ERA20LA206

The pilot’s failure to maintain control of the airplane while maneuvering in instrument meteorological conditions, which placed the airplane in an unusual attitude from which the pilot could not recover. Contributing to the accident was the convective and turbulent weather.

Before the personal instrument flight rules flight began, the pilot obtained a preflight weather briefing that indicated that instrument meteorological conditions, convective activity, and moderate-to-severe icing conditions would be occurring along the route of flight. According to track data, while the pilot was navigating to avoid weather, the pilot was using the autopilot for maneuvering. After the pilot reported to air traffic control that the airplane would be turning direct to its destination, the performance analysis of track data showed that the airplane began a slight left turn with a bank angle of about 10°, which was consistent with the intended route of flight. However, the turn then reversed, and the airplane began banking to the right, reaching about 120° right wing down during the next 70 seconds and showing a slow oscillation in pitch attitude. Satellite imagery showed that the airplane was likely in instrument meteorological conditions when it began a rapid descent, and the airplane’s descent rate was about 7,000 feet per minute. Postaccident examination of the airplane and right engine (the left engine was not recovered) revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The dynamics of the airplane’s movements after the right turn began indicated that the airplane likely was not being actively controlled when it diverted from the intended flightpath. The circumstances of this accident were thus consistent with the pilot’s lack of timely recognition that the autopilot was disengaged. The available evidence for this accident precluded a determination of where the pilot’s attention was directed while navigating direct to the destination. However, the turbulence would have increased the pilot’s workload, and the restricted visibility conditions would have prevented the pilot’s use of outside cues to detect deviations in the airplane’s attitude. Also, the initial roll rates might not have been sufficient to provide reliable cues to the pilot of the developing bank, and the convective conditions would likely have made it difficult for the pilot to detect and recover from the fully developed unusual attitude.

The Division of Forensic Sciences, Georgia Bureau of Investigation, performed an autopsy of the pilot and the pilot rated passenger. Their cause of death was multiple blunt force injuries.   Toxicology testing performed by the Federal Aviation Administration Forensic Sciences Laboratory identified amlodipine in the pilot’s liver and urine samples. Amlodipine is a blood pressure medication that is generally not considered impairing. The toxicology testing also identified glucose in the pilot rated passenger’s urine sample. As no blood was available for either pilot, carbon monoxide testing was not performed. The pilot obtained a preflight weather briefing using the ForeFlight application about 1300 on the day of the accident. He also filed an IFR flight plan at the same time and estimated the flight to be about 2 hours and 36 minutes at a planned cruising altitude of 18,000 ft msl and with 5 hours and 20 minutes of fuel onboard. The pilot’s preflight weather briefing included convective significant meteorological information (SIGMET) 65E and 69E, which extended over central and northern Georgia and were valid from 1255 to 1455. A convective SIGMET implies severe or extreme turbulence, severe icing, and low-level wind shear. When convective SIGMET 65 and 69E expired at 1455, the convective SIGMET 78E was issued for an area of thunderstorms with tops above 45,000 ft msl. The airplane’s route of travel and the accident site were within the affected area.   The pilot’s preflight weather briefing also included the following: airmen’s meteorological information Sierra and Tango, which were issued for IFR conditions over northern Georgia and for turbulence, respectively; the synoptic conditions with a surface analysis chart; meteorological aerodrome reports and the terminal area forecast along the route of flight; the Graphic Forecast for Aviation surface and cloud forecast for 1100 to 1700, wind forecast, and notice to air missions for the route and selected airports. The pilot also viewed static images such as the convective outlook, surface prognostic charts, and winds aloft charts. In addition, the pilot had access to real-time radar that could be overlaid on the map page (as long as the pilot had an active connection to the internet or a compatible in-flight weather receiver). The pilot did not obtain the National Weather Services’ current or forecast icing products. A review of those icing products for 1508 depicted a high probability of encountering icing conditions over the route of flight with a high probability of encountering supercooled liquid droplet conditions about the time of the accident. According to the Weather Surveillance Radar-1988 Doppler 3.12° base reflectivity and enhanced images that showed echoes of 10 to 25 decibels along the flight track between 1517 and 1520, the flight was in instrument meteorological conditions and echoes associated with supercooled liquid droplets and ice crystals, which indicated the potential for moderate-to-severe icing conditions. The high-resolution rapid refresh sounding at 1500 supported the development of general air mass-type thunderstorms with the potential for structural icing above the freezing level at 15,000 ft msl. The geostationary operational environmental satellite No. 16 infrared imagery depicted an enhanced area of clouds extending east to west across Georgia and over the accident site. The cloud tops over the accident site at 1521 were at an altitude of about 32,000 ft msl. The visible imagery depicted the main core of the cloud to the southwest, where stronger updraft and downdraft would be expected with the outflow extending over the accident site. Wreckage and Impact Information Crew Injuries: 2 Fatal Aircraft Damage: Destroyed Pilot The pilot held a private pilot certificate for single and multiengine airplanes with an instrument rating. His pilot logbook was never located. The pilot’s last third-class FAA medical certificate was issued in March 2020. At that time, he reported a total of 2,000 flight hours. It is unknown how many hours of actual instrument flight experience he had accrued or if he was current for operating in instrument meteorological conditions. The pilot completed an approved simulator training course for the Piper PA-31 airplane in April 2020. Pilot Rated Passenger The pilot rated passenger held a student pilot certificate. Remnants of the endorsements section of his pilot logbook were found in the airplane wreckage. However, the remnants were too severely burned to obtain logged flight data information. The pilot rated passenger’s last third-class FAA medical certificate was in July 2018. At that time, he reported a total of 15 flight hours. An airplane performance study was conducted using ADS-B radar data and GPS position and attitude heading reference system data downloaded from the handheld Appareo Stratus 2S device that was located in the wreckage. The study determined that the 1-hour 7-minute flight was uneventful until the last 90 seconds. The study found that, when one of the pilots reported to ATC that the airplane would be turning direct to its destination, the ADS-B data were consistent with the airplane’s autopilot being engaged at this time; specifically, the recorded altitude, groundspeed, and heading were relatively constant. After the turn, the airplane dynamics appeared consistent with an open-loop situation, that is, the pilot being hands off despite the autopilot being disengaged. Data showed the airplane banking 10° left during the next 20 seconds, which would be expected based on radio communications. After reaching 10° of left bank, the airplane began to roll back to the right as if it were returning to wings level, but the airplane instead continued to roll right to a bank angle of about 120° during the next 70 seconds with about a 1° to 2° per second roll rate. At the same time, the airplane entered a series of pitch oscillations for about 60 to 65 seconds. These large pitch and bank angles precluded the calculation of the airplane’s speed. However, the flight dynamics were similar to the airplane’s inherent phugoid and spiral modes. The last ADS-B return was recorded at 1519:07, and the last radio transmission was received 12 seconds later at 1519:19. At that time, the airplane’s descent rate was about 7,000 feet per minute according to the recovered GPS data. The airplane’s maximum operating speed at 26,000 ft msl was 182 knots. The performance study concluded that the airplane did not exceed this speed during the flight until the airplane deviated from straightand-level flight. The airplane was operating in an area of convective activity. As such, it is possible that the turbulent weather associated with the convective activity could have precipitated or contributed to the airplane dynamics recorded in the final 90 seconds of the flight. Although there was a high probability of moderate-to-severe icing conditions at the time of the accident, the performance dynamics observed in the final moments of the flight were not consistent with an ice encounter; that is, the airplane’s speed and altitude remained constant before deviating from straight-and-level flight. Each Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-135 turboprop engine was equipped with a five-bladed propeller. The airplane was certificated for operation by a single pilot and for flight into known or forecasted icing conditions. The airplane was equipped with pneumatic deice boots on the wing and tail leading surfaces. The airplane was also equipped with an autopilot but had no autothrottle capability. The main wreckage of the airplane was found inverted, and fire consumed most of the fuselage. The main wreckage consisted of the cockpit, fuselage, empennage, inboard sections of both wings, and the right engine. The propeller hub remained attached to the engine. The outboard sections of both wings