ERA24FA001

A partial loss of engine power for undetermined reasons. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s inadequate preflight weight and balance planning and his aggressive low altitude maneuvering, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and loss of control.

The purpose of the flight was to photograph the accident airplane while airborne for a magazine article. There were two airplanes that made up the flight. The lead airplane (a Beech A36) took off first from the departure airport’s only runway with a photographer onboard and the aft right door removed. The accident airplane took off about 700 ft behind the Beech. The owner was to fly the accident airplane during the takeoff and climb-out, and after joining up in formation the pilot-rated passenger was to take over the controls and fly the airplane during the formation photo shoot. During the taxi to the runway, the accident airplane’s engine was running when the Beech pulled up next to it. The engine then shut off. About 5 seconds later, the engine restarted. During the takeoff roll, the engine sounded to a witness as if the propeller was set for climb and not takeoff; he then heard the engine surge. During the initial climb, it sounded to the witness as if it were not running at full power. The accident airplane then made a gentle left turn while it was 300 to 400 ft above ground level (agl) to join up with the Beech. After closing to about 1,000 ft away from the Beech, the accident airplane suddenly entered a hard right turn back toward the airport. During the turn, the pilot of the Beech heard the pilot-rated passenger transmit on the common traffic advisory frequency something similar to, “we have a problem and we’re returning to the airport.” The airplane then struck an embankment in a right-wing, nose-low attitude about 440 ft from the approach end of the runway and about 250 ft left of the centerline. The pilot and pilot-rated passenger were fatally injured, and the airplane was substantially damaged. An airplane- and glider-rated pilot also observed the accident from the opposite side of the airport while pushing back a glider after landing on grass near the runway. A short while after the Beech took off, he saw the accident airplane take off, noting that it took longer (an estimated 100 additional ft) compared to the Beech. When the accident airplane was “just barely off” he saw “white smoke” briefly come out its exhaust pipes before smoke stopped being emitted. One or two seconds later, the accident airplane turned slowly to the left about 20° to 30° and was “barely going up.” It continued in this direction for about 1 mile, then turned right “to come back to the airport.” The airplane at this time was about 300 to 400 ft in altitude on a right base leg for the approach end of the runway “but was always turning right” and not on a square base leg. When the airplane’s heading was 80° to 90° off the runway heading and it was still 300 to 400 ft agl, the “nose dropped down” and the airplane continued to turn right heading for the runway threshold. The witness did not remember hearing the engine and postulated that it might be because he was too far away. The airplane then disappeared short of the runway threshold on what appeared to be the runway centerline. Both the accident pilot and pilot-rated passenger had accrued thousands of hours of flight time. However, the pilot had only about 10 hours of flight experience in the accident airplane make and model; it could not be determined if the pilot-rated passenger had any flight experience in the accident airplane make and model because no pilot logbooks were recovered or provided. Review of images captured by the photographer on board the Beech showed no evidence of any open doors, smoke, or liquids leaking from the accident airplane. The photographs also indicated that the flaps were partially extended and that, just before impact, the landing gear may have been in transit and a nose-up pitch input was being applied. A review of maintenance records did not reveal any evidence of discrepancies or abnormalities with the airplane, propeller, or engine. However, examination of the airplane, propeller, and engine did reveal some discrepancies. The hydraulic lifters had not been replaced during the last engine overhaul as required by the engine manufacturer; however, examination of the plungers per the engine manufacturer’s inspection guidelines did not reveal any anomalies or evidence of a leaking plunger in any of the lifters. Two of the hydraulic lifters exhibited a slower bleed-down rate during testing; however, this would have had little effect on valve timing at higher engine rpms. Additionally, the extension portion of the fuel reservoir drain control was found to be improperly installed, 90° forward on the arm assembly with the tang over the aft side of the arm. Despite this condition, it could still be moved slightly even though the actuating cables for both drain valves were bent due to impact damage. None of the discrepancies found were likely to have resulted in any preimpact failures or malfunctions that would have affected normal operation. Around the time of the accident, the density altitude was about 2,758 ft above mean sea level (msl). The airplane would have had a takeoff distance that was about 37% longer than normal with an approximate 28% decrease in the rate of climb. Given the conditions, the pilot could have reasonably anticipated that the airplane would have used more of the runway length during the takeoff and would have had a more sluggish climb rate than normal. Two video cameras mounted on a nearby residential building recorded the airplane just before impact as it passed --right to left--in a right-banked, descending turn. Spectrum analysis of a sound consistent with the airplane’s engine that was recorded on one of the videos was used to estimate the engine speed was 2,125 rpm (±45 rpm) during a 7-second period that ended 2 seconds before ground impact. Based on this analysis, the engine was likely operating at that time. Although a calculated weight and balance for the flight was not found, the airplane’s weight was estimated using information from the pilot’s operating handbook (POH) and balance form found in the airplane’s maintenance records. With an estimated fuel load of 40 gallons (out of a 60-gallon usable fuel capacity), plus the reported weight of the occupants, the airplane’s total weight would have been about 292 lbs below its maximum gross weight and the center of gravity (CG) would have been about 1 inch forward of the CG limit. Assuming a fuel load of 60 gallons, the airplane’s total weight would have been 172 lbs below its maximum gross weight and the CG would have been about 1.2 inches forward of the CG limit. The airplane was equipped with a portable GPS receiver that captured accident flight data. An airplane performance study using the recovered GPS data showed that after takeoff, a little more than 1,140 ft from the runway threshold, the airplane’s total energy (potential plus kinetic) reached a peak and then began to decrease, consistent with a decrease in engine power. The airplane then began to transition from rolling left to rolling right, and the lift coefficient began to increase sharply. The lift coefficient then exceeded the airplane’s expected maximum lift coefficient (which was calculated based on data from the POH), which was indicative of an aerodynamic stall. The roll angle then reached a maximum of 39°, the airspeed reached a minimum of 52 kts calibrated airspeed (KCAS), and the altitude reached a maximum of 1,929 ft msl, followed by a sharp drop at -1,300 ft/min; all of these parameters showed behavior consistent with an aerodynamic stall. Several days before the accident, the pilot asked a flight instructor if he would sit in the right seat of the accident airplane to accompany him on a practice flight to prepare for the photo flight. The flight instructor agreed, having already flown the airplane several times. The flight instructor read off the checklist for the pilot and they discussed what the pilot in command (PIC) would do in an emergency during

According to FAA records, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate, with ratings for airplane single engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane. He also possessed a type rating for the DC-3, and private pilot privileges for rotorcraft-helicopter. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on January 6, 2023. He reported on that date that he had accrued about 9,000 total flight hours. The pilot-rated passenger held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land, airplane single engine sea, airplane multiengine land, airplane multiengine sea, and instrument airplane. He also held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single and multiengine, and instrument airplane. Additionally, he possessed a type rating for the CE525 and a remote pilot certificate with a rating for small unmanned aircraft system. His most recent FAA second-class medical was issued on May 2, 2023. He reported on that date that he had accrued about 5,800 total flight hours. The pilot-rated passenger had also applied for BasicMed, with a BasicMed course date of July 20, 2023, and Comprehensive Medical Examination Checklist dated July 14, 2023. The accident airplane was equipped with a 2-blade, variable pitch, constant speed propeller. According the airplane’s maintenance records, the engine had accumulated about 76 hours of operation since major overhaul. Pilot According to the Essex County coroner’s autopsy report, the pilot’s cause of death was multiple blunt traumatic injuries and his manner of death was accident. Toxicology testing performed by the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory on the pilot’s blood, vitreous, and urine, did not identify any substances that are generally considered impairing. Pilot-Rated Passenger According to the Essex County coroner’s autopsy report, the pilot-rated passenger’s cause of death was multiple blunt traumatic injuries and his manner of death was accident. Toxicology testing performed by the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory on the pilot-rated passenger’s blood and urine detected the enlarged prostate medication tamsulosin, commonly marketed as Flomax, which is not generally considered impairing. On October 1, 2023, about 1608 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 177RG, N545PZ, owned and operated by Lake Placid Air Service, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at Lake Placid Airport (LKP), Lake Placid, New York. The pilot and pilot-rated passenger sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 aerial photography flight. The purpose of the flight was to photograph the airplane while airborne for a magazine article. According to witnesses, there were two airplanes that made up the flight. The lead airplane was a Beech A36, N4GA, which took off first from runway 32, with a photographer onboard and the aft right door removed. Then the accident airplane took off about 700 ft behind the Beech. The owner of the accident airplane was to fly it during the takeoff and climb-out, and after joining up in formation, the pilot-rated passenger was to take over the controls and fly the airplane during the formation photo shoot. During the taxi to the runway, the pilot of the Beech observed that the Cessna’s engine was running when he pulled up next to it. He then heard the engine stop and saw the propeller stop; about 5 seconds later he saw the engine restart and the propeller turn again. During the takeoff roll the engine sounded to a witness as if the propeller was set for climb and not takeoff; he then heard the engine surge. During the initial climb, it sounded to the witness as if it were not running at full power. The airplane was then observed to make a gentle left turn when it was 300 to 400 ft agl to join up with the Beech while still about 1,000 ft away from it. The accident airplane suddenly made a hard right turn in the direction of the airport. During the turn, the pilot of the Beech heard the pilot-rated passenger transmit on the common traffic advisory frequency something similar to, “we have a problem and we’re returning to the airport.” The airplane subsequently struck an embankment in a right-wing, nose-low attitude about 15 ft below the top of a plateau on airport property. The airplane then slid about 30 ft down the embankment and came to rest on the side of the slope upright, perpendicular to the embankment, with its left wing facing uphill and its right wing facing downhill. Measurements indicated that the embankment was located about 440 ft from the approach end of runway 14, about 250 ft left of centerline, and had an approximate 70° slope that led down to a ravine located off the approach end of the runway. An airplane- and glider-rated pilot also observed the accident from the opposite side of the airport while pushing back a glider after he landed on the grass near runway 32. He noticed the Beech taking off, so he stopped and watched. He said to his wife, “look there is no door because I think they will take aerial pictures.” A short while later, they saw the accident airplane also take off. That takeoff took longer (maybe 100 ft more) compared to the Beech. When the accident airplane was “just barely off” they saw “white smoke” come out from its exhaust pipes, “like: pouf…pouf…pouf…then nothing.” One or two seconds later, the airplane turned slowly to the left about 20° to 30° and was “barely going up.” It continued in this direction for about 1 mile, then turned right “to come back to the airport.” The airplane at this time was about 300 to 400 ft in altitude on a right base leg for runway 14, “but was always turning right” and not on a square base leg. When the airplane’s heading was 80° to 90° off the runway heading and the airplane was still 300-400 ft above the ground, the “nose dropped down” and the airplane continued to turn right toward the runway 14 threshold. The pilot did not remember hearing the engine and postulated that it might be because they were too far away. The airplane then disappeared short of the runway 14 threshold, on what appeared to be the runway centerline. On-Scene Wreckage Examination On scene examination of the wreckage revealed that during the impact sequence the right wing sustained upward buckling from the wingtip inboard to the aileron/flap junction. The fuselage and empennage were slightly buckled along the right side from the aft side of the cabin door to about fuselage station (FS) 225. Control cable continuity was established from the flight control surfaces to the cockpit controls. The flaps were extended approximately 10°; the speed brakes were in the stowed position and the stabilator trim was neutral. The airplane’s stall warning system sustained impact-related damage that precluded any postaccident functional testing. The fuel strainer bowl was fractured during the impact sequence and only a portion of it was observed. The fuel strainer screen was clean. The fuel selector handle operated normally in all positions and positively engaged in the detents. The position of the fuel selector valve was confirmed to be in the BOTH position by rotating the handle through all positions while defueling the airplane through the inlet line of the fuel strainer. The fuel caps were closed and secured. The position of the fuel pump switch could not be determined due to impact damage. There were no obstructions noted in the fuel or fuel vent system from the wing tanks to the inlet of the fuel strainer. First responders reported that fuel was draining from the airplane upon arrival. The nose landing gear was crushed aft consistent with impact, which separated the actuator; its position could not be determined. The landing gear was in an intermediate position. The single main landing gear actuator was observed attached to its frame. The sector gear teeth were