ERA16LA109

The flight instructor's inadequate preflight fuel planning, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion.

The student pilot and flight instructor were conducting an instructional cross-country flight with two passengers on board. They were returning to their home airport at night; the flight instructor estimated that there was a headwind of 30-40 knots and the airplane's groundspeed was about 81 knots during the cruise portion of the flight. Just before crossing a large ocean inlet, the flight instructor suggested that they divert for fuel on the other side of the inlet. Shortly thereafter, the engine "sputtered." The flight instructor then turned on the electric fuel pump and instructed the student pilot to switch the fuel selector to the left fuel tank and to maintain 2,000 ft msl. Once the fuel selector had been selected to the left fuel tank, the engine stopped sputtering. The flight instructor informed air traffic control that he wanted to divert to a nearby airport. They continued to fly for another 2-3 minutes when the engine sputtered again and lost total power. The instructor then took control of the airplane from the student pilot and advised the tower controller at the diversion airport that he was declaring an emergency. The flight instructor then made a 180° turn and headed for the shoreline. As the airplane descended, he was unable to see the shoreline due to the darkness and decided to ditch the airplane as close as he could to the beach. Upon touching down, the flight instructor opened the cabin door and instructed everyone to exit the airplane. The student pilot handed the instructor a life vest. The two passengers jumped into the water and started swimming for shore. Neither the student pilot nor the passengers were wearing life vests. About 3 minutes after the ditching, the airplane was located by a helicopter. The flight instructor, student, and one passenger were rescued. A search by the police department and the US Coast Guard could not locate the remaining passenger. About 2 months later, the missing passenger's body was discovered on a beach. The autopsy listed the cause of death as drowning. Postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact failure or malfunction of the engine or airplane that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of the fuel system revealed that the system was essentially devoid of fuel. The flight instructor estimated that 40 gallons of fuel were onboard before departure on the first leg of the flight; the student estimated 36 gallons were onboard. Before they departed from their home airport, the student pilot asked the flight instructor if he wanted to refuel, and the flight instructor advised him that they had plenty of fuel. The student again asked about refueling during the return flight, but the instructor stated the fuel looked good. There was no evidence that the flight instructor had obtained an official weather briefing before the initial or return leg of the flight. On the first leg of the flight, the instructor recognized that the winds aloft increased their groundspeed, allowing them to arrive at their destination sooner, but on the second leg of the flight, those same winds significantly increased their flying time. The instructor should have accounted for the effect of wind on the flight's duration. Review of the POH indicated that, at a 65% power setting, with full fuel tanks (48 gallons usable), endurance would be about 5.3 hours, and at a 65% power setting, with 40 gallons of fuel, endurance would be about 4.4 hours. Examination of aircraft rental and fueling records revealed that the airplane had been operated for 5.1 hours since it was last refueled. Thus it is likely that the flight instructor did not conduct adequate preflight fuel planning; had they done so and had they accounted for the wind, they would have recognized there was insufficient fuel to complete the flight and maintain the required 45 minutes of reserve fuel.

Fuel Requirements in Visual Flight Rules (VFR) Conditions According to 14 CFR 91.151, no person may begin a flight in an airplane under VFR conditions unless (considering wind and forecast weather conditions) there is enough fuel to fly to the first point of intended landing and, assuming normal cruising speed, to fly an additional 30 minutes during the day and an additional 45 minutes at night. The Suffolk County Office of the Medical Examiner, Suffolk County, New York, performed an autopsy and toxicological testing of the deceased passenger. The autopsy listed the cause of death as drowning; the toxicological specimens were negative for any drugs of abuse. About 9 minutes before the accident (2256), the recorded weather at ISP, which was 11 miles from the accident site, included: wind 220° at 10 knots, 10 miles visibility, sky clear, temperature 7°C, dew point 3°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.82 inches of mercury. The National Weather Service (NWS) Surface Analysis Chart for 2200 EST depicted surface winds from the south-southwest at 10 to 20 knots, with no significant weather reported in the vicinity of the accident site. The Upton (OKX) Long Island 1900 sounding depicted a surface-based temperature inversion with a top near 2,000 feet. As a result of light surface winds and an increasing wind component with altitude, a moderate risk of low-level wind shear existed in the lowest 1,000 ft, and predominately light-to-moderate turbulence was predicted below 3,000 ft, and light turbulence through 10,000 ft. An airplane descending into Providence, Rhode Island, at 2344 provided an in-situ measurement of the low-level winds. The airplane's track into the airport was from the southwest, parallel to Long Island Sound, and along the accident airplane's general route of flight. The airplane detected a surface-based temperature inversion to about 2,500 ft with westerly winds of 58 knots at that level. Another limited report from an airplane descending into LaGuardia reported a low-level wind maximum of 52 knots at 1,800 feet. The winds aloft forecast current at the time of departure for stations near the route of flight indicated: General Edward Lawrence Logan International Airport (BOS), Boston, Massachusetts: - 3,000 ft: 270° at 34 kts - 6,000 ft: 260° at 38 kts Bradley International Airport (BDL), Windsor Locks, Connecticut: - 3,000 ft: 280° at 26 kts - 6,000 ft: 270° at 36 kts John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), New York, New York: - 3,000 ft: 270° at 40 kts - 6,000 ft: 280° at 40 kts According to the United States Naval Observatory, sunset occurred at 1732 and the end of civil twilight occurred at 1800. At the time of the accident, the moon was located at an azimuth of 187° and an altitude of 62° above the horizon, and the phase of the moon a waxing gibbous with 97% of the visible disk illuminated. A query to Lockheed Martin Flight Services (LMFS) found that there was no record that the pilot or instructor obtained a weather briefing either through the Direct User Access Terminal Service or LMFS. The flight instructor held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single- and multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. He also held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine and instrument airplane. His most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) first-class medical certificate was issued November 12, 2015. He reported 2,800 total hours of flight experience, of which 1,400 hours were in the accident airplane make and model. The student pilot reported that he had accrued 20 total hours of flight experience, 19 of which were in the accident airplane make and model. After the ditching, the airplane remained afloat for about 5 minutes before it sank nose first to the bottom of the bay and came to rest on its landing gear, about 100 ft northwest of Buoy S8. Charted water depth in the area was between 1 ft and 3.5 ft; however, the airplane ditched just after high tide so an additional 5 ft of water was present. Only 1 ft of the vertical stabilizer was visible above the water's surface after the airplane sank. Airplane Examination Examination of the airplane after recovery revealed substantial damage due to salt water immersion, a broken engine mount, damage to the right wing inboard leading edge, damage to the bottom of the inboard right wing, and damage to the aft fuselage structure just forward of the stabilator. The pitot tube was clear, and the stall vane moved freely. Flight control continuity was established from the flight controls in the cockpit to the ailerons, stabilator, and rudder. The stabilator trim was neutral. The wing flaps were in the fully extended (40°) position. Both wing flaps exhibited impact damage, and the right wing flap actuating linkage was fractured. Visual examination of the fuel tanks through the filler ports revealed that only a small amount of liquid with the odor of seawater was visible in the fuel tanks. About 4 gallons of a semi-opaque liquid was drained from both fuel tanks. When the liquid was tested with water-finding paste, the paste turned pink indicating the presence of water. The outlet screens from each tank were free of blockages. The throttle was full forward, the mixture was full rich, the carburetor heat control was in the "OFF" position, and the primer was in and locked. The fuel selector was in the left fuel tank position. The master switch, fuel pump switch, landing light switch, navigation lights switch, anti-collision lights switch, and radio master switch were all in the "ON" position. All the seats were in place and secure, and the seatbelts were in place, unbuckled, and secure at their attachment points. Both front shoulder straps were hanging loose and were not attached to the lap belts. Propeller and Engine Examination The propeller was a one-piece alloy forging and remained attached to the front of the engine crankshaft; it displayed light leading-edge erosion and no evidence of S-bending. Drive train continuity was established from the front to the back of the engine, and thumb compression was present on all four cylinders. Internal examination of the cylinders using a borescope did not reveal any anomalies of the cylinders, piston heads, or valves. Both magnetos were found secure to their respective mounts. The magnetos were removed and disassembled. Internal examination of the magnetos revealed no evidence of any preimpact anomalies; corrosion consistent with salt water immersion was present on the internal case and gear region. The spark plugs and ignition harness were removed and examined. The massive electrode plugs indicated a worn-out service life. The fine wire plugs indicated a normal service life when compared to the Champion Aviation Check-A-Plug Card (AV-27). The ignition harness exhibited some damage to the outer overbraid near the magneto caps and near the spark plug leads. The starter, alternator, and vacuum pump remained attached to their mounting locations. The engine oil system was intact. The engine contained oil in the galleries and rocker box covers. The oil suction screen was removed and a liquid consistent with diesel fuel (which had been added after recovery to help stop corrosion due to the salt water), oil, and salt water drained from the oil sump. The oil suction screen contained a piece of material that was consistent with a disposable paper rag. It was lodged within the suction screen and covered about 25% of the length of the screen. The oil filter was removed and drained, and no metal was found. The oil cooler was impact-broken from its mount; however, it had not been breached and all attached hoses remained secure to the inlet and outlet ports of the oil cooler. The engine's fuel system remained intact. The fuel strainer was devoid of fuel. The carburetor was found secure on its mount. The carburetor float