ERA18FA022

The noninstrument-rated pilot's intentional visual flight rules flight into instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in a loss of control due to spatial disorientation. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's self-induced pressure to complete the flight.

The noninstrument-rated private pilot did not obtain an official weather briefing or file a flight plan before departing on the cross-country flight with three passengers. About 55 minutes into the flight, while cruising at 5,500 ft and receiving visual flight rules (VFR) flight following services from air traffic control, the pilot advised the controller that he was climbing the airplane to "maintain VFR." Six minutes later, after completing a series of erratic turns between 6,600 and 7,200 ft, the pilot advised the controller that he had encountered instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and requested vectors to an altitude with "more visibility." The controller advised that the cloud tops were reported about 8,000 ft, and the pilot stated that he would climb the airplane to that altitude; however, the airplane did not begin a climb. Instead, the airplane's radar track showed a series of shallow left and right turns before it depicted a sharp, tightening right turn and a rapid descent before radar contact was lost in the area of the accident site. Postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of fire, no pre-impact mechanical anomalies, and a distribution that was consistent with an in-flight breakup. One witness near the accident site described seeing the airplane as it appeared from beneath the clouds in a vertical descent, heard a "pop," and then watched as the airplane "just blew apart" before it disappeared from view behind trees. The witness stated that the weather at the time of the accident was "solid fog." It is likely that the pilot's decision to continue the flight into deteriorating weather conditions resulted in his loss of airplane control due to spatial disorientation. The restricted visibility and entry into IMC were conducive to the development of spatial disorientation, and the airplane's erratic flight track, which included altitude and directional changes inconsistent with progress toward the destination, the rapidly descending right turn depicted on radar, and the in-flight breakup are all consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation. Despite not being instrument rated, the pilot chose to continue along the flight route as weather conditions deteriorated, rather than diverting, consistent with a common behavioral trap known as "get-there-it is." The spouse of one passenger had planned a surprise party for the afternoon of their return. It is likely that the pilot's desire to get to the destination airport because of the party or another unknown reason contributed to this behavior.

The Office of The Chief Medical Examiner, Louisville, Kentucky, performed the autopsy on the pilot. The cause of death was listed as "blunt force injuries." The laboratory at FAA Forensic Sciences, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological testing on the pilot. The results were negative for the presence of drugs or alcohol. The 1415 weather observation at Glasgow Municipal Airport (GLW) Glasgow, Kentucky, 14 miles north of the accident site, included a broken ceiling at 500 ft above ground level (agl), an overcast ceiling at 1,300 ft agl, and 10 miles visibility. The wind was from 210° at 4 knots. The temperature and dew point were 11°C, and the altimeter setting was 30.25 inches of mercury. The 1353 weather observation at Bowling Green-Warren County Regional Airport (BWG), Bowling Green, Kentucky, included a broken ceiling at 1,200 ft agl, an overcast ceiling at 1,300 ft agl, and 9 miles visibility. The wind was from 230° at 7 knots. The temperature was 12°C, the dew point was 11°C, and the altimeter setting was 30.25 inches of mercury. The 1335 weather observation at UCY, included an overcast ceiling at 3,500 ft agl, and 10 miles visibility. The wind was from 240° at 5 knots. The temperature was 15°C, the dew point was 10°C, and the altimeter setting was 30.26 inches of mercury. Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES)-16 "visible" and infrared (imagery from 1407 revealed cloudy conditions over the accident site region. Infrared cloud-top temperatures in the area immediately surrounding the accident location varied between about 0°C and -7°C, which corresponded to cloud top heights about 8,500 ft and 15,000 ft, respectively. At 1238, an AIRMET SIERRA for IFR conditions was issued for a region that bordered the accident location and advised of ceilings below 1,000 ft, visibility below 3 statute miles, and precipitation and mist. The ceiling at the destination airport at the estimated time of arrival was 6,000 ft overcast. The pilot did not file a flight plan, and there was no record of him having obtained a weather briefing from Leidos Flight Services, Direct User Access Terminal Service, or Foreflight before departure. In an interview with police, the pilot's spouse stated that her husband "always" checked weather conditions before flight, and that the Foreflight application was "constantly" streaming to his iPad while flying. The pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. He did not possess an instrument rating. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on October 14, 2014. A review of the pilot's logbook revealed that he had logged 251 total hours of flight experience, of which 246 hours were in the accident airplane make and model. The pilot had logged 5.9 total hours of simulated (hood) instrument flight experience, of which 2 hours were in 2014, 2.1 hours in 2015, and 1.8 hours on July 8, 2017. The wreckage was examined at the accident site. There was an odor of fuel at the scene, and the majority of the airplane was accounted for except the left aileron balance weight, left tip tank, stabilator trim tab, and about 6 ft of the right wing and right aileron. Parts associated with the rudder and right wing were located about 0.75 mile northeast of the main wreckage. The wreckage displayed no evidence of an in-flight fire. The entire wreckage path was oriented about 240° magnetic, and the main wreckage path was about 100 ft long. The initial impact point was in treetops about 60 ft high, and the main wreckage came to rest wedged between tree trunks. The cockpit, cabin area, and empennage were destroyed by impact. Pieces of angularly cut wood were entangled with the wreckage. The airplane was fragmented and scattered along the length of the wreckage path. Control continuity to the wings, rudder, and elevator was confirmed through the control cables and bellcranks to the cockpit area. Separations in the control cables displayed signatures consistent with cuts by recovery personnel or overload separation. The engine was separated from the airframe and marked the end of the debris path. The propeller was separated from the engine and came to rest 25 ft northeast of the engine. The propeller blades displayed similar "S" bending, trailing-edge gouges, and chordwise scratching. The engine crankshaft was rotated by hand through the vacuum pump drive pad. Continuity was confirmed through the accessory section to the valve train and crankshaft. Compression was confirmed on all cylinders using the thumb method. The magnetos were intact in their mounts. Once removed, they produced spark at all terminal leads when tested. The vacuum pump rotated smoothly, and when disassembled, the rotor and vanes were intact. The carburetor and fuel pump were destroyed by impact. Parts associated with the left aileron balance weight, left tip tank, the stabilator trim tab, and about 6 ft of the right wing and right aileron were located by hunters months after the accident and were recovered on October 30, 2018. According to FAA and maintenance records, the airplane was manufactured in 1965 and had accrued 2,776.97 total aircraft hours. The most recent annual inspection was completed on October 10, 2017, at 2,771.94 total aircraft hours. On November 12, 2017, at 1410 central standard time, a Piper PA-32-260, N3371W, was destroyed during an in-flight breakup and collision with terrain while maneuvering near Fountain Run, Kentucky. The private pilot and three passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was owned and operated by the pilot under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the personal flight, which departed Everett-Stewart Regional Airport (UCY), Union City, Tennessee, at 1303, and was destined for Lake Cumberland Regional Airport (SME), Somerset, Kentucky. The pilot and passengers were returning from a hunting trip, and the spouse of one passenger had planned a surprise party for the afternoon of their return. Radar and voice information from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that the pilot contacted the Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and was receiving visual flight rules (VFR) flight following services. The airplane was in cruise flight travelling eastbound about 5,500 ft mean seal level (msl) for about 30 minutes before the radar track depicted a slight turn to a northeasterly heading. At 1357:44, the pilot informed the controller that he was going to climb the airplane in order to maintain VFR flight. Beginning at 1358, the radar track indicated a climb to about 6,600 ft followed by a series of left and right turns while maintaining a generally northeast track. About 1404, the radar track depicted a nearly 180° left turn, followed immediately by a 180° right turn until the airplane resumed an approximate northeast heading. The airplane's altitude varied between 6,800 and 7,200 ft during the turns. At 1406:20, the pilot stated, "we hit some uh IMC. Is there any vectoring to an altitude here with some uh more visibility?" The controller advised the pilot to standby while he communicated with other aircraft and Nashville Approach Control. He then directed the pilot to "maintain VFR," which the pilot acknowledged. At 1407:51, the controller shared a pilot report of cloud tops "around eight thousand or so". At that time, the airplane's altitude was about 7,325 ft. The pilot replied that he would climb the airplane to 8,000 ft. Over the next 30 seconds, the radar track depicted shallow left and right turns with altitudes that varied between 7,000 and 7,300 ft. Beginning at 1408:41, the airplane's track depicted a shallow right turn at 7,299 ft and 144 knots followed by a descending right turn that increased in rates of bank and descent. At 1408:58, at an altit