ERA19FA248

The pilot's continuation of an unstabilized approach despite recognizing associated cues and the flight crew's decision not to initiate a go-around before touchdown, which resulted in a bounced landing, a loss of airplane control, a landing gear collapse, and a runway excursion. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to deploy the speedbrakes during the initial touchdown, which may have prevented the runway excursion, and the pilot's attempt to go around after deployment of the thrust reversers.

The pilots were conducting a visual flight rules cross-country flight with three passengers onboard. The preflight, departure, and cruise portions of the flight were uneventful. During the initial approach to the airport, the flight crew discussed having some difficulty visually acquiring the airport. They also discussed traffic in the area and were maneuvering around clouds, which may have increased the pilots' workload. As the approach continued, the airplane crossed a ridgeline at 710 ft above ground level (agl), which triggered a terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) alert. Further, the flight crew made several comments about the airplane flying too fast and allowed the airspeed to increase well above the reference speed (Vref) for the approach. At 1535:57 (about 1 minute 52 seconds before landing), the pilot pulled back the throttles to idle, where they stayed for the remainder of the approach. In an attempt to slow the airplane for landing, the pilot partially extended the speedbrakes when the airplane was below 500 ft agl, which is prohibited in the airplane flight manual (AFM). Five seconds before touchdown, the airplane's descent rate was 1,500 ft per minute (fpm), which exceeded the maximum allowed for landing per the AFM of 600 fpm. When the airplane first touched down, it was traveling about 18 knots above Vref. The pilot did not extend the speedbrakes upon touchdown, which the landing checklist required, but instead attempted to deploy the thrust reversers immediately after touchdown, which was a later item on the landing checklist. However, the thrust reversers did not unlock because the airplane bounced and was airborne again before the command could be executed, which was consistent with system design and logic: the thrust reversers will not unlock until all three landing gear are on the ground. The airplane touched down four times total; on the third touchdown (after the second bounce), when all three landing gear contacted the runway, the thrust reversers unlocked as previously commanded during the first touchdown. Although the pilot subsequently advanced the throttles to idle, which would normally stow the thrust reversers, the airplane had bounced a third time and had already become airborne again before the thrust reversers could stow. When the airplane became airborne, the system logic cut hydraulic power to the thrust reverser actuators; thus the reversers would not stow. The thrust reversers were subsequently pulled open due to the aerodynamic forces. The pilot attempted to go around by advancing the throttles when the airplane was airborne. However, the electronic engine controls prevented the increase in engine power because the thrust reversers were not stowed. When the airplane touched down the fourth and final time, the pilot attempted to land straight ahead on the runway; the airplane touched down hard and the right main landing gear then collapsed under the wing. The airplane departed the paved surface and came to rest about 600 ft beyond the runway threshold. The passengers and crew eventually evacuated the airplane through the main cabin door, and the airplane was destroyed in a postaccident fire. A postaccident examination of the airplane systems, structure, powerplants, and landing gear revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane's approach was unstabilized: its airspeed during the approach and landing well exceeded Vref and its descent rate exceeded the maximum allowed for landing just seconds before touchdown. Both the pilot and copilot commented on the airplane's high speed several times during the approach. During short final, the pilot asked the copilot if he should go around, and the copilot responded, "no." Although the copilot was the director of operations for the flight department and the direct supervisor of the pilot, the pilot stated that the copilot's position did not influence his decisions as pilot-in-command nor did it diminish his command authority. Neither the pilot nor copilot called for a go-around before landing despite awareness that the approach was unstabilized. As the airplane touched down, the pilot failed to follow the AFM guidance and used the thrust reversers before the speedbrakes. According to the airplane manufacturer's calculations, the airplane could have stopped within the length of runway available if the airplane had not bounced and the speedbrakes and wheel brakes were used at the point of the first touchdown. After the third touchdown, when the airplane became airborne again, the pilot attempted a go-around; the AFM prohibits touch-and-go landings after the thrust reversers are deployed. It is critical for pilots to know the point at which they should not attempt a go-around; a committed-to-stop (CTS) point is the point at which a go-around or rejected landing procedure will not be initiated and the only option will be bringing the aircraft to a stop. Establishing a CTS point eliminates the ambiguity for pilots making decisions during time-critical events. The FAA issued Information for Operators 17009, "Committed-to-Stop Point on Landings," to inform operators and pilots about the importance of establishing a CTS point; however, the director of operations was not aware of the concept of a CTS point during landing.

The pilot, seated in the left cockpit seat and acting as the pilot-in-command, and the copilot, seated in the right cockpit seat, both held a type rating in the accident airplane. Both the pilot and copilot completed their most recent recurrent training together at TRU Simulation, Tampa, Florida. A review of the TRU Simulation syllabus for recurrent training revealed that the thrust reverser system was covered in ground training. In postaccident interviews, both the pilot and co-pilot reported that the thrust reverser system was adequately covered in initial and recurrent training. According to the copilot, who also served as the director of operations for the airplane operator, he and the pilot were the only pilots who flew the accident airplane. Both the pilot and copilot were qualified to act as pilot-in-command. The normal procedure for the crew was to "switch seats" often, with the pilot in the left seat always acting as pilot-in-command. As the director of operations, the copilot on the accident flight was also the direct supervisor of the pilot in the left seat. The pilot reported that this relationship neither influenced his decisions as pilot-in-command nor diminished his command authority. When asked if he thought there may have been repercussions from the copilot if he had discontinued the approach, the pilot responded "absolutely not." The pilot and copilot stated in postaccident interviews that they did not think that their maneuvers around clouds and traffic and identification of landmarks near 0A9 distracted them or increased their workload. In addition, the pilot and copilot said there was no pressure from the passengers to land rather than go around, and the copilot added that the airplane left SVH on time and that there were no other time constraints. The pilot recalled hearing the TAWS excessive closure rate warning alert on short final; however, he did not think that the alert contributed to the outcome. In retrospect, he felt the initial touchdown was too hard, possibly from an inadequate landing flare between final approach and touchdown, which would have slowed the descent rate and created a softer touchdown. When the copilot was asked in postaccident interviews if he thought the approach was stabilized, he responded "no." The airplane, also known as a Citation Latitude, had a low-wing, cruciform tail design with twin, fuselage-mounted engines. It was equipped with two cockpit seats and nine passenger seats. The pilots reported that the airplane departed SVH with about 1,312 gallons of fuel on board. According to the AFM, the maximum certified landing weight was 27,575 lbs, and the crew reported that the airplane weighed 27,508 lbs at the time of the accident and required 3,000 ft of runway for landing. According to the AFM, speedbrakes must be stowed before 500 ft agl and remain stowed until landing. The maximum landing descent rate was 600 fpm. The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), a Garmin G5000 advanced integrated flight deck with flat screen displays and touch screen controls, a Textron Aircraft Recording System (AReS), and a Pratt and Whitney Canada FADEC on each engine. The CVR and G5000 memory card were removed from the airplane and sent for analysis to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Vehicle Recorder Division, Washington, DC. Textron reviewed the AReS data and provided a report to the NTSB. According to the airplane manufacturer, speedbrake extension at touchdown has a "significantly greater effect" than thrust reverser use. The manufacturer calculated the landing distance of the accident airplane model if it had been traveling at an airspeed of 126 knots at touchdown, which was 18 knots above Vref and was the speed of the accident airplane at the displaced threshold. According to the manufacturer's calculations, an airplane could have stopped within the length of runway available to the accident airplane if only speedbrakes and wheel brakes were used during the first touchdown and the airplane did not bounce. The AFM included three checklists to be completed during approach and landing: the approach checklist, the before landing checklist, and the landing checklist. The before landing checklist included lowering the landing gear, selecting full flaps, and confirming Vref; the landing checklist included extending speedbrakes at touchdown then deploying thrust reversers after nosewheel touchdown. The airplane came to rest upright but rolled toward the left about 42°; it was on a true heading of 285º and at an elevation of 1,551 ft msl. The fuselage aft of the main entry door, the right wing, the empennage, and most of the fuel system were destroyed by the postaccident fire. The left and right thrust reverser actuators, located in the engine nacelles, were found in the stowed positions. The flap handle in the cockpit and the flap actuators were found in the flaps 2 position. The speedbrake handle in the cockpit was found in the midrange position, neither stowed nor extended. Flight control cable continuity was not established on scene; however, the AReS data did not reveal any evidence of a flight control issue nor did the flight crew report one. Both engines were heavily damaged by fire and soot. Visual and borescope examinations of the engines did not reveal any evidence of preimpact mechanical anomalies or failures that would have precluded normal engine operation. The oil and fuel filters on both engines were unobstructed. Review of the AReS data revealed normal engine parameters throughout the flight and accident sequence; the engines operated as commanded by the crew. The nose landing gear and the left main landing gear were impact-separated during the collision with the creek bed and embankment and were found adjacent to the main wreckage. The right main landing gear remained attached to the right wing by the hydraulic landing gear actuator and remained under the wing during the postaccident fire. The right main landing gear trunnion pin, located on the forward side of the trunnion, remained attached to the trunnion assembly. The trunnion bearing in the wing structure was separated from the wing and was not found. The forward trunnion pin-bearing installation hole in the wing structure was elongated. The aft trunnion pin was not observed because the aft trunnion assembly sustained postaccident fire damage and was melted. The aft trunnion bearing remained in place in the aft wing spar and was unremarkable. The upper bolt used to install the right main landing gear oleo strut to the trunnion assembly was sheared (the oleo strut absorbs shock in the landing gear during landing). The inboard hole of the upper oleo and trunnion installation knuckle attachment was elongated. The threaded portion of its bolt and nut, with the cotter key installed to keep the upper oleo and trunnion connected, was found on the runway. The fracture surface of the bolt exhibited metallurgical signatures consistent with overstress; the head of the bolt was not located during the wreckage examination. The examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any preaccident anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. On August 15, 2019, about 1537 eastern daylight time, a Textron Aviation Inc. 680A, N8JR, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Elizabethton, Tennessee. The pilot and copilot were not injured and the three passengers sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 business flight. In postaccident interviews and written statements, the pilot and copilot reported that the purpose of the flight was to drop off one of the three passengers at Elizabethton Municipal Airport (0A9), Elizabethton, Tennessee, before continuing the flight to San Antonio, Texas. The flight departed Statesville Regional Airport (SVH), Statesville, North Carolina, at 1519 and climbed to 12,50