ERA24FA127

The pilot’s failure to ensure the proper placement of the fuel selector during the approach and landing, which resulted in fuel starvation and a subsequent total loss of engine power.

The pilot was approaching the destination airport in night visual meteorological conditions at the conclusion of a visual flight rules cross-country flight. As the pilot descended the airplane from 10,500 ft mean sea level (msl), he was communicating with the approach controller and transitioning through Class C airspace toward his destination airport, which was located in underlying Class D airspace. The approach controller handed the pilot off to the destination airport tower controller. The pilot contacted the tower controller about 8 miles north of the airport, and again about 5 miles north of the airport as instructed. The pilot was subsequently cleared to land on runway 20 with a request to confirm the airplane type; the pilot responded with the airplane type, but did not read back the landing clearance. The airplane’s flight track was aligned with the runway centerline during the 3-nautical-mile final approach, but one mile from the runway, the airplane remained at an altitude about 2,400 ft msl, and the pilot subsequently informed the tower controller that he wanted to overfly the airport at 2,500 ft msl and come back to land on runway 20. The reason the pilot did not land could not be determined, and the controller did not inquire about the reason, but instructed the pilot to contact the approach controller again. Residential video/audio cameras captured the sound of the airplane’s engine as it overflew the airport. Analysis of the audio revealed that the engine was operating at nearly full continuous power of about 2,650 rpm before the engine sound became abnormal, and the audio contained several “popping” noises before the sound of engine noise ended. When the airplane was south of the airport, the approach controller asked if the pilot still had the airport in sight. The pilot stated that his engine had “turned off,” and that he would be landing, but he did not know where. The controller declared an emergency and repeatedly cleared the pilot to land on runway 2. The pilot responded that he had the runway in sight, but was too far away to reach it. Shortly after, the airplane impacted terrain adjacent to an interstate 2 nautical miles south of the runway and a significant postimpact fire ensued. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of the fuel system revealed that the fuel selector was between the off and left main tank positions. This setting would starve the engine of fuel and was likely the result of the pilot changing the fuel selector handle in preparation for landing. The first step of the manufacturer’s approach and landing checklist was, “Fuel Selector Proper Tank.” Given the lack of other mechanical anomalies found during the examination, it is likely that the pilot moved the fuel selector at some point during the overflight and approach, but failed to fully seat the selector in position, resulting in a restricted fuel flow that was less than that needed to sustain engine power. Following the loss of engine power, the remaining altitude was insufficient to provide gliding distance to the runway.

Based on available pilot records for review, the investigation determined that the pilot had accumulated about 200 total hours of flight experience as of February 22, 2024, about 10 days before the accident flight. Of those, 43.4 hours were flown in the accident airplane make model. The pilot’s documented total night flying experience was 18.5 hours. Based on available pilot records for review, the investigation determined that the pilot had accumulated about 200 total hours of flight experience as of February 22, 2024, about 10 days before the accident flight. Of those, 43.4 hours were flown in the accident airplane make model. The pilot’s documented total night flying experience was 18.5 hours. An autopsy of the pilot was performed by the Center for Forensic Medicine, Office of the Medical Examiner, Nashville, Tennessee. The autopsy report was reviewed by the NTSB Investigator-In-Charge. According to the autopsy report, the cause of death was combined blunt force trauma and thermal injuries, and the manor of death was accident caused by airplane crash with fire. Toxicology testing performed at NMS Labs in Horsham, Pennsylvania, on behalf of the Nashville, Tennessee, Medical examiner indicated no positive findings. The FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory found no evidence of carboxyhemoglobin, ethanol, glucose, or drugs of abuse. On March 4, 2024, at 1943 central standard time, a Piper PA-32RT-300T, C-FBWH, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Nashville, Tennessee. The private pilot and four passengers sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The airplane departed under visual flight rules (VFR) from Brampton-Caledon Airport (CNC3), Brampton, Ontario, Canada, about 1222 and arrived at Erie International Airport/Tom Ridge Field (ERI) Erie, Pennsylvania, about 1 hour later. At ERI, the pilot added 11 gallons of fuel to each wing fuel tank. The pilot departed about 90 minutes later and flew to Mount Sterling/Montgomery County Airport (IOB), Mount Sterling, Kentucky, where he added a total of 52.1 gallons of fuel. The third flight leg was from IOB to John C Tune Airport (JWN), Nashville, Tennessee, about 180 miles away. ADS-B and communications data provided by the FAA indicated that the airplane departed about 1915 during dusk, proceeded on a track of about 230°, and climbed to an enroute altitude of 10,500 ft above mean sea level (msl). As the airplane transitioned into the airspace surrounding Nashville International Airport (BNA) on the way to JWN, the pilot was in communication with the Nashville Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON). The approach controller issued the altimeter setting and runway in use before terminating radar services and issuing a frequency change. The pilot contacted the tower controller and stated that he was about 8 miles north of the airport. The controller acknowledged and told the pilot to report when he was five miles north. The pilot acknowledged. After the pilot reported that he was five miles north and that he had the runway in sight, the tower controller cleared the pilot to land on runway 20 and requested the airplane type. The pilot responded “PA-32,” but did not read back the landing clearance. Starting when the airplane was about three miles from the runway, its flight track was aligned with the runway centerline; however, about one mile from the runway, the airplane remained at an altitude of 2,500 ft msl. The pilot requested to “go around and come back to two zero.” The controller replied, “sir you can overfly the field and contact Nashville departure. I have multiple inbounds behind you sir.” The pilot acknowledged and stated he would contact departure. The reason for the pilot’s continued flight at 2,500 ft and the reason for the subsequent overflight was never communicated by the pilot, nor did the controller inquire about the reason. As the pilot was overflying JWN at 2,500 ft msl, he contacted the departure controller and stated “Uhm, I’m overflying the field and 2,500 I need to come back to land.” The approach controller instructed the pilot to contact JWN tower; however, the pilot replied that he had been instructed to contact departure control. As the pilot was at 2,500 ft msl and flying on a heading of about 210° south of the approach end of runway 2, the departure controller asked the pilot if he still had JWM in sight. The pilot stated that his engine “shut down.” The controller asked again if he was trying to land at JWN. The pilot responded with, “my engine turned off, I’m at one thousand, six hundred,” followed by, “I’m going to be landing, I don’t know where.” The airplane was descending through 1,200 ft msl when the departure controller declared an emergency and repeatedly cleared the pilot to land on runway 2. The pilot indicated that he had the runway in sight, but was too far away to make it, as he was descending through 900 ft msl (about 450 ft above ground level). No further transmissions were received from the pilot. Figure 1 shows the airplane’s flight track during the final portion of the flight. Figure 1 - Profile view of final segment of accident flight track with time, altitude, ground speed, and heading information. A review of video recordings from residential surveillance and vehicle traffic cameras revealed that, before impacting the ground, the airplane was on a track of about 080° as it descended over a residential neighborhood before passing over an interstate highway, where it impacted the shoulder of the interstate before it struck an embankment and caught fire. Multiple witnesses reported that they heard the airplane as it passed overhead and that the airplane sounded like it was having engine issues, with one witness stating the engine was, “sputtering and making popping sounds.” The airplane impacted terrain at an elevation of 440 ft msl about 2 nautical miles south of the approach end of runway 2 at JWM. The wreckage path was oriented on a heading about 076° magnetic, with the nose of the airplane oriented on a 273° magnetic heading. The wreckage field extended about 75 ft with the initial impact point consisting of a 6-ft-long ground scar. The gouge contained red position light lens fragments, and the left wingtip was resting adjacent to the initial impact point. During the accident sequence, the left fuel tank was breached, and a large postimpact fire largely consumed the left wing and fuselage. All major components of the airplane were located in the immediate vicinity of the accident site. The airframe remained upright, and the engine was found inverted, impact damaged, and exposed to heat, but was relatively intact. The impact and thermal damage were limited to the accessory section on the aft part of the engine. The cockpit and cabin were destroyed by impact forces and fire, and most flight instrumentation and gauges were destroyed. The vertical speed indicator indicated -400 ft per minute and the manifold pressure/fuel flow gauge, which was thermally damaged, indicated 15 inches manifold pressure and zero gallons per hour fuel flow. The airplane was equipped with an electronic engine monitor that suffered significant thermal exposure. The unit was sent to the NTSB recorders laboratory for examination and download of the nonvolatile memory; however, the extensive nature of the fire damage rendered it inoperable and no data were recovered. The three propeller blades remained attached to the hub and engine at the propeller flange. Two of the blades exhibited little to no chordwise scraping; one of the blades displayed a slight forward bend and minor polishing. There were no leading edge gouges. The propeller spinner was crushed and lacked rotational damage signatures. The propeller governor remained attached to the engine at the mounting pad and the control linkage remained attached to