ERA15FA378

The pilot's failure to maintain single-engine minimum controllable airspeed following a loss of right engine power during initial climb. Also causal was the loss of right engine power for reasons that could not be determined because examination of the wreckage revealed no significant mechanical deficiencies. Contributing to the outcome was the failure of maintenance personnel to ensure that required airspeed markings and placards were installed in accordance with an airworthiness directive and the airplane flight manual.

The commercial pilot, who had no documented previous experience in the make and model multiengine airplane, was performing touch-and-go landings on a 9,730-ft-long runway to familiarize himself with the airplane. Witnesses reported that, during the second takeoff, the airplane appeared to "struggle." Another witness reported the airplane was climbing at an unusually shallow angle. The airplane then drifted to the right of the runway centerline, rolled sharply to the right, and descended to ground impact in a steep, nose-low attitude. The airplane came to rest about 180 ft right of the runway centerline and about 1,450 ft before the end of the runway's paved surface. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the right engine throttle was retarded, and the propeller lever was in the feather position. The right propeller blades displayed little damage and appeared to be in the feathered position. The left engine throttle and propeller levers were full forward, and damage to the left propeller was indicative of full left engine power at impact. Examination of the right engine revealed three anomalies; the diaphragm of the right fuel servo exhibited an unusual soot pattern; particulate contamination was in the fuel filter screen; and the spark plugs were in a degraded condition. However, none of these anomalies would likely have resulted in a total loss of engine power. Based on the witness descriptions and the lack of damage to the right propeller blades, it is likely that during the climb, the right engine experienced, at least, a partial loss of power. Based on the postaccident positions of the right engine throttle and propeller levers and signatures observed on the right engine's propeller, the pilot likely responded to the loss of right engine power by retarding the right throttle and feathering the right propeller; however, he did not maintain the appropriate airspeed and subsequently lost control of the airplane. Given the airplane's impact location about 1,450 ft before the end of the runway, it is likely that, if the pilot had immediately retarded both throttles, maintained the appropriate airspeed, and landed straight ahead, he likely would have maintained control of the airplane. Additionally, the airspeed indicator did not have a marking for single-engine minimum controllable airspeed, nor was there a placard on the instrument panel as required by a Federal Aviation Administration airworthiness directive and the airplane flight manual. While the lack of these markings was not causal to the accident, their presence might have reminded the pilot of this critical information, and might have changed the outcome of the event.

An autopsy was performed on the pilot by the Office of the Medical Examiner, District 6, Largo, Florida. The autopsy findings included multiple blunt force injuries. Forensic toxicology was performed on specimens from the pilot, by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The testing found no traces of ethanol or drugs in the samples submitted. The recorded weather at PIE, at 1153, about 11 minutes after the accident, included wind from 300°at 10 knots, 10 statute miles visibility, few clouds at 2,300 ft, scattered clouds at 3,800 ft, and overcast clouds at 3,000 ft, temperature 29°C, dew point 24°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.82 inches of mercury. According to FAA airman, personal logbook, and employment records, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane. He also held a flight instructor certificate, with ratings for airplane single-engine, airplane multiengine, and instrument airplane. He held a first-class medical certificate, issued January 16, 2014. He had accrued about 768 total hours of flight experience, with 166 hours of flight experience in multiengine airplanes. In the previous 90 days, the pilot had flown 221 hours, with 85 hours in the previous 30 days. The pilot's multiengine experience was limited to Piper PA-44 and Beechcraft BE-55 airplanes. There were no entries in his pilot logbook for the Piper PA-30. The airplane impacted a service road and came to rest upright in the grass 180 ft east of runway 36, about 1,450 ft before the end of the runway's paved surface. There was no postcrash fire, and all major components of the airplane were located near the site. The debris path consisted of small pieces of Plexiglas, heater hoses, the nose cone, a cabin door, and landing gear assembly that were outside of the immediate site near where the airplane first made contact with the ground, about 20 ft west of the main wreckage. Both the left and right engines remained attached to their mounts. The wreckage path was oriented perpendicular to runway 36 with the airplane upright and oriented on a magnetic heading of 280°. The forward and lower portion of the cabin exhibited aft and upwards crushing. Both rudder pedals were compacted by the floor upwards under the instrument panel and could not be moved. The floor of the forward cabin was deformed by impact damage, but both seats remained attached to the floor-mounted seat rails. The pilot seat on the left side was moveable along the seat rails for several stops and was slightly deformed. The head rest was damaged. The right seat was jammed and could not be moved. Both front and back seats were functional and in place. The front seatbelts were functional and remained attached to their anchor points. There were no shoulder harnesses installed. Both fuel sector valves were on and functioned normally. The fuselage aft of the rear seat, and immediately aft of the left wing, exhibited longitudinal tearing with the tail section twisted 10°to the right. The tear traversed the fuselage over the cabin roof and continued to the right side, where it terminated just aft of the baggage compartment. Control continuity was established by accessing the rudder, elevator and trim cables through the tear in the fuselage. All of the cables were intact and on their respective pulleys and guides. The cables were continuous and could be traced to their termination point in the tail. The airspeed indicator was dislodged from the faceplate but appeared intact. The needle indicated 68 mph, which is just below the lower limit of the white arc. The left engine throttle, propeller and mixture controls were positioned fully forward, and the right engine throttle and right propeller levers were in the aft position and the mixture fully forward. The left cowl flap was in the closed position and the right cowl flap was in the fully opened position. The left wing was crushed and bent upwards approximately 30°. The engine remained attached to the engine mount and wing. There was rippling and deformation in the upper surface of the skin, but the wing appeared to be structurally intact. The flap remained attached, but was deformed. Both inboard and outboard fuel tanks remained intact and about 15 gallons of fuel were recovered from the tanks. The engine cowling was attached. The air intake cowling was damaged and separated from the lower portion but remained in place around the spinner. The left engine's spark plugs were secure. The spark plugs were removed and displayed signatures consistent with normal wear but were oil-soaked. The No. 2 bottom spark plug was impact-damaged and could not be removed from the cylinder. Rotation of the magneto input drive produced spark at all terminal leads. The left fuel servo was impact-damaged and broken at its mount. The fuel servo was removed and inspected. The throttle plate was free to move when hand actuated at the throttle linkage. The throttle cable was secured to the arm. The mixture arm was also free to rotate when hand actuated. The mixture cable was secure to the arm. The fuel servo diaphragm was visually inspected for tears and rips with no defects noted. The inlet fuel strainer was removed from the fuel servo with no contaminants noted. The flow divider was removed and opened to inspect the diaphragm for tears or cuts with no defects noted. The fuel injector nozzles were removed from their respective mounts at each individual cylinder and checked for obstructions with no obstructions noted. The fuel lines from the flow divider to the fuel injector nozzles were inspected and tested with air; no blockage was noted in any of the four lines. Functional testing of the left engine's fuel servo revealed that it operated normally and within limits under controlled conditions. The left engine-driven diaphragm fuel pump was found secure to its mount and the pump created suction and compression when hand-actuated. The body was removed to inspect the diaphragm for tears or cuts with no defects noted. The left engine's oil suction screen was removed and was found to have a few large (0.2"-0.5") particles inside the screen, as well as some smaller particles. The oil filter housing was impact-damaged at the accessory housing. The oil sump was visibly breached, and oil was observed in a spray pattern over the wing and inboard of the engine nacelle and fuselage. Mechanical continuity of the left engine was established with hand rotation of the crankshaft and assisted by turning the vacuum pump drive in the accessory drive area. All cylinders produced suction and compression, and all intake and exhaust valves moved when the crankshaft was rotated. The left propeller governor was broken from its mount on the rear accessory case. The solid oil line steel fittings were secure at the case and at the governor. The propeller governor oil screen was clear of obstructions. The left propeller remained attached to the engine via the engine crankshaft flange and the propeller blades exhibited S-bending, gouging, and chordwise scratches. The cylinder and feathering spring assembly were unremarkable and the preload plates exhibited impression marks consistent with being in the normal operating range at impact. The right wing showed significantly less damage than the left. The engine remained attached to the engine mount and wing. There was rippling and deformation in the upper surface of the skin, but the wing appeared to be structurally intact. The right outboard aileron was detached from the right connector point and remained attached on the left side. The flap was retracted and remained attached, but was deformed. Both inboard and outboard fuel tanks remained intact, and about 20 gallons of fuel were recovered from the tanks. The engine cowling was attached. The air intake cowling was damaged and separated from the lower portion, b