol were detected in the samples submitted. The testing detected the presence of Citalopram and n-desmethylcitalopram in the blood in quantities of 0.398 ug/mL and 0.533 ug/mL, respectively. Citalopram, marketed under the trade name Celexa, is a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor antidepressant and desmethylcitalopram is the metabolite. The testing also detected an unquantified amount of desmethylsildenafil, dextromethorphan, dextrorphan, and pramipexole in the blood and liver samples submitted. Dextrorphan is the metabolite of dextramoethorphan, a cough suppressant found in common over the counter medications. Unquantified amounts of Citalopram and n-desmethylcitalopram were also detected in the pilot's liver. Review of the pilot's personal medical history revealed that he had been taking pramipexole since 2006. Pramipexole, marketed under the trade name Mirapex, is a dopamine agonist used to treat Parkinsons disease and restless leg syndrome. Mirapex use is associated with serious risks including "falling asleep while engaged in activities of daily living, including operation of motor vehicles;" hypotension, hallucinations, and major behavioral changes. On April 5, 2012, the pilot reapplied for a second class medical certificate, at which time he reported Zocor, Trilipix, and Mirapex. Although Mirapex is a disqualifying drug, the pilot's Aviation Medical Examiner noted it as "previously reported" and subsequently issued him a second-class medical certificate. The accident site was located in a marsh area bordered by trees about 350 feet from the helicopter's departure point. The initial impact point was identified by several damaged tree limbs about 50 feet above the ground, which were about 25 feet from the helicopter's final resting location. The wreckage path was oriented about 340 degrees magnetic and extended from the initial impact point to where the main wreckage came to rest. The main wreckage was inverted in water and oriented on a northerly heading. The middle wire of a three strand power line, also located in the wreckage path, was severed during the accident and repaired before NTSB investigators arrived on scene. There were no indications of pre or postimpact fire. The wreckage was subsequently recovered from the accident scene and examined at a nearby law enforcement facility. The tailboom remained attached to the fuselage and was severed about three feet from the tail rotor section. The severed tail section consisted of the tailboom structure, horizontal stabilizer, the upper and lower vertical stabilizers, and the tail rotor. The forward 10-foot section of the tailboom was canted to the left. There was no visible damage to both tail rotor blades, which also remained attached to the tail rotor gearbox. The horizontal and upper vertical stabilizers were intact, and the lower vertical stabilizer exhibited some compression damage. The main rotor mast was impact separated from the helicopter and co-located with the main wreckage. For reference purposes, the two main rotor blades were arbitrarily designated "A" and "B". Blade "A" was bent about 45 degrees downward and segmented into thirds with most of the blade spar still intact and attached to the main rotor hub. The remaining 10 inches of "Blade A" blade spar were not recovered. The middle third section of the blade was partially separated and the remaining outboard third of the blade was fracture-separated parallel to the blade chord. Blade "B" was bent down about 30 degrees and remained intact to the blade tip. The skin and honeycomb section of the remaining 2 feet of blade had separated. Both blades exhibited compression and impact damage. The drive belts were broken, but exhibited no signs of rolling. Both the upper and lower actuator bearings rotated freely and the sprag clutch locked and free-wheeled normally. The main rotor gearbox was detached from the airframe, broken into several pieces, and rotated freely. The engine starter ring gear exhibited linear scoring that was parallel in direction to the gear's rotation. The aft surface of the upper sheave displayed circular scoring and the upper drive belt sheave exhibited multiple scores across its grooves that were consistent with machining marks. Examination of the flight control system revealed separations consistent with overload on multiple push-pull tubes. There were additional separations within the cyclic stick assembly, cyclic torque tube, and the Blade "B" pitch change link. Control continuity for the cyclic, collective, and anti-torque systems was established and all separations were consistent with overload fractures. All separations in the tail rotor driveshaft were consistent with bending overload. Main and tail rotor gearbox continuity was confirmed. Both fuel bladder tanks were separated from the main wreckage. The fuel caps remained attached to their respective fuel tanks. The fuel lines were torn at the line outlets, but intact from the tear to the engine. Fuel line continuity was confirmed through the vent lines in the mast fairing, vent fittings on both