ERA15FA175

The pilot's excessive pitch control inputs to the airplane’s sidestick control, which resulted in an overstress of the airframe and its subsequent in-flight breakup. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's decision to operate the airplane contrary to the manufacturer's flight test policy.

The commercial pilot was tasked with performing high-speed taxi tests and familiarization with the experimental airplane. After performing two high-speed taxis, the pilot requested taxi clearance to the active runway, received a takeoff clearance, and departed from the runway. Witnesses reported that, after departure and while in the traffic pattern, the airplane's pitch oscillated and that, when it turned onto the final leg of the traffic pattern, it continued to pitch up and down. The airplane subsequently descended and impacted terrain about 1 mile from the approach end of the runway. Images captured by an onboard video recorder provided information about where the pilot's attention was directed, his interaction with the flight controls, and the status of cockpit instruments and engine indicators. The information indicated that the pilot did not pin his left arm to the armrest and that he used his entire forearm to move the airplane's sidestick flight control. In addition, the pilot released and re-gripped the sidestick several times, which exacerbated the negative g maneuvers. These control inputs were indicative of the pilot overcontrolling the airplane. As the pilot flew the right-hand traffic pattern, he repeatedly turned his head right and/or reached right. These movements and distractions resulted in the airplane beginning to oscillate. In each of the pitch excursions, except for one that occurred during the takeoff, the pilot's left arm moved fore and aft, and negative gs were present. During the flight, as the speed increased, each pitch oscillation increased; the final adjustment of the flight control by the pilot resulted in an overstress of the airframe and its subsequent in-flight breakup. A postaccident examination of the airframe, flight controls, and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Although the pilot reported a high level of total flight experience, he had accumulated less than 1/2 hour of total flight experience in the accident airplane make and model at the time of the accident. The airplane manufacturer's flight test policy indicated that, to gain experience, pilots should first taxi the airplane, then perform high-speed taxis, then perform high-speed taxis with the nose gear off the ground, and finally, after the pilot was comfortable with the airplane, to perform a takeoff. The pilot decided to perform the takeoff without the requisite experience; therefore, he was operating contrary to the manufacturer's flight test policy.

St. Lucie County International Airport was located 3 miles northwest of Fort Pierce, Florida. It had three runways designated 10R/28L, 14/32, and 10L/28R. The runway designated as 10R/28L was 6,492 feet-long and 150 feet-wide, constructed of asphalt and noted in "good condition." At the time of the accident the airport had an operating air traffic control tower. A GoPro camera was shipped to the NTSB Recorders Laboratory for data download. The camera and the memory card were undamaged. The memory card was read out normally. A Recorder Laboratory Specialist reviewed the video and prepared a transcript of the events from the video camera. The video revealed that the camera was mounted on a suction mount hanging from the top of the sliding canopy looking forward. It captured the taxi, takeoff, and the accident flight in the traffic pattern of FPR. Immediately after liftoff, the airplane began large pitch oscillations up and down. Loose objects would rise into view and fall, coincident with the observed pitch oscillations. This pattern continued throughout the flight. The pilot's left forearm was moving fore and aft to control the airplane. The forearm was not resting on and stationary to the metallic armrest area of the airplane, which indicated that the pilot was moving the sidestick control primarily through forearm motion rather than wrist action. Throughout the initial climb, there were several other pitch oscillations. Then, the pilot turned the airplane onto the crosswind leg of the traffic pattern and his attention was diverted to the right, and immediately the airplane again began pitch oscillations. Next, the pilot turned onto the downwind leg of the traffic pattern, and again, diverted his attention, and adjusted his grip on the sidestick. While his hand was not on the sidestick, the airplane began another pitch oscillation. When the pilot maneuvered the airplane onto the final leg of the traffic pattern, he readjusted his grip on the sidestick and moved his right hand to the throttle, at which time the airplane began pitch oscillations and the pilot's right hand was noted moving upward, off the throttle. The pilot re-gripped the throttle and continued to line the airplane up with the intended runway for landing. A few seconds later, the airplane experienced a large pitch up, the pilot's hand moved downward and off the throttle, and the airplane had a positive pitch attitude. Immediately, the airplane experienced a large downward pitch oscillation and the canopy glass broke, the camera exited the airplane, and it rotated in the airstream behind the airplane. As the camera rotated, it captured the airplane until it impacted the ground, and soon after the camera came to rest in the vicinity of the airplane. Throughout the accident flight, the airspeed of the airplane continuously increased to a maximum of about 160 mph while the airplane was on final approach to the runway. The pitch control inputs, pitch excursions, and energy of the objects rising into and falling from the camera view were increasing throughout the flight. The propeller was rotating, and the engine sound was smooth and continuous without interruption until the camera exited the airplane. In addition, during the video, the pilot was not observed utilizing any type of checklist. Video Study The GoPro video camera was mounted to the canopy of the airplane, aft and slightly to the right of the pilot. The instrument panel and both side stick controllers were in camera's recorded view. The pilot was using his left hand to control the left side stick. Large fore/aft stick movements and corresponding pitch oscillations were observed from just after the takeoff to the end of the flight. There were periods where the stick movement and airplane pitch were relatively stable. The final pitch down culminated in a structural breakup where the seats separated from the airframe and the pilot was ejected through the airplane's canopy. Overall, the pitch oscillations were consistent with the stick movements and both sticks moved in unison. Throughout the flight, the pilot did not rest his left arm to the armrest, rather the entire forearm was used to move the stick. In addition, the pilot released and re-gripped the stick several times. Repeatedly, the pilot would turn his head to the right and/or reach right, which resulted in the beginning of an oscillation. In each case, his left arm would move fore and aft and negative Gs were present in each of the pitch excursions except for the initial takeoff excursion. The speed of the airplane was steadily increasing throughout the flight, and on short final, the airspeed indicator indicated about160 mph. The recording included the final excursion, which was similar to a negative G excursion, although no G-meter was observed it appeared to be a greater force than the previous excursions. The airplane manufacturer stated that the purpose of the taxi tests was for the pilot to become familiar with the control feel and characteristics of the airplane and the side-stick control. A representative of the company said that the pilot was expected to be able to carefully lift the nose gear off the runway without taking off and repeat this maneuver several times prior to being considered eligible to fly the airplane. This type of maneuver was not observed on the video of the accident flight. Stabilator Spar and Bracket Examination The stabilator spar and bracket were examined by the NTSB Materials Laboratory in Washington, DC. Magnified optical examinations of the fracture revealed features and deformation patterns consistent with an overstress separation with no indications of preexisting cracking such as fatigue. The stabilator brackets left bearing loop was fractured with features indicative of an overstress separation. Fracture deformation was to the left. The right hand bracket loop was intact. Deformation and contact marks were present at the bearing loop area consistent with leftward deflection of an attached clevis like structure. Both brackets showed shadow marks consistent with the presence of mounting hardware attaching the brackets to the common plate. Bedecorp – Flight Handbook The manufacturer's flight handbook contained "…information and guidelines for learning to fly a BD aircraft. These procedures required for test flying an aircraft, as well as new pilots checking themselves out in an aircraft." In addition, "as a general rule, it takes three days before the pilot is cleared for their initial take off and flight around the pattern. It is recommended that a majority of the flight testing be done in the early morning hours while the wind is calm. It is also important to give the pilot time to absorb and digest the information from each of the following steps. The list below is a minimum amount that the company requires a new pilot to perform in order to be checked out in the aircraft." The flight procedures checklist indicated that the pilot was to start learning the specifics of that make and model of airplane by first taxiing, then performing high speed taxies, performing high speed taxies with the nose gear off the ground, and finally, after he or she was comfortable with the airplane, to perform a takeoff. The Medical Examiner Department, District 19, of Florida, performed an autopsy on the pilot. The autopsy report indicated that the pilot died as a result of "multiple blunt trauma injuries" and the report listed those injuries. The FAA's Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological testing of the pilot. Fluid and tissue specimens from the pilot tested negative for cyanide, ethanol, and other drugs. The airplane impacted terrain in a nose down attitude and came to rest inverted, on a 092 degree magnetic heading. There was an impact crater approximately 18 inches deep. The on-board camera, canopy, and seats separated from the airframe. The leading