ERA23FA142

The failure of both flight crews to see and avoid each other while operating in the airport environment.

A float-equipped J3C was returning to its seaplane base for a water landing after a local flight. A PA-28 was performing power-off 180° landing maneuvers at an airport adjacent to the seaplane base. Shortly after the PA-28 pilot announced a left turn to the base leg over the airport common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF), the airplanes collided nearly head-on at 465 ft above ground level. Postaccident examination of both airplanes revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The J3C was not equipped with a radio, nor was it required to be. With no radio in the J3C, neither they nor the crew in the PA-28 would have had any attentional cueing that would have alerted them to the other airplane. Neither airplane was equipped with avionics that would allow for an in-cockpit traffic display and only the PA-28 was equipped with ADS-B out. Review of video evidence from a nearby residence revealed that, given the two flight paths and the nearly head-on impact, the front-seat pilot of the J3C and the right-seat flight instructor of the PA-28 should have been able to detect the other airplane. Both crews efforts to detect the other likely would have been made more difficult by the complex background of sky and ground. The PA-28 flight instructor’s postaccident toxicology testing results indicated that she had used the antihistamine medication cetirizine. Based on the cetirizine levels measured in cavity blood and tissue, it is possible that she may have been experiencing some associated sedation at the time of the accident. Although sedation can adversely affect vigilance, there is no clear evidence that this was a factor in the collision, which plausibly could have occurred in the absence of impairment. Ethanol was detected at a very low level in a postmortem cavity blood specimen from the PA-28 pilot receiving instruction. Ethanol was not detected in his urine. These results indicate that some or all of the detected ethanol may have been from postmortem production, and that ethanol effects did not likely contribute to the accident. The J3C was not equipped with a radio, nor was it required to be, and was therefore not self-announcing or able to receive transmissions on CTAF. With no radio in the JC3, neither they nor the crew in the PA-28 would have had any attentional cueing that would have alerted them to the other airplane. Neither airplane was equipped with avionics that would allow for an in-cockpit traffic display and only the PA-28 was equipped with ADS-B out. Had both flight crews had access to two-way radios and in-cockpit traffic displays, with ADS-B in and out, they likely would have been better able to see and avoid the impending collision.

The white-and-red-colored Piper PA-28 was a single-engine, low-wing airplane. It was equipped with a rotating beacon light, anticollision strobe lights, navigation position lights, and a landing light. The operational status of each lighting system at the time of the accident could not be determined. A review of the airworthiness file for the PA-28 revealed that the airplane received its original airworthiness certificate December 12, 1988. The record also showed that it was not equipped with an active traffic system that was interfaced to the electronic cockpit instruments, such as ADS-B in. This was confirmed during postaccident examination, which found no avionics compatible with an in-cockpit traffic display. The airplane was equipped with ADS-B out and a two-way communications radio. The yellow-colored Piper J3C was a single-engine, high-wing airplane. A review of the airworthiness file for the J3C revealed that the airplane received its original airworthiness certificate July 18, 1956. Postaccident examination found the airplane was not equipped with ADS-B in or out, a two-way radio, or any avionics that would support an in-cockpit traffic display, nor was it required to be. The Office of the District Medical Examiner 10th Judicial Circuit of Florida ruled the cause of death for all occupants as multiple blunt force traumatic injuries and the manner of death for all occupants as accident. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Forensic Sciences Laboratory performed toxicological testing of postmortem specimens from the PA-28 flight instructor. Cetirizine was detected at 95 ng/mL in cavity blood and at 645 ng/mL in liver tissue. Cetirizine is a second-generation antihistamine medication that is available over the counter and is commonly used to treat allergy symptoms. Cetirizine often carries a warning that users may experience drowsiness and should be careful when driving a motor vehicle or operating machinery. Data on sedation and psychomotor impairment from cetirizine are mixed, with some studies finding some sedating and impairing effects. The FAA states that pilots should wait 48 hours after using cetirizine before flying, to allow time for the drug to be cleared from circulation. The FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory performed toxicological testing of postmortem specimens from the PA-28 pilot receiving instruction. Ethanol was detected at 0.011 g/dL in cavity blood and was not detected in urine. Fexofenadine and its metabolite azacyclonol were detected in cavity blood and liver tissue. Ethanol is the intoxicating alcohol in beer, wine, and liquor, and, if consumed, can impair judgment, psychomotor performance, cognition, and vigilance. FAA regulation imposes strict limits on flying after consuming ethanol, including a prohibition on piloting a civil aircraft while having a blood ethanol level of 0.04 g/dL or greater. Alcohol consumption is not the only possible source of ethanol in postmortem specimens. Ethanol may sometimes be produced by microbes in a person’s body after death, potentially elevating ethanol levels in some postmortem specimens but not others. Fexofenadine is an over-the-counter non-sedating antihistamine commonly used to relieve symptoms of seasonal and environmental allergies. Fexofenadine is not generally considered impairing. The FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory performed toxicological testing of postmortem specimens from the J3C flight instructor. No tested-for substances were detected. The FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory performed toxicological testing of postmortem specimens from the J3C pilot receiving instruction. Metoprolol was detected in heart blood and liver tissue. Pravastatin was detected in liver tissue and was not detected in heart blood. Metoprolol is a prescription medication that can be used as part of treatment for high blood pressure, certain arrhythmias, and certain types of heart failure. Pravastatin is a prescription medication commonly used to control cholesterol and reduce cardiovascular risk. Metoprolol and pravastatin are not generally considered impairing. All major portions of both airplanes, except for the right wing and aileron of the PA-28, were recovered from the lake. Examination of the Piper PA-28 revealed impact damage to the forward fuselage and wings. The cabin door was impact separated forward of its hinge attachment points. The right wing was separated from the airplane in the wing root area. A 50-inch section of the inboard portion of the right wing was recovered with a 37-inch portion of the flap attached by two hinges. A 48-inch piece of the right flap was impact separated and recovered; however, the rest of the outboard portion of the right wing was not recovered. There was significant hard body impact damage and fragmentation to the leading edge and wing structure at the outboard separation point. Examination of the J3C revealed that the fuselage and empennage remained intact; however, the inboard lower corner of the right float was crushed along a 30-inch span beginning about 28 inches aft of the bumper, with impact scars along the longitudinal axis of the float. An 87-inch span of the chine and inboard sister keelson were torn away 52 to 139 inches aft of the bumper, leaving a 6 to 8-inch opening in the float hull. The bulkheads adjacent to this missing section were impact-displaced aft. Examination of both airframes and engines revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplanes. On March 7, 2023, at 14:00 eastern standard time, a Piper J3C airplane, N10510, and a Piper PA-28-161 airplane, N9221D, collided in midair in Winter Haven, Florida. The flight instructor and pilot receiving instruction in each airplane were fatally injured. Both flights were operated as Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flights. According to the operator of the float-equipped J3C, the airplane was returning to Jack Brown’s Seaplane Base (F57), Winter Haven, Florida for a water landing after a local flight. A witness reported the J3C was on a southerly heading, had just turned to a westerly direction, and appeared lower than the PA-28 just before the collision. According to recorded CTAF radio transmissions and ADS-B data, the PA-28 departed from the airplane’s home airport, Lakeland Linder International Airport (LAL), Lakeland, Florida. The flight proceeded to Winter Haven Regional Airport (GIF), Winter Haven, Florida, where the pilot receiving instruction was performing power-off 180° landing maneuvers to runway 29. The flight school chief pilot reported that the purpose of this flight was to practice power-off 180° landing maneuvers as the pilot receiving instruction had been graded unsatisfactory in the previous flight lesson. The maneuver during which the accident occurred was the fourth such maneuver. Shortly after the PA-28 pilot announced a left turn to the base leg of the traffic pattern, the airplanes collided nearly head-on. ADS-B data revealed that the collision occurred at an altitude about 575 ft mean sea level. Surveillance video footage showed neither airplane made altitude or heading changes immediately before the collision. The right wing of the PA-28 fractured during the collision and both airplanes impacted a lake east of the approach end of runway 29 at GIF. A video study of surveillance footage that captured the accident was conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board’s Office of Research and Engineering. The study was able to estimate the location, speed, and altitude of the J3C. The study showed that the ground speed of the J3C at the time of collision was about 46 knots. The ground speed of the PA-28 at the time of collision, based on ADS-B data, was about 80 knots. Based on the altitude of the J3C 5 seconds before collision, its descent rate was 456 ft/minute and the descent rate of the PA-28 during the 5 seconds was 792