ERA17LA092

The pilot’s failure to maintain airplane control after takeoff, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall.

The pilot filed an instrument flight rules flight plan and departed from the airport. After takeoff, air traffic controllers observed the airplane “barely climbing,” in a left turn, and leveling off well below the pilot’s assigned altitude of 3,000 ft mean sea level. The cloud ceiling was at 900 ft above ground level (agl) at the time, and the pilot did not enter instrument meteorological conditions after taking off. The airplane only reached about 400 ft agl before it began to descend. The airplane then struck the roof of a warehouse with its left wing, impacted terrain in a nose-low attitude while rotating to the left, and contacted the ground about 0.5 miles from the departure end of the runway. A fire then erupted. The pilot was seriously injured and the airplane was destroyed. Following the accident, the pilot stated to police officers that during his climbout, the airplane would no longer gain altitude, “wouldn’t pull up,” and began to lose altitude. He stated that he had no warning lights or audible alerts, that the engine was running normally, and that he was attempting to return to the airport. He did not provide any additional statements or other information about the flight. An annual inspection of the airplane had been completed 5 days before the accident with no unresolved discrepancies noted. Postaccident examination and testing did not reveal evidence of any preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions of the airplane or engine that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of the wreckage and security camera video revealed that the flaps were up and the landing gear had not been retracted after a positive rate of climb was established after rotation. The airplane would have had trouble accelerating with the landing gear in the down position, which may have degraded its ability to climb normally. The airplane was equipped with a stall warning horn that would sound as the airplane approached an aerodynamic stall. Review of recorded air traffic control audio transmissions from the airplane revealed the presence of the stall warning horn during the pilot’s transmissions for about 13 seconds before impact. This indicated that the pilot likely did not recognize the impending stall and did not reduce the angle of attack immediately to retain or regain control of the airplane, which allowed the airplane to approach and then exceed the critical angle of attack and resulted in the airplane entering an uncontrolled descent.

On January 21, 2017, about 1245 eastern standard time, a Hawker Beechcraft G36, N979BA, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near West Caldwell, New Jersey. The pilot was seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The airplane departed from Essex County Airport (CDW), Caldwell, New Jersey, destined for Westchester County Airport (HPN), White Plains, New York. Review of air traffic control (ATC) information from the Federal Aviation Administration revealed that at 1213, the pilot called on the clearance delivery frequency and was instructed to contact ground control. He was advised that the field was reporting instrument meteorological conditions and to file an instrument flight plan. At 1219, the pilot called for his instrument clearance to HPN; the controller advised him that the altitude filed of 1,500 ft was not good for the route of flight and destination and that the altitude was inappropriate and reserved for flight under visual weather conditions. At 1221, the pilot received an instrument clearance to HPN at an altitude of 3,000 ft. At 1227, the pilot advised that he was ready to depart. Several transmissions followed, after which the tower did not get a response from the pilot. At 1231, the pilot advised again that he was ready to depart and, at 1237, asked about the weather and whether he could depart under visual flight rules. At 1243, the departure controller issued a release for his departure and asked the tower to have the pilot climb directly to 3,000 ft. The pilot was then cleared for takeoff on runway 22 to climb to 3,000 ft. At 1244, air traffic controllers described that the airplane was “barely climbing,” in a left turn, and leveling off well below its assigned altitude. Review of ATC recorded audio transmissions from the airplane revealed the sound of a stall warning during transmissions from the pilot for about 13 seconds before impact. Air traffic controllers then observed the airplane descending and saw a smoke plume about 1 mile south of the airport. Review of radar data, security camera video, and photographs revealed that after taking off, the airplane turned left, continued climbing until it reached about 400 ft above ground level, and then began to descend. The airplane struck the roof of a warehouse with the left wing, impacted terrain in a nose-low attitude while rotating to the left, and then contacted the ground with the belly of the airplane. A fire erupted. The pilot stated to police officers after the accident that he owned the airplane and that it had just had an annual inspection. He stated that he had departed from CDW to return to HPN via a filed flight plan. He advised that during his climbout at about 800 ft, the airplane would no longer gain altitude, “wouldn’t pull up,” and began to lose altitude. He stated that he had no warning lights or audible alerts and that the engine was running normally. He attempted to abort the takeoff and return to the field and was unable to contact the tower for a mayday call before crashing. At the time of the writing of this report, the pilot had not submitted the required Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1/2, nor had he provided any other statements about the circumstances of the accident. The airplane’s most recent annual inspection was completed on January 16, 2017. At the time of the inspection, the airplane had accrued 251.9 total hours of operation. According to the maintenance repair company that performed the airplane’s annual inspection, they started the annual inspection and some avionics checks on December 13, 2016. During the inspection, they found a crack in the right flap actuator mount, which they repaired. The inspection was normal with no major findings noted, though they discovered two issues that they repaired/corrected: an ignition switch that had a hot ground in every position but off and a fuel drain on the left wing that was leaking. According to the Hawker Beechcraft Corporation G36 Pilot’s Operating Handbook, a stall warning horn located forward of the instrument panel sounds a warning signal as the airplane approaches a stall condition. The signal is triggered by a sensing vane on the leading edge of the left wing. The warning signal becomes steady as the airplane approaches a stall condition. The accident site was located about 0.5 miles from the departure end of runway 22. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the landing gear was down, the three-bladed propeller had separated from the engine during the impact sequence, and the majority of the airplane's cabin had been consumed by fire. The engine and firewall had separated from the fuselage. The empennage remained attached via the rudder cables and the elevator trim cables. Control cable continuity was established for all flight controls from the flight control surfaces to the breaks in the system and from the breaks to the forward cabin. The right flap actuator indicated the right flap was retracted. The inboard left wing had been consumed by fire. The left and right elevator control rods in the aft tail area were fractured. The right rod appeared to have been bent in half and fractured due to impact. The left rod was fractured at both ends immediately adjacent to the rod end bolt threads. The separated portion of the left elevator control rod was not bent and remained in one piece. The instrument panel was consumed by the postimpact fire, and the fuel selector valve and strainer assembly sustained thermal damage. The engine remained attached to the firewall via the engine control cables, the exhaust pipe clamps, the starter motor, the alternator wiring, and the exhaust gas temperature and cylinder head temperature wires. The engine mounts were fractured. The engine sustained impact-related damage that fractured the crankshaft aft of the propeller flange and forward of the thrust flange. The crankcase was damaged, and the propeller seal was not observed. The fuel injection lines were deformed downward around the cylinders. There was light soot over the cylinders. The cooling baffle behind the magnetos was thermally damaged. The throttle, propeller, and mixture control cables remained attached to their cockpit controls and respective levers, but the propeller control shaft was fractured from the housing. The cockpit controls were thermally damaged. Torque putty, consistent with that used at the factory, was observed on all the cylinders and the fuel injection lines. The fuel inlet fitting on the engine-driven fuel pump was fractured, and the vapor return line fitting was displaced in the housing. All three of the fuel metering unit fittings were fractured. The induction system remained mostly intact with the intake manifold on both the left and right sides sustaining puncture damage. The intake filter was separated from the throttle body, and the filter was deformed within its cowling bracket. The throttle valve was in the fully open position, and some dents were noted on the balance and intake tubes. The fuel pump remained secured to the back of the engine. The fuel inlet fitting was fractured, and the vapor return line fitting was displaced in the housing. Removal of the fuel pump from the engine revealed that its drive coupling was intact. Manual rotation of the drive coupling while inserted into the drive shaft resulted in a free rotation of the fuel pump. Disassembly of the pump revealed no preimpact anomalies. The throttle body and fuel metering unit remained secured to the bottom of the engine. The throttle and mixture control cables remained secured to the control levers. The controls were operated through their full range; no slipping was noted between the levers and the shafts, and both controls moved with no binding noted. The fuel metering unit was removed from the engine, and the mixture control shaft was bent.