ERA23FA330

The pilot’s continued flight into a known area of adverse weather, which resulted in the penetration of a severe thunderstorm, the pilot’s loss of airplane control, and the airplane’s subsequent in-flight breakup.

The purpose of the flight was for the pilot to return to his home airport. The pilot filed an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan and was cleared to the destination airport by air traffic control (ATC). While enroute, the controller advised the pilot of weather along the route of flight, and the pilot requested deviations around the weather, which were approved. About 7 minutes before the accident, the pilot requested an instrument approach to the destination airport. The controller asked the pilot if he could proceed direct to the initial approach fix for the requested approach, and he responded that he could after he passed an area of weather to his right. About 6 minutes before the accident, the controller instructed the pilot to turn to a heading of 080° when he was able. The pilot responded to the instruction but did not begin the turn. About 4 minutes, and 7 nautical miles, before the accident, the controller advised the pilot of heavy to extreme precipitation at his 2 o’clock position and 5 miles ahead. The pilot acknowledged, stating that he was beginning the turn; the pilot turned about 20° to the right and continued on a heading of about 340°. About 30 seconds later, and 1 nautical mile before the accident, the airplane began a right tightening and descending turn consistent with a loss of airplane control until the final track data point. The final seconds of flight track data and debris distribution were consistent with an in-flight breakup of the airplane. Postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane or engine that would have precluded normal operation. All fracture surfaces and control cable fractures were consistent with overload failure. Although the approach control facility was not at its fully authorized staffing level at the time of the accident, sector staffing was in accordance with local and FAA directives and had no impact on the accident. The controller provided weather information to the pilot and suggested routing away from the depicted weather, and when the pilot did not appear to start a turn, the controller used plain language to explain the weather conditions. Had the pilot complied with the initial or secondary issuance of the turn to 080°, the airplane likely would not have entered the area of known convective activity that likely contributed to the loss of control and subsequent in-flight breakup. Information from preflight weather information providers did not show that the pilot received weather information from any of these sources before the accident flight. Had the pilot received a weather briefing, he likely would have observed that the planned route and time of flight were coincident with active convective SIGMETs and forecasted thunderstorms. The airplane was equipped with forward-facing weather radar that could be displayed on multiple instruments in the cockpit. Due to the damage the airplane sustained during the accident sequence the investigation was unable to determine whether the radar was operational or in use at the time of the accident. Had the pilot been using the onboard weather radar, he likely could have utilized it as another tool to assist in avoiding the convective activity.

The pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. He reported a total of 1,870 flight hours on his most recent application for an FAA-issued medical certificate, dated December 6, 2022. No pilot logbooks were found, and the investigation was unable to determine the pilot’s instrument currency or total amount of flight time in actual instrument meteorological conditions. The airplane was equipped with a Garmin GWX 68 radar antenna that was interfaced with a Garmin GTN 750 Xi multifunction display, and a Garmin GI 275 electronic flight instrument. The GWX 68 was installed on August 23, 2022. According to the manufacturer, the GWX 68 was a compact all-in-one antenna/receiver/transmitter that provided 4-color storm cell tracking. Due to the disposition of the wreckage and thermal damage, the investigation was not able to determine if the GWX 68 was operational or being used at the time of the accident. The airplane was also equipped with an L3 WX-500 Stormscope. According to the manufacturer, the antenna detected the electric and magnetic fields generated by intra-cloud, inter-cloud, or cloud-to-ground electrical discharges that occured within a 200 nautical mile radius of the aircraft and sent the resulting "discharge signals" to the processor. The processor digitized, analyzed, and convertd the discharge signals into range and bearing data. The processor then communicated that information to the external display as cells and strikes. Due to the disposition of the wreckage and thermal damage, the investigation was not able to determine if the WX-500 was operational or being used at the time of the accident. The Georgia Bureau of Investigation, Division of Forensic Sciences, ruled the cause of death for the pilot as “Multiple blunt force injuries” and the manner of death as “Undetermined.” The FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory performed toxicological testing of postmortem specimens from the pilot. No tested-for substances were detected. On August 10, 2023, at 1005 eastern daylight time, a Cessna P210N, N210JT, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Junction City, Georgia. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. According to the pilot’s wife, the purpose of the trip was to return from Florida to their home in Georgia. She also reported that the pilot did not have any activities scheduled for the day and had set aside the day. The pilot typically made the flight about once a month. The pilot had filed an IFR flight plan using the ForeFlight application the morning of the accident flight and received an IFR clearance to the destination by ATC. A review of ADS-B data and FAA air traffic control communications revealed that the airplane departed Sarasota/Bradenton International Airport (SRQ), Sarasota/Bradenton, Florida, at 0800 with a destination of Thomaston-Upson County Airport (OPN), Thomaston, Georgia. The flight climbed to a cruising altitude of FL200 and at 0948 an ARTCC controller advised the pilot of weather along the route of flight. At 0951 the pilot requested deviations for weather; ATC granted the request and instructed the pilot to descent to 11,000 ft. At 0954 Atlanta ARTCC contacted the Macon sector of Atlanta approach control and coordinated the accident airplane’s deviations to the left for weather. At 0958 the pilot was instructed to contact Atlanta approach, which he did, advising them, “with you descending to one one thousand.” The controller acknowledged the pilot and instructed him to descend to 8,000 ft, which the pilot acknowledged. The controller then asked the pilot at 0959 to, “advise approach request and the weather at Upson County.” The pilot responded that he would like the RNAV 30 approach with the initial approach fix of SINFO; the controller then asked if the pilot could proceed direct to SINFO. The pilot responded saying, “in about a couple of minutes I just want to get around this buildup on my right-hand side.” The controller then instructed the pilot, “when able fly heading 0-8-0 vectors for RNAV 30,” which the pilot acknowledged. At 1001 Atlanta approach called the pilot and stated, “I don’t know what you’re missing on your right but I know that the one you’re going into is the one I see and it looks pretty bad at your 2 o’clock 5 miles 20 miles in diameter heavy to extreme precipitation uh unless you plan on doing a left turn out to 0-8-0 I’d advise starting your turn at this time.” The pilot responded, “…I’ll start my turn;” this was the last transmission by the pilot. After this exchange, the pilot made a slight right turn from a heading of 322° to about 340°, which he maintained until 1004:28 when a right turn began with the airplane about 11,925 ft above ground level (agl). The right turn continued, tightened, and a rapid descent began with the last track data point at 1005:04 when the airplane was about 6,200 ft agl. The last track data point was about 1,590 ft west northwest of the accident site. The main wreckage of the airplane came to rest in a heavily wooded area at an elevation of about 575 ft mean sea level, and oriented on a heading of about 179°. There were multiple trees that exhibited impact damage from the airplane consistent with a near-vertical descent and impact. The final tree impact was co-located with the remaining tail section of the wreckage and the top of the tree was fractured about 40 ft from the base. A majority of the fuselage, including the instrument panel, was consumed by postimpact fire. The horizontal stabilizer, elevator, and elevator trim separated from the airplane in flight and were not recovered while on site. A portion of the horizontal stabilizer was found after completion of the onsite examination about 0.59 nautical miles (nm) southeast of the accident site. The vertical stabilizer and rudder were separated just above the middle rudder hinge and the separated portions were not recovered while on site. The aft spar of the vertical stabilizer and the remainder of the vertical stabilizer and rudder remained attached to the tail. A portion of the vertical stabilizer was located after completion of the onsite examination about 0.62 nm southeast of the accident site. The right wing remained attached to the fuselage and was located at the accident site with the aileron, flap, and speed brake attached. The left wing was not recovered during the onsite examination and a portion was later located about 0.58 nm southeast of the accident site with the flap and speed brake attached. All fracture surfaces were consistent with overload failure. Elevator control continuity was established from the elevator bellcrank in the tail to the control in the cockpit through cuts made to facilitate recovery. Rudder control continuity was confirmed from the rudder bellcrank to the rudder pedals in the cockpit through cuts made to facilitate recovery. Right aileron continuity was confirmed from the control surface to an overload fracture in the forward cabin door post; the cable exhibited broom straw and unraveling. The left aileron direct control cable exhibited an overload fracture and broom straw at the forward door post and was continuous into the cabin. The aileron balance cable was continuous from the right aileron bellcrank to the stop that would normally attach to the left aileron bellcrank. The engine was examined and no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures were found that would have precluded normal operation. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL At the time of the accident the Macon Sector Radar (MCN-M) position was manned by an on-the-job training instructor (OJTI) and trainee. Both the OJTI and trainee were current and proficient in accordance with the facility standards on the day of the accident. The MCN-M controller trainee had