ERA19FA188

The pilot’s failure to navigate around hazardous weather, resulting in the penetration of a thunderstorm, a loss of airplane control, and an inflight breakup. The air traffic controller’s failure to provide the pilot with adequate and timely weather information as required by FAA Order JO 7110.65X contributed to the pilot’s inability to safely navigate the hazardous weather along his route of flight.

The pilot departed on the cross-country flight with the airplane about 730 lbs over its maximum gross weight. While in cruise altitude at 27,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the pilot reported to air traffic control that he observed weather on his radar along his route and ahead of his position. The areas of weather included thunderstorms with cloud tops up to 43,000 ft msl. The controller acknowledged the weather; however, she did not provide specifics to the pilot, including the size and strength of the area of precipitation or cloud tops information, nor did she solicit or disseminate any pilot reports related to the conditions, as required. The airplane entered an area of heavy to extreme precipitation, likely a thunderstorm updraft, while in instrument meteorological conditions. Tracking information indicated that the airplane climbed about 300 ft, then entered a right, descending spiral and broke up in flight at high altitude. The recovered wreckage was found scattered along a path about 2.6 miles in length. Both wings separated, and most of the empennage was not located. The airplane was likely about 148 lbs over the maximum allowable gross weight at the time of the accident. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of a preaccident malfunction or failure that would have prevented normal operation. The pilot, who owned the airplane, did not possess an instrument rating. The pilot-rated passenger in the right seat was instrument-rated but did not meet recency of experience requirements to act as pilot-in-command. Toxicology testing detected a small amount of ethanol in the pilot’s liver but not in muscle. After absorption, ethanol is uniformly distributed throughout all tissues and body fluids; therefore, the finding in one tissue but not another is most consistent with post-mortem production. Hazardous weather avoidance is ultimately the pilot’s responsibility, and, in this case, the airplane was sufficiently equipped to provide a qualified pilot with the information necessary to navigate hazardous weather; however, the controller’s failure to provide the pilot with adequate and timely weather information as required by Federal Aviation Administration Order JO 7110.65X contributed to the pilot’s inability to safely navigate the hazardous weather along his route of flight, resulting in the penetration of a thunderstorm and the resulting loss of airplane control and inflight breakup.

A frontal boundary was located from the western Atlantic Ocean across northern North Carolina and into Kentucky, with the cold front section of the frontal boundary located over the accident site. The Storm Prediction Center (SPC) issued a Convective Outlook at 1226 with areas of general thunderstorms forecast for the accident site. Satellite imagery at 1330 and 1340 indicated an extensive layer of cloud cover, cumuliform in nature, over the accident site with the cloud cover moving southwest to northeast. Approximate cloud tops over the accident site at 1330 were about 38,000 ft. Consolidated Storm Prediction for Aviation (CoSPA) images were retrieved for 1325, 1330, and 1335. The data showed areas of rain shower and thunderstorm activity over the accident site, moving southwest to northeast, about 15 knots, with cloud tops at 43,000 ft msl and Video Integrator Processor (VIP) precipitation intensity levels of 3 to 4 (moderate to heavy). The ZDC ATC’s radar display of Weather and Radar Processor (WARP) weather derived imagery, weather radar representation, settings, and aircraft movement of the accident aircraft was captured at 1323, 1325, 1327, 1329, 1331, and 1333, respectively. The ZDC radar display of WARP weather derived imagery indicated the accident aircraft was in an area of moderate precipitation at 1325. The accident airplane entered an area of heavy precipitation between 1329 and 1331 and remained in the heavy precipitation through the accident time. A playback of En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) data was performed, and screen captures at 1324 and 1331 were examined. About the time the pilot accepted the last clearance from the controller (to proceed direct FKN), the airplane flew directly into areas of heavy to extreme precipitation. At 1331, the airplane was depicted inside the same area of heavy to extreme precipitation. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Order JO 7110.65X, Air Traffic Control, includes air traffic control procedures and phraseology pertaining to weather for use by personnel providing air traffic control services. Chapter 2, General Control, requires controllers to solicit and disseminate pilot reports (PIREPS) when requested, deemed necessary, or if thunderstorm activity exists or is forecast in their area of responsibility. Chapter 2 also requires controllers to issue pertinent information regarding observed and/or reported weather areas to potentially affected aircraft. This information includes azimuth, size of the weather area, and precipitation intensity. The CoSPA, WARP, and ERAM products listed above, as well as other weather sources, were available to the controller before the accident. A review of recorded communications and interviews with ATC personnel revealed no evidence that the controller issued details of displayed weather to the accident pilot or to any other aircraft within her airspace. Also, the controller did not solicit or disseminate PIREPS regarding the thunderstorm activity or cloud tops. The pilot, seated in the left cockpit seat, was also the registered owner of the airplane. He held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating; however, he did not possess an instrument rating. His most recent flight review was completed on October 3, 2017. He filed a flight plan using ForeFlight Mobile and listed himself as the pilot-in-command. The pilot-rated passenger, seated in the right cockpit seat, held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land and instrument ratings. His most recent flight review was completed on April 14, 2017. He had not logged the instrument approaches and tasks required by 14 CFR 61.57 (c) to act as pilot-in-command, nor had he accomplished a flight review required by 14 CFR 61.56 (c) to act as pilot-in-command. The low-wing, retractable tricycle gear-equipped airplane was manufactured in 2007. In 2017, the original reciprocating engine was removed, and a Pratt and Whitney Canada PT6A-35 turboprop engine was installed per a JetProp LLC supplemental type certificate. The contents of the fuselage were weighed at the accident site. These weights, as well as passenger weights provided by family members, were used to calculate the airplane’s weight at takeoff from APF and at the time of the accident, based on expected fuel consumption. In additional to the four adults on board, the airplane contained passenger luggage, personal items, and family pets. The maximum allowable gross takeoff weight for the airplane was 4,340 lbs. According to personnel at APF, all fuel tanks were filled to capacity before departure. The remaining useful load under these conditions was 128 lbs. The estimated takeoff weight at APF was 5,070 lbs, and the aircraft weight at the time of the accident was about 4,488 lbs. The airplane was equipped with a factory-installed, wing-mounted weather radar pod. The airplane was also capable of receiving XM Satellite Weather information with a subscription. It was not determined if the pilot was utilizing XM Satellite Weather information during the accident flight. According to the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, Raleigh, North Carolina, autopsy report, the cause of death of the private pilot was blunt force injuries due to the airplane crash and the manner of death was accident. The examination was limited by extensive injuries; no natural disease was identified by the medical examiner. Toxicology testing performed by the FAA Forensic Sciences laboratory detected ethanol in the private pilot’s liver tissue at 0.020 grams per hectogram (gm/hg); no ethanol was detected in muscle tissue. No other tested for drugs were detected in muscle tissue. According to the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, Raleigh, North Carolina, autopsy report, the cause of death of the pilot-rated passenger was blunt force injuries due to the airplane crash and the manner of death was accident. The examination was limited by extensive injuries; no contributory natural disease was identified by the medical examiner. Toxicology testing performed by the FAA Forensic Sciences laboratory detected ethanol in the pilot-rated passenger’s muscle tissue at 0.015 gm/hg; no ethanol was detected in liver tissue. Irbesartan, a non-impairing medication used to treat high blood pressure, was detected in liver and muscle tissue. Toxicology testing detected cannabis’ inactive metabolite carboxy-delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC-COOH) in the pilot-rated passenger’s liver tissue. Ethanol Ethanol is a social drug commonly consumed by drinking beer, wine, or liquor. It acts as a central nervous system depressant; it impairs judgment, psychomotor functioning, and vigilance. Ethanol is water soluble, and after absorption it quickly and uniformly distributes throughout the body’s tissues and fluids. The distribution pattern parallels water content and blood supply of the tissue. A small amount of ethanol can be produced after death by microbial activity, usually in conjunction with other alcohols, such as propanol. Cannabis The plant Cannabis sativa contains chemicals called cannabinoids; tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) is the primary psychoactive cannabinoid compound. THC's mood-altering effects include euphoria and relaxation. In addition, cannabis causes alterations in motor behavior, time and space perception, and cognition. Significant performance impairments are usually observed for at least 1-2 hours following cannabis use, and residual effects have been reported up to 24 hours. THC is rapidly metabolized, but the rate of metabolism is not linear and depends on the means of ingestion (smoking, oil, and edibles), potency of the product, frequency of use, and user characteristics. The primary metabolite, 11-hydroxy-delta-9-THC, is equally psychoactive but is rapidly metabolized to the non-psychoactive metabolite THC-COOH. THC is fat soluble, so is stored in fatty tissu