ERA16FA074

The pilot's decision to initiate the flight into known adverse weather conditions, in an airplane that was not approved for instrument flight, which resulted in an encounter with instrument meteorological conditions and his subsequent spatial disorientation and loss of airplane control.

The airline transport pilot, who was a US Navy flight instructor and newly certificated civilian flight instructor, was flying his cousin to his home base where he planned to provide her with initial flight training. He received a weather briefing earlier in the day, and the briefer indicated that visual flight rules (VFR) flight was not recommended due to instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) at the surface. Despite the briefer's statement, the pilot indicated he planned on remaining VFR throughout the flight. Before taking off for the accident flight, during ground operations, the pilot discussed the weather with a former flight service station pilot weather briefer, who told the pilot that the weather was "really bad" in the direction of the pilot's destination, and the pilot agreed, yet he chose to depart anyway. He reported that the pilot appeared to be "in a hurry." No evidence was found indicating that the pilot received any additional weather briefing information before taking off for the accident flight. The flight departed to the northwest toward an approaching cold front. The conditions associated with the front included low clouds and mist. As the pilot proceeded toward his destination, the flight encountered the front, and the pilot declared an emergency with air traffic control (ATC), stating that he was in instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions and that his airplane was "not capable of IFR." Radar data of the final segment of the flight showed the airplane in a left, 180-degree turn for 43 seconds, immediately followed by a right, 90-degree turn for 37 seconds before radar and radio contact was lost. The last radar return was observed at an altitude of about 1,200 ft mean sea level. The wreckage was located about 0.2 nautical mile southeast of the last radar return. Forward-to-aft crushing signatures to the wreckage, damage to adjacent trees, and the lack of a linear wreckage debris path were consistent with a near-vertical, nose-low attitude at impact. An examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any evidence of a preimpact anomaly or malfunction, and the pilot did not report any mechanical issues to ATC. According to the airplane builder and Federal Aviation Administration records, the airplane was not approved for flight in IMC. The low visibility conditions that existed during the flight, which was conducted at night in instrument conditions, were conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. Further, the pilot's actions and responses and the airplane's turning ground track and near-vertical descent were consistent with the pilot losing airplane control due to spatial disorientation. The pilot should not have initiated the flight into a known approaching cold front in an airplane not equipped for IMC flight, and this decision directly led to the accident.

The Offices of the Medical Examiner, District Two, Tallahassee, Florida, performed autopsies of the pilot and the passenger. The autopsy reports noted the cause of death for both of them was multiple blunt traumatic injuries. The FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute performed postaccident toxicological testing on tissue specimens from the pilot and the passenger. The specimens for both of them tested negative for a wide range of drugs, including major drugs of abuse. Testing for carbon monoxide and cyanide was not performed. Although the pilot's specimens tested negative for ethanol (at a 10 percent cutoff), local toxicology testing found small amounts of ethanol consistent with postmortem production. The pilot received a weather briefing at 1425 from Lockheed Martin Flight Service (LMFS) Flight Watch while the airplane was over South Alabama Regional Airport, Andalusia, Alabama, en route to X04. The pilot also requested updated weather information for the Tallahassee area during the weather briefing. The weather briefer provided the current AIRMETs for turbulence, icing, and IFR conditions, all of which were valid at the airplane's current location in southern Alabama from 1425 to 1431. The weather briefer indicated "VFR flight not recommended with IMC [instrument meteorological conditions] at the surface," then provided the current METAR and the terminal aerodrome forecast for TLH, which forecast an overcast ceiling at 1,500 ft above ground level (agl) and moderate rain showers until 2000. The briefer also provided the pilot the current center weather advisory, which discussed a line of rain and embedded thunderstorms moving from 230° at 40 knots with thunderstorm tops to flight level 350 east of Tallahassee and moving northeastward across northern Florida in between the accident airplane's position at that time and X04. The pilot stated that he intended to remain VFR throughout the flight. The weather briefer said, "VFR flight not recommended," and then provided an alternate destination airport. The accident flight took off from X04 around 1800. The accident pilot did not contact LMFS or direct user access terminal service to receive a weather briefing on the ground before departing from X04. No evidence was found indicating that the pilot received any additional weather briefing information. Perry-Foley Airport (K40J), Perry, Florida, located about 17 nm south of the accident site, was the closest official weather station. At 1915, K40J reported wind from 170° at 5 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, light mist, overcast ceiling at 700 ft agl, temperature 23° C, dew point 22° C, and altimeter setting 29.86 inches of mercury (inHg). At 1935, K40J reported wind from 150° at 5 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, overcast skies at 1,700 ft agl, temperature 23° C, dew point 21° C, and altimeter setting 29.87 inHg. At 1955, K40J reported wind from 140 degrees at 4 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, broken ceiling at 500 ft agl, broken skies at 1,500 ft agl, overcast skies at 2,100 ft agl, temperature 23° C, dew point 21° C, and altimeter setting 29.87 inHg. Suwannee County Airport (K24J), Live Oak, Florida, was located 31 nm east-southeast of the accident site. K24J was not equipped with working sky cover instrumentation at the time of the accident. At 1935, K24J reported wind from 180° at 3 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, temperature 22° C, dew point 22° C, and altimeter setting 29.90 inHg. At 1955, K24J reported wind from 180° at 4 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, temperature 22° C, dew point 22° C, and altimeter setting 29.89 inHg. The National Weather Service surface analysis chart for 1900 depicted a cold front just west of the accident site that stretched from south-southwest into the Gulf of Mexico to north-northeast through central Georgia and into western North Carolina. The station models around the accident site depicted temperature-dew point spreads of 2° F or less. Mostly cloudy skies and light rain were located around the accident site at 1900. About a 5-knot wind from the south was observed east of the cold front, and wind under 10 knots was observed west of the cold front. With a light surface wind environment and small temperature-dew point spreads, it would be expected that any low clouds and mist would have remained east of the cold front. A review of base reflectivity and lightning data revealed that the accident flight flew through base reflectivity values between 0 and 15 decibels, which were consistent with light precipitation (drizzle and light rain) at the accident site at the time of the accident. These values were also consistent with likely IMC at the flight level of the airplane at the time of the accident. There were no lightning strikes near the accident site at the time of the accident. According to astronomical data obtained from the US Naval Observatory, on the day of the accident, sunset occurred at 1736, and civil twilight ended at 1803. Complete darkness prevailed when the accident occurred with the phase of the moon as a waxing crescent with 40 percent of the moon's visible disk illuminated. With the abundant cloud cover surrounding the accident site at the time of the accident, it is unlikely the moon provided any illumination for the accident flight. The pilot held an FAA airline transport pilot certificate with an airplane multiengine land rating, a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating, and an instrument airplane rating. He also held an FAA flight instructor certificate with airplane single-engine and instrument airplane ratings, which he had obtained 1 week before the accident. According to US Navy personnel, the pilot was a current naval aviator and flight instructor and had logged about 1,856 hours of military flight time. According to a pilot logbook recovered at the scene, he had logged about 218 hours of civilian flight time, including 126 hours in the accident airplane. The pilot's most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on March 8, 2010, with no limitations. Under 14 CFR Section 61.23 (b)(9): Operations not requiring a medical certificate. "A person is not required to hold a medical certificate….When a military pilot of the U.S. Armed Forces can show evidence of an up-to-date medical examination authorizing pilot flight status issued by the U.S. Armed Forces and (i) The flight does not require higher than a third-class medical certificate; and (ii) The flight conducted is a domestic flight operation within U.S. airspace." A DD Form 2992, Medical Recommendation for Flying or Special Operational Duty, dated August 12, 2015, which cleared the pilot for flight duty, was found with the pilot's civilian logbook in the wreckage. The student pilot/passenger, who was seated in the aft cockpit seat, obtained an FAA student pilot certificate on December 4, 2015. A pilot logbook was found with her personal belongings and revealed 0 hours of logged flight time. The pilot's father reported that both pilots were very busy and highly driven. There was limited time for this training experience, "but they made the time anyway." The airplane crashed in a pine forest about 4.5 nm north-northeast of Greenville, Florida. General forward-to-aft crushing signatures were observed on the fuselage and both wings. Scraping damage, in a vertically down direction, was observed on adjacent trees. The engine and forward fuselage were found in a crater submerged under the ground. There was no linear wreckage path noted, and there was no evidence of fire. All of the structural components of the airframe and engine were accounted for at the scene. The cockpit instrument panel was destroyed, and the flight and performance instruments were separated. No useful information was obtained from the instruments. The attitude indicator was not located The turn coordinator face was destroyed. The left wing was generally