ERA18FA114

The pilot's decision to continue the night visual flight rules flight into instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in a loss of control due to spatial disorientation. Contributing was the pilot's lack of instrument/night currency, and his failure to request additional assistance from air traffic control.

The commercial pilot and passenger completed a cross-country flight earlier the day of the accident. Before departing on the night visual flight rules (VFR) return flight, the pilot called flight service for a weather briefing. The flight service specialist provided the pilot with information pertinent to the flight, which included a forecast for instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions for the destination airport area. The pilot stated to the specialist that he could fly IFR if he needed to; however, review of the pilot's logbooks found no entries to indicate that he met currency requirements for instrument flight or that he met night currency requirements for passenger carriage. The pilot expressed concern for cloud conditions to personnel at the airport before departing but chose to conduct the flight. As the flight neared the destination airport, the pilot, who was receiving VFR flight-following services, stated to the controller that he was unable to visually identify the destination airport. The controller subsequently suggested another airport located west of the destination. This airport was not equipped with a weather observation system, although a nearby airport was reporting VFR conditions. The pilot diverted toward the suggested airport and passed about 1 mile south of the runway but was not able to visually identify the airport, likely due to a low cloud layer. Several radio transmissions between the pilot and controller indicated that the airplane was flying in and out of instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) during this time. Shortly thereafter, the pilot was informed that his original destination was reporting IFR conditions. The pilot stated to the controller that he would attempt to fly to the destination airport by flying west to get under the clouds, then maneuvering east under the clouds toward the destination. Radar track data showed that, during the final 2 minutes of the flight, the airplane conducted two left, descending, 360° turns, starting about 2,100 ft above ground level (agl) and leveling off about 500 ft agl. The airplane continued straight and level for about 20 seconds until radar contact was lost. The wreckage was located about 0.25 mile from the last radar return. The debris path was scattered over several hundred feet of flat, open farm field, consistent with a high-speed impact in a shallow descent; the airplane's landing gear and flaps were not configured for landing. A postaccident examination of the airplane did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. Two other airports about 35 miles southwest of the accident site, which were located within the airplane's fuel endurance capability, reported VFR conditions throughout the evening. However, the pilot did not request further assistance from air traffic control in maintaining VFR or navigating to an airport with more favorable weather conditions rather than attempting to fly under the low cloud ceilings. The airplane's radar track is consistent with the pilot's stated intention to fly underneath the cloud layer and navigate to his destination airport under the clouds. While maneuvering, it is likely that the pilot experienced spatial disorientation due to the dark night instrument meteorological conditions and the lack of visual references provided by the farm fields over which he was flying. The changes in the airplane's altitude and heading depicted on radar and the distribution of the wreckage consistent with a high-speed impact are also consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation.

On March 25, 2018, about 2137 central daylight time, a Beech V35A, N7019N, was destroyed when it impacted terrain near Hydro, Oklahoma. The commercial pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was owned by the pilot who was operating it as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight, which departed from Odessa Airport-Schlemeyer Field (ODO), Odessa, Texas, about 1947, and was destined for El Reno Regional Airport (RQO), El Reno, Oklahoma. The pilot and passenger departed RQO earlier in the day and arrived at ODO about 1345. A line technician at the ODO fixed-base operator (FBO) reported that the passenger left the airport shortly after the airplane arrived and the pilot remained in the terminal. The FBO technician reported that the pilot asked that weather radar and satellite information be displayed on a large monitor throughout the afternoon, as the pilot stated to him that he was "concerned with the clouds." Review of an audio recording from Leidos Flight Service in Austin, Texas, revealed that the pilot called for a weather briefing at 1806. The pilot informed the flight service specialist that he was planning a visual flight rules (VFR) flight from ODO to RQO in about 30 minutes and it would be about a 2.5-hour flight. During the 11-minute call, the flight service specialist provided the pilot with numerous weather and flight information details. The flight service specialist informed the pilot that multiple AIRMETs affected his route of flight. The specialist stated that one AIRMET was for "IFR [instrument flight rules] right at your destination," developing between 1900-2200, "shortly after you depart Odessa." The pilot stated, "I don't see that being a problem right now, I can see things are changing out here. Things look good v-f-r at Odessa." The specialist responded, "yeah, this isn't a problem about Odessa, it's about your destination. Your first part of your route isn't the problem, it might be that last part. Can you go i-f-r if you need to?" The pilot responded, "yeah, I can if I need to." The specialist and pilot continued the briefing for another 7 minutes; an audio recording of the entire call is available in the public docket. Review of air traffic control audio provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that the pilot requested VFR flight following services upon departure from ODO, and radio communications were uneventful for about the first 1 hour 40 minutes of the flight. About 2120, the pilot checked in with the Oklahoma City Terminal Radar Approach Control Facility (OKC approach) and was provided with the current altimeter setting. About 2125, the OKC approach controller asked the pilot if he had RQO in sight. The pilot stated that he did not and informed the controller that he was trying to "get down underneath it [clouds]" and asked for the reported weather at Oklahoma City Airport (OKC). The controller informed him that OKC reported a ceiling of 1,100 ft agl, which the pilot acknowledged. About 2126, the controller informed the pilot that Hinton Municipal Airport (2O8), Hinton, Oklahoma, was to the west about 5 miles, and asked if he would like to try that airport. The pilot acknowledged the suggestion and began to navigate toward 2O8. About 2128, the controller informed the pilot that Hinton was at his 12 o'clock and 3 miles. The pilot did not respond. The controller attempted to contact the pilot two additional times, and on the third attempt, instructed the pilot to 'ident' the transponder. At 2128:56, the pilot responded, "I'm hearing you, I'm still trying to get out of these clouds here uh I'm uh headed over towards Hinton right now but I'm going to go back out to the west and see if I can get underneath [the clouds]." About 2129, the OKC controller instructed the pilot to contact the Fort Worth Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZFW center) controller and informed the pilot that he was actually in ZFW's airspace at that time. The pilot did not respond. For the next 1.5 minutes, the OKC controller attempted to contact the pilot three additional times and, on the fourth attempt, he instructed the pilot to click his microphone twice if he could hear the transmission. The pilot did not respond, and no microphone clicks were heard on the audio recording. About 2131, the pilot transmitted, "…uh I'm still uh trudging out to the west here I'm still trying to get back out of it uh could you give me the el reno [weather]." The OKC controller asked the pilot how he heard the transmission. The pilot did not respond. The ZFW controller attempted to contact the pilot, but the pilot did not respond. The OKC controller attempted to contact the pilot again, and the pilot told the controller to go ahead. The OKC controller informed the pilot that he could not tell if he could hear him or not. About 2132, the pilot responded to the OKC controller, "okay I'm I'm uh I'm trying to uh I'm still trying to get out of this I I see it's clear above I'm just going to climb back up here." Seventeen seconds later, the OKC controller informed the pilot that the weather at RQO included 7 miles of visibility with an 800-ft overcast ceiling. The pilot responded, "…okay that explains it alright very good." The OKC controller told the pilot to contact ZFW center and advised him that ZFW center had radar contact on the airplane and that they would work with him. The pilot acknowledged. About 2133, the pilot transmitted on the OKC approach frequency, "…Fort Worth center … we're uh back v f r on top again." The OKC controller advised the pilot that he was still transmitting on OKC approach control frequency. The pilot acknowledged and switched to the ZFW center frequency. At 2133:19, the pilot contacted the ZFW controller and reported that he was at 3,500 ft. The ZFW controller asked the pilot his intentions, to which the pilot responded, "okay my intentions are now that I've got myself out of the clouds, I'm back up on top here I'm going to try to go out to the west and get and slide in underneath it." The controller asked where he was flying to the west and where the pilot wanted to get back to. The pilot responded, "okay I'll try and go out towards Hinton Oklahoma and uh I'll try and get on the outskirts of this overcast and try to go underneath it to go to uh el reno." The controller acknowledged the transmission. About 2138, the ZFW controller informed the pilot that radar contact was lost and asked the pilot to say his altitude. The pilot did not respond. The controller attempted to contact the pilot three additional times, but there were no further communications received from the pilot. Review of radar data provided by the FAA revealed that the airplane was established on a northeasterly course toward RQO when, about 2125 and 8 miles from the airport, the airplane turned north, then west toward the town of Hinton, Oklahoma. The airplane continued flying west, passing Hinton Airport (2O8) about 1 mile south at 2,700 ft mean sea level (msl), and then flew southwest. At 2134, the airplane was about 7 miles south of Hydro, Oklahoma, flying southwest at 3,850 ft msl. Figure 1 shows the airplane's flight path and change of course. Figure 1: Overview of Radar Flight Path The radar track showed the airplane subsequently enter two left, descending, 360° spiral turns, leveling off about 2,200 ft msl. The airplane then flew north for about 20 seconds; the last radar target, at 2137, showed the airplane flying at 2,125 ft msl on a heading of 033° at 157 knots groundspeed. The final radar target was about 1/4 mile southwest of the accident site. Figure 2 depicts the spiral flight path. Figure 2: Closer View of Final Few Minutes of Radar Flight Path A witness, who was traveling southbound in his car on a road about 1/2 mile west