ERA23LA161

The pilot's inadequate preflight planning, which resulted in a takeoff above the airplane’s maximum gross weight, a CG forward of the limit, and a tailwind component that prevented the airplane from climbing above trees.

The pilot reported that the airplane did not gain sufficient airspeed during the takeoff roll. He stated that, to avoid overrunning the runway onto a busy road he lifted the airplane off the runway when it reached rotation speed near the end of the runway. He was able to clear the highway, but the airplane contacted trees on the far side of the highway. The airplane descended to the ground and postimpact fire ensued. Witnesses who heard and saw the airplane taking off reported the engine sounded strong, as if it was running at full power. One witness observed the airplane pitch up into a steep nose-up attitude, climb to an estimated altitude of 100 ft, then start settling, barely clearing the streetlights along the side of a road. The airplane then began a slight roll to the left and struck trees. A large fireball erupted almost immediately upon impact with the trees. The climb and impact sequence were later verified by review of airport security camera video. The pilot contacted air traffic control (ATC) and requested to take off from a runway that was 2,700 ft in length, had an uphill gradient, and obstacles off the departure end. In addition, the pilot did not use the entire runway for the takeoff; instead, he initiated the takeoff with 2,301 ft of runway available. The requested runway also resulted in him departing with a tailwind component of about 3 knots, and an 11-knot crosswind component. The primary runway in use was 8,001 ft long and would have resulted in the airplane taking off downhill, with a headwind and no obstacles off the departure end. The runway selected by the pilot was closer to his hangar than the available longer runway. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any evidence of preimpact failure of the engine or airplane that would have precluded normal operation. As the postimpact fire consumed many of the items onboard, the investigation was unable to establish the actual weight of the items that were loaded onto the airplane. However, the weights of the recovered cargo, in addition to the weights of the occupants (the pilot, his wife, and their dog), and the fuel onboard, indicated that at a minimum the total weight was in excess of the airplane’s maximum takeoff weight by about 14 pounds and the center of gravity (CG) was outside of the forward limit of the operating envelope. Based on this information, it is most likely that the overweight condition and exceedance of the CG limitations resulted in performance degradation that prevented the pilot from gaining sufficient airspeed and altitude to clear the trees off the end of the runway. The performance degradation was compounded by the pilot’s runway selection, which resulted in a takeoff tailwind component and obstacles.

The reported weather at SGJ, at 1654 (about 10 minutes after the accident) included: wind from 140° at 13 knots, 10 miles visibility, sky clear, temperature 24° C, dew point 16° C, and an altimeter setting of 30.19 inches of mercury. According to FAA records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on October 19, 2021. On that date, he reported that he had accrued about 1,800 total flight hours. The pilot’s flight logbook was in the airplane when the fire occurred and was not recovered. The pilot estimated that he had accrued about 2,000 total flight hours at the time of the accident. Examination of the airplane revealed evidence of heavy ground impact forces and postimpact fire. The fire consumed the majority of the airplane’s roof, windscreen, windows, and interior. Fire burn-through was present on the left side of the fuselage. The left wing displayed heavy impact and fire damage. The outboard portion of the wing was separated by impact and fire damage just outboard of the landing gear well. Fire consumed several portions of the wing. The left main landing gear was found retracted. The left aileron cables remained attached to the aileron sector. The aileron control rod was pulled from the sector. The left aileron remained attached to the wing. The inboard end was burned away. The left flap control rod was fractured at the inboard hinge location. The right wing was also heavily impact- and fire-damaged. A large portion of the right flap remained attached to the wing and was deformed and burned. The right flap inboard control rod was bent. The right main landing gear was impact- and fire-damaged and was in the retracted position. The right aileron separated from the wing at the hinges and control rod. The control rod remained attached to the aileron. The aileron revealed buckling and tearing. The aileron flight control cables remained attached to the sector. One of the aileron cables displayed unraveling. The right-wing speed brake/spoiler was found retracted. The right-wing main fuel tank cap was in place. The interior of the aft fuselage was fire damaged. The right half of the horizontal stabilizer was separated from the empennage and remained partially attached to the elevator. The elevator separated from the horizontal stabilizer on the left side and revealed bending and buckling. The elevator trim control surface remained attached to the elevator and to the elevator trim control rods. The left half of the elevator did not reveal fire damage. The right half was fire damaged. The elevator trim actuator was found in the full nose down position. The elevator trim cables were overload separated. The elevator control rod was bent and jammed against the aft former by impact forces. Both elevator control cables remained attached to the quadrant. The vertical stabilizer and rudder remained intact and attached to the aft fuselage. They revealed only minor deformation and no notable fire damage. The rudder control cables remained attached to the sector. The rudder could be moved by hand when the cables were pulled from where recovery personnel had cut the aft fuselage and control cables. Control cable continuity was confirmed from the cut fuselage location to the elevator, elevator trim, and rudder. Continuity was confirmed from the location where recovery personnel had made a cut just aft of the outflow valves to the floor of the cockpit location for both the elevator and rudder. Deformation of the cockpit floor bound the elevator and rudder control cables in that location. Sound could be heard in the forward cockpit floor location when the cables were pulled by hand. No movement of the aileron cables between the wing roots and the control columns was obtained, as the aileron cables were bound by impact deformation of the fuselage structure. The left aileron cable ends at the left-wing root had been cut by recovery personnel. The right aileron cable ends at the right-wing root also revealed cuts from recovery personnel with one end displaying some unraveling consistent with overload forces. No pre-impact failures or malfunctions were discovered with the flight control system. The instrument panel was heavily fire damaged. The throttle and propeller controls were found full forward. The mixture control was found in a mid-range position. The landing gear handle was found in the retracted position. The flap handle was found in a mid-range position that appeared to be 20°. The flap position indicator appeared to be in the 20° extended position. The flap actuator was found near the flaps extended 20° position. The fuel selector handle was found in the right tank position. The induction air control was found in the primary position. The pilot stated he filled the main tanks before takeoff, providing a fuel load of 120 gallons. The fuel ignited during the impact sequence and was consumed by fire. No fuel remained in either wing. The aircraft was equipped with auxiliary fuel tanks. One auxiliary fuel tank cap, with a diameter smaller than the main tank caps, was found in the wreckage. Two fuel tank finger screens were found in a fire-separated condition. Both screens appeared free of debris. The fuel strainer and emergency fuel pump remained attached to the firewall and were both impact- and fire-damaged. The fuel strainer was removed and opened for examination. The fuel screen inside appeared clean. The emergency fuel pump was opened and revealed melted and fire-damaged internal components. The fuel selector valve was in the right tank position. Examination of the 3-bladed propeller revealed that it was heavily impact damaged. One blade was fractured about one foot from the hub, with the remaining portion attached to the hub. The other two blades were fractured and had separated from the hub. The propeller spinner revealed torsional deformation consistent with rotation at the time of impact and the propeller governor had remained attached to the engine and no damage was noted. The propeller governor control cable had remained attached to the governor control arm and the arm was positioned at the full increase rpm position. The governor oil screen was absent of debris. Examination of the engine revealed that the engine was discolored consistent with exposure to the fire. The rear-mounted engine accessories were fire damaged. The engine was partially disassembled to facilitate the examination. The engine crankshaft was rotated in both directions through about 180° of rotation by turning the propeller. Continuity of the crankshaft to the rear gears and to the valvetrain was confirmed. Motion of all pistons in their respective cylinder bores was observed. The rear-mounted accessories and the engine accessory case were removed. Heavy corrosion was observed on the rear gears. No other damage to the gears was observed. The fuel injector servo remained attached to the engine and was fire damaged. The throttle and mixture cables had been cut by recovery personnel and the positions of the throttle and mixture controls on the servo unreliable. The fuel injector servo was removed and partially disassembled. The rubber diaphragms and plastic parts in the servo exhibited thermal damage. The servo fuel inlet screen was unobstructed. The fuel flow divider remained attached to the engine. The fuel injector lines were secure. The flow divider was partially disassembled and no damage to the diaphragm or other internal components was observed. The fuel injector nozzles were unobstructed. The fuel pump remained attached to the engine and was discolored consistent with exposure to the fire. The pump was removed and the drive assembly was observed to be intact. No other damage to the pump was observed. Both magnetos remained attached to the engine and were fire damaged. Neither could be rotated to produce spark. The uppe